The end and aim of law by Duncan, James Lindsay
unman. of EDINBURGH. 
Thesis for Ph.D. Degree. 
"THE END AND AIM OF LAW 
by 
JAMES LINDSAY DUNCAN, M.A., LL.B. 
`ie"t,i.=.e u,.,Mw,(. z -.. '131. 
TABLE of CONTENTS. 
Pages. 
INTRODUCTION 1. 
Part Ì. THE THREE DOMINANT THEORIES AS TO WHAT 
IS THE END AND AIM OF LAW 6. 
Chap. 1. The Origin of Law 6. 
" 2. The End and Aim of Primitive Law 14. 
" 3. The Security Theory as expressed by 
Plato and St. Paul 18. 
" 4. Developments of the Security Theory 
and the Law of Nature 22. 
5. The Freedom Theory of Law 26. 
6. The Happiness Theory of Law 33. a 
Part II. LEGAL THEORIES IN ENGLAND IN THE 
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 35. 
Chap. 1. The English Theory of Kingship 35. 
" 2. The Attempted Despotism of the Tudor 
Monarchs and Bodin's Theory of 
Sovereignty 41. 
" 3. The Divine Right of Kings and the 
Absolutist Theories of Hobbes 50. 
" 4. Legal Tendencies in Great Britain 
from the end of the Civil War down 
to the Revolution 63. 
Part III. THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 AND EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY THEORIES OF LAV 69. 
Chap. 1. The Revolution and the Constitutional 
Code contained in the Bill of Rights 




4. The Age of Judicial Optimism, Black- 
stone and Paley 96. 
69. 
2. Lockets Essay on The True Original 
Extent Lind End of Civil Government.. 77. 
3. Montesquieuts Spirit of the Laws 87. 
" 5. The Social Contract Theory of 
Rousseau and the "Natural Law" 
Theory of Quesnay 104. 
ii. 
Pages. 
Part IV. NINETEENTH CENTURY THEORIES OF LAW 115. 
Chap. 1. The Opening Years of the Century 115. 
a 2. Bentham and Theories of Law Reform.. 13.°1. 
* 3. The Triumph of Individualism 135. 
4. John Stuart Mill and the Philosophy 
of Individualism 141. 
" 5. Herbert Spencer and Darwinian Pol - 
itical Theory 152. 
" 6. Legislative Tendencies of the Second 
Half of the Nineteenth Century 162. 
Part W. TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORIES OF LAW 174. 
Chap. 1. The Law of Nature with a Variable 
Content and the Legal Theories of 
M. Duguit 174. 
" 2. Pluralism and Professor Laski's 
Idealism 185. 
" 3. Modern Legislative Tendencies 196. 



























The subject which is to be discussed in this 
thesis is the End and Aim of Law. In writing it, I 
have had two purposes in view, a greater one and a lesser. 
The greater one has been to give some account of the 
juristic theories which have prevailed in this country 
during the last four hundred years and to examine the 
influence of these theories upon the trend of legislation. 
The lesser one has been an examination, in more general 
perspective and in much less detail, of theories propounded 
throughout the ages as to what is the End and Aim of Law. 
I have given precedence to the latter inquiry as the wider 
one, and as also, to some extent, embracing the former. 
It will be convenient here to indicate the scope of both 
these inquiries. 
The first has involved (after a short discussion of 
the origin of all law) a consideration of what may be called 
the three dominating theories of the End and Aim of Law. 
The three dominating theories are respectively, the Security 
Theory, the Freedom Theory, and the Happiness Theory. The 
first of them, the Security Theory, regards the preservation 
of order and security as the dominant purpose of law. It 
is, in essence, an illiberal theory. Its aims are to keep 
each man in his appointed place in society, to preserve the 
social status auo, and to stamp out lawlessness and the 
arbitrary and violent settlement of disputes. It is the 
earliest theory of law and is suited to the requirements of 
societies at an early stage in their development. All 
theories of law must, of course, take some account of order 
and security, but the peculiar characteristic of the Security 
Theory/ 
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Theory is that it goes no further. The second theory, 
the Freedom Theory, while agreeing that it is an essential 
function of law to preserve security, demands, at the same 
time, that the law will secure freedom for the individual 
to develop whatever innate capacities he may possess. It 
does not wish to see the individual suppressed and kept in 
the station into which he was born; it rather wishes to 
afford him a full opportunity for self development. This 
is the theory of classical liberalism. As long as the 
individuals activities do not have any anti - social effect, 
he is to be left free to do as he chooses. It is a theory 
which thinks preeminently in terms of "rights ", and, in the 
world of economics, it throws the field open to unrestricted 
competition. The third theory, the Happiness Theory, while 
adopting to a certain extent the cardinal aims of the first 
two theories, lays emphasis not so much upon freedom as 
upon human wants and needs. There is less talk of "rights" 
and more of "duties" -- the duties which different members 
of society owe to each other. It is the particular theory 
of law predominant at the present day. Just as the Freedom 
Theory seeks to diminish state intervention, so this theory 
seeks to extend it. Its doctrines are positive, whereas 
those of the Freedom Theory are largely negative, and, in 
the field of politics, its offshoots are socialism and pro- 
tection. My lesser task then is an examination in general 
perspective of these three theories. It will be necessary 
to treat the subject in broad outline and with an absence 
' of detail. 
My larger task, as I have said, is a discussion of 
the, 
the juristic theories which have influenced the trend 
of legislation in this country, roughly from the time of 
the Renaissance down to the present day. The Renaissance 
marks a convenient stepping off point for such a discussion. 
The ancient English theory of Kingship was based upon 
feudalism and the mutuality of obligations between over- 
lord and vassal. It had as its central idea the obliga- 
tions owed by the King to his subjects. The King was a 
constitutional monarch with definitely limited powers. 
This theory of the law received a rude check in the efforts 
of the various Tudor monarchs to aggrandize their powers 
and still more so, on the accession of the Stuarts, in the 
theory of the Divine Right of Kings. My historical 
survey opens at a moment of conflict between two wholly 
opposed sets of ideas. These were championed, on the 
one hand, by believers in despotism, represented by Bodin 
and Hobbes in the world of philosophy, and, on the other, 
by believers in natural rights and natural law. On the 
stage of history, the first cause perished in this country 
with the final expulsion of the Stuarts. Constitutional 
topics will inevitably bulk largely in this discussion, 
but I shall also endeavour to indicate the influence of 
these theories on the field of private law. I have con- 
cerned myself mainly with the effect of juridical theory 
upon the law of England. Scottish law I have not directly 
considered, but, so far as constitutional law is concerned, 
the two systems, to all intents and purposes, became merged 
on the Union of the Parliaments in 1707. Nlat I have to 
say about legislative tendencies subsequent to that date 
will/ 
will apply, in the main, to Scotland as to England. 
From the conflict between absolutism and natural 
law, I shall pass to the rationalistic theories of the 
eighteenth century. During that century reason was 
commonly regarded as the criterion of all law. As 
Nor. Allen expresses it: "Law itself becomes an emanation 
from a natural order of things, a natural rule of reason, 
and breach of the law is merely tvarying from the right 
1. 
rule of reason.'" This will lead up to the utilitarian 
doctrines of Bentham, the adoption of laissez -faire as the 
cardinal maxim of government, and the individualism of the 
nineteenth century. Finally I shall come to the social- 
istic tendencies of modern legislation and the growth of 
what may be called the "Law of Nature with a moveable 
content" theory. The name is rather clumsy, but it 
serves to denote an important distinction between new 
and old theories of the Law of Nature. The Law of 
Nature is rather a shadowy conception, which proclaims 
the validity of certain moral principles and of in- 
violable human rights which ought to be respected in 
all systems of law. The Law of Nature in its older 
guise tended to dwell on such things as rights of freedom 
and rights of private property. These ideals have to a 
certain extent been jettisoned today. None the less the 
validity of certain ethical principles which ought to 
underlie all legal codes is recognized, only there is 
the important addition that these ethical principles 
are/ 
1. Allen. Law in the Faking (Clarendon Press 1922), 
.page 13. 
are not fixed but vary considerably at different times 
and in different places. l shall also have to ask in 
what direction legal development is proceeding at the 
present moment, and how far the goal which is sought is 
a desirable one. 
That, then, is a brief survey of the task before 
me. It will largely be one of exposition of the differ- 
ent theories, to which Z have referred, and of indicating 
what the historical repercussions of these theories have 
been. To some extent I shall criticise them in the 
light of modern knowledge and of opinions upon law held 
today. fitly main task as critic will come towards the 
conclusion of this thesis in the examination of the 
legislative tendencies of today. On subjects that 
are controversial it is difficult not to be controversial, 
but it is probably only towards the conclusion that I shall 
be entrenching on subjects which are keenly debated by 
political partisans. That may serve to provide some 
refreshment at the end of the possibly somewhat dry 
road which first falls to be traversed:. 
Fart Ì. 
THE TIME DOMINANT THFARIES AS TO IGHAT 
IS THE END AND AIM OF LAW. 
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Chapter 1. 
The Origin of Law. 
Before attempting any explanation of what the 
earliest aim of law is, it will make things clearer to 
indicate what the origin of all law has been. Of all 
animals man is the least self sufficient, and, if I say 
civilised man, the truth of the remark is still more 
Obvious. If we go far enough back in the history of 
mankind, if we go back to the time when man first emerged 
on the globe as something distinct from an anthropoid 
ape, then men no doubt lived alone and fended for himself 
alone. But, if we pass over the aeons during which this 
state of things prevailed, and come to man living in 
society, we find that the creation of society robs him 
of his self sufficiency. Even in the most primitive 
societies there was doubtless some form of division of 
labour by which one man pursued one occupation and another 
man another. As societies grew larger this division of 
labour became more and more pronounced so that men spec - 
ialized and became skilled in particular employments. In 
modern civilized society this is of course more than ever 
the case. Modern history has produced few Alexander 
Selkirks. We are all dependent upon each other and it 
would be impossible for any of us to live in isolation. 
This is true apart from the social intercourse which is 
necessary for our welfare. Few of us, are suited for the 
life which would be thrust on us if we were stranded in 
complete/ 
complete solitude on a desert island, and, it is generally 
true, that every man is dependent upon his fellow creatures 
in a way in which no other animal is. It was the forma- 
tion of society which originally produced merits lack of 
self sufficiency. But in turn it is this lack of self 
sufficiency which new makes the existence of society 
necessary for the existence of man. Now society cannot 
exist without the observance of certain rules of conduct 
on the part of its members. The price which man pays 
for living in society is that he is obliged to sacrifice 
a very considerable portion of his native independence 
and the element of law is thrust upon him whether he 
wishes it or not. 
A very clear picture of legal origins is given by 
Sir H. S. Maine in his well known treatise on Ancient Law. 
The subject is of course a part of the wider subject of 
early social relations and customs generally. It is 
perhaps unnecessary to mention that all theories of an 
original Social Contract have long since been rejected 
by scientific investigation. The theory of the Social 
Contract was that men at different times and at different 
places found that living apart in isolation was inconvenient 
and burdensome. Their only relations were hostile, and 
life tended to become short and precarious. The realiza- 
tion of this impelled them to form a contract under which 
they agreed to live in society on a basis of mutual 
dependence and under some system of law. To this Social 
Contract all law owes its origin. Such a theory is of 
course quite unhistoric and there has never been any 
Social/ 
Social Contract of this nature. It was a theory 
promulgated by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau among other 
writers as a basis for their speculations. The theory 
attained considerable importance in the world of politics, 
being used to justify political absolutism,on the one 
handland "Law of Nature" theories on the other. It is 
necessary, however, that we should look elsewhere for the 
origin of law. 
Study of the subject is handicapped in large 
measure by lack of knowledge. There is no society which 
we can trace back beyond a certain point. All societies, 
even the most primitive, which are at present in existence, 
have attained to a certain level of development, and the 
earliest records of all societies also of course only go 
back to a certain point. Beyond that point there is 
darkness and the field is open only to conjecture. The 
key to the earliest form of society is supplied in Mainels 
1. 
opinion by certain lines from the Odyssey of Homer: 
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"They have neither assemblies for consultation nor laws, 
but every one exercises jurisdiction over his wives and 
his children, and they pay no regard to one another." 
Maine goes on to say "These lines are applied to the 
Cyclops, and it may not perhaps be an altogether fanciful 
idea when I suggest that the Cyclops is Homer's type of 
ano 
1. Maine. ancient Law (fifteenth edition published by 
John Murray, Publisher, London 1894). Page 124. 
an alien and less advanced civilization; for the almost 
physical loathing which a primitive community feels for 
men of widely different manners from its own usually 
expresses itself by describing them as monsters, such as 
giants, or even (which is almost always the case in 
1 
Oriental mythology) as demons." Accordingly the earliest 
type of society would appear on Mainets thesis to consist 
of these small isolated groups. Each family lives by 
itself holding no communication with. other families. This 
represents the earliest picture which we have of the human 
race and it may be said with considerable force of reason 
to depict one stage in the history of all human development. 
The earliest picture which. we can envisage of the 
human race is the one which I have just described of 
separate families living in isolation. The next step 
forward is when the family extends into a group. The 
process by which this is achieved would appear to operate 
thus. At the earliest stage of all, the different male 
children on the father's death separated and formed families 
of their own. Later, however, no such separation took 
place. The different families continued to live together 
and the group would constantly be enlarged as the different 
generations multiplied. All early states had as their 
foundation the idea of descent from a common ancestor. 
The conception of a state being formed out of people 
happening to live on the same territory, that is a state 
based on the local contiguity of its inhabitants, comes 
very much later. To a certain extent, of course,the 
theory/ 
1. Page 125. 
-1C - 
theory of descent from a common ancestor is fictitious. 
In course of time strangers would become incorporated in 
the group. This often gave rise to a considerable mount 
of bitterness. An aristocracy composed of members of 
the original stock and boasting pure blood tended to arise, 
while,at the same time,there was another group, composed 
of members not of the original stock. The most famous 
historical illustration of this conflict is the bitter 
quarrel between Patricians and Plebeians which distracted 
the early history of Rome. That this is a true explana- 
tion of the formation of states is illustrated by the 
ascending series of groups which composed the Roman state. 
The Family, House and Tribe of Rome may be taken as typical 
of early state formation. 
The formation of the state must, I think, be taken 
as a condition precedent of the existence of law. The 
two conceptions of "state" and "law" arise together. When 
I use the term "state ", I mean something of a very rudi- 
mentary order. I conceive a state as existing when there 
are a number of families living together owning allegiance 
to a common head. My remark that the formation of the 
state must be taken as a condition precedent of the 
existence of law does not imply any acceptance of what 
is known as the Imperative or Austinian Theory of Law. 
The Imperative Theory of Law briefly is that law consists 
entirely in the commands addressed by a political superior 
to a political inferior. Law is regarded as consisting 
solely of the decrees of a sovereign power. Obviously, 
there/ 
there must, according to this theory, be a state and a 
sovereign before law.can exist. The Austinian Theory 
of Law has not, however, survived the damaging criticisms 
to which it has been exposed. The works of Sir H. S. 
Maine have amply demonstrated that the theory is quite 
unhistoric. Law comes not from without society; it is 
not something imposed on society from above. Law comes 
rather from within society; it is a product of social 
forces. Its ultimate origin is the mass of customs which 
society does in fact observe. Nevertheless, I still 
adhere to what I have said that the existence of some form 
of rudimentary state is a condition precedent of law. 
Doubtless certain rules of life and conduct are observed 
even by isolated families, such as the Cyclops of Homer 
typified. But, so also, certain rules of life and con- 
duct are observed by all animals. It is not a law in our 
sense that the cuckoo shall allow another bird to hatch 
its eggs for it. Nor is it a "law" that the male and 
female of the human species shall resolve to give birth 
to children. These things are the products of more or 
less automatically functioning instincts even in creatures 
the 
endowed with /intelligence of the "isolated family man". 
But laws in our sense must come into existence when differ- 
ent families all resolve to live together. Certain rules 
which are very far removed from pt.mitive instincts govern 
their mutual dependence. Custom determines the way in 
which they live together, and it is these customs which 
are the parents of law. 




the contradiction is not I think a real one. The picture 
which he draws of the origin of law is that of the early 
chieftain settling disputes which have arisen among 
members of the tribe. The tribe believes that he is 
enabled to settle these disputes by some form of divine 
inspiration and his judgments when delivered give rise to 
custom and law. He gives these judgments precedence over 
custom as a source of law. He states: "However strongly 
we, with our modern associations, may be inclined to lay 
down a priori that the notion of a custom must precede 
that of a judicial sentence, and that a judgment must 
affirm a custom or punish its breach, it seems quite 
certain that the historical order of the ideas is that 
2. 
in which I have placed them." No doubt it is true that 
the judgments of these early chieftains gave rise to 
customs and that these customs were laws. But the 
grounds of the judgments must have arisen out of the 
colouring of the chieftain's mind, which colouring he 
would owe to customs already in existence. I think it 
is quite correct to say that laws are at first nothing 
more or less than customs. There may be dispute as to 
whether a custom becomes a law only when judgment has been 
pronounced upon it and it has received the stamp of the 
judge's approval, or whether the custom is already a law 
waiting to be applied when necessary and not requiring the 
stamp of any judge's approval to give it the formal validity 
of law. The latter view is I would suggest the more con- 
venient/ 
1. Page 4. 
2'. Page 5. 
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convenient, but leaving that particular question aside, it 
may be affirmed that the ultimate origin of law is custom 
and that the existence of the state is a condition pre- 
cedent of the existence of law. 
- 14 - 
Chapter 2. 
The End and Aim of Primitive Law. 
I have now brought the state and, with it, law into 
existence. What was the end and aim of early law? Its 
end and aim must I think be interpreted in the light of 
what I have called the Security Theory of Law. It will 
be remembered that when I talked before of the Security 
Theory, I said that its primary aims were to keep each 
man in his appointed place, to preserve the social status 
quo, and to stamp out arbitrary violence. Its primary 
purpose is the suppression of the individual. It is 
necessary to notice that the sphere of law is two fold. 
There is first of all obedential law, that is the law 
which the state imposes on the individual and to the re- 
quirements of which he is bound to conform. Secondly, 
there is contractual law, the law which the individual 
creates for himself. It consists of the obligations 
which he voluntarily undertakes and the state only steps 
in to see that obligations voluntarily undertaken are 
duly fulfilled. The law of contract is one of slow 
growth, and in primitive society the entire sphere of 
law is obedential. The notion of contract does not 
exist. All the activities of the individual are con- 
trolled by obedential law. The whole position is very 
clearly illustrated in Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, 
and the sketch that follows owes its source to that 
work. 
Primitive / 
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Primitive man, as I have said. , is bound down under 
an inflexible and rigid code from which it is impossible 
for him to liberate himself, not that the idea of liber- 
ating himself is likely to occur to him. The rules which 
he obeys are derived from two sources, first from the 
station into which he is born and secondly from the im- 
perative commands addressed to him by the chief of the 
household of which he is a member. The complete sup- 
pression of the individual results in this that the units 
which compose early society are not individuals but fam- 
ilies. To quote Sir H. S. Maine once again, "The points 
which lie on the surface of history are these:- The eldest 
male parent - the eldest ascendant - is absolutely supreme 
in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, 
and he is unqualified over his children and their houses 
as over his slaves; indeed, the relations of sonship and 
serfdom appear to differ in little beyond the higher cap- 
acity which the child in blood possesses of becoming one 
1. 
day the head of a family himself." Primitive man thus 
finds himself born in a position out of which he cannot 
rise. The legal system keeps him bound hand and foot. 
The supreme end and aim of law is the rigid preservation 
of this cast iron system. 
Primitive law then extends like a net embracing all 
human activities, while having for its supreme object the 
preservation of society. As society advances however the 
extreme rigidity of the earliest systems is gradually 
mitigated. The individual achieves a certain degree of 
freedom/ 
le Maine. Ancient Law. Page 123. 
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freedom. Trade and barter are, of course, the great 
liberating factors, and, while obedential law at first 
remains as rigid as ever, there is a gradual development 
towards a law of contract. This is approached naturally 
in very hesitating fashion. But, when there is some form 
of contractual law, the individual for the first time 
creates rights for himself. when he has performed his 
side of the bargain he can compel the other party to do 
likewise. For this purpose he does not require to 
resort to arbitrary violence. What he does is to call 
the machinery of the law into play and legally compel his 
debtor to perform his obligations. The hesitancy of the 
approach towards contractual law is illustrated by the 
great amount of formality which attended the completion 
of early contracts. These formalities were at first of 
equal importance with the actual agreement between the 
parties. The stipulation of early Roman law consisted 
of a series of questions and answers, and if these were 
departed from in the slightest degree the whole contract 
was vitiated.. A long period had to elapse before bare 
agreements, arrived at without any elaborate formalities, 
became legally enforcible. The main point however is 
that, in the sphere of contract, the chains which at one 
time bound the individual hand and foot began to fall off, 
while, as contracts lost their element of requisite for- 
malities, it became easier for the individual to contract, 
and, in consequence, his sphere of liberty became enlarged. 
During/ 
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During all this time the central notion of sup- 
pression still remained. The individual had still to be 
kept in his place. Obedentia.l law remained as strict as 
ever. Even when in the history of Roman Law we come to 
the beginning of the Empire, the patria potestas still 
remained a dominant feature of private law. True, the 
days had passed when a father could put his son to death 
without trial, but the son was still not allowed to 
possess property of his own beyond his earnings in certain 
restricted fields. Even although the son rose to a high 
position in the state he was not freed from this parental 
domination. In similar fashion, in the field of public 
law, the paramount authority of the state was the pre- 
dominant feature. Obedience and submission was what was 
demanded of all citizens and individual freedom was in 
every way curtailed. Always the preservation of security 
was looked upon as the primary function of law. At no 
time do any of the Roman jurists suggest that the aim of 
law should be to secure for each individual a maximum of 
freedom and a minimum of state or parental control. Nor 
do they suggest that the satisfaction of the wants of the 
citizens should be the primary end and aim of law. These 
ideas all belong to an era later than that at which we have 
so far arrived. 
Chapter 3. 
The Security Theory as expressed by Plato & St. Paul. 
I think it may be said with truth that up to the 
beginning of the modern world (treating the modern world 
as commencing with the Renaissance) the predominant idea 
as to the end and aim of law was the preservation of order. 
In times of turbulence it was necessary that this should 
be so, and, even in periods of comparative stability, the 
urge was always in the same direction. And,if this is so 
in the light of history, the predominant ideas of early 
writers upon law and legal systems are the same. Time 
will not allow a full investigation of this, but that the 
observation is justified will be seen from the works of 
three very different types of men, Plato, St. Paul, and 
Justinian. The first of these, Plato, in The Republic 
set himself the task of constructing an ideal state. The 
motive which impelled this task was the search after what 
constituted justice, and also the desire to show that the 
life of a just man was preferable to that of an unjust. 
With these theories we are not directly concerned, but it 
is of interest to observe that the leading protagonist in 
The Republic, Socrates, regarded justice as existing when 
every person in the state did his particular duty and did 
not interfere with the concerns of other people. Now the 
securing of justice may always be taken to be the desired 
aim of law, and hence the business of the law would be to 
see that every citizen did his proper business and did not 
interfere/ 
- 19 - 
interfere with other citizens. These conclusions are 
reached in Book IV. 1tiat the elements of justice are 
have long eluded those who have taken part in the con- 
versation. They now think they have discovered the 
golden secret. 
'well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: 
you remember the original principle of which we spoke at 
the foundation of the state, that every man, as we often 
insisted, should practise one thing only, that being the 
thing to which his nature was most adapted; - now justice 
is this principle or a part of it. 
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only. 
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing onefs own 
business, and not being a busybody; we said so again 
1. 
and again, and many others have said the same." 
The state which Plato constructs is very well 
designed for the application of these ideas. The main 
lines are not always clear and consistent, but, for the 
present, we may say that there are three classes in the 
state, namely the governors, the guardians and the crafts- 
men. In one passage he regards these as being men of gold, 
2.. 
silver and iron respectively. It is necessary that the 
gold shall rule and that the silver shall keep watch and 
ward over the fortunes of the city. As soon as the gold 
and silver become corrupted they are no longer fitted for 
their high purposes, and he says that the state will perish 
when iron comes to have dominion over it. This insistence 
by the most aristocratic of communists on the preservation 
of! 
1. Plato. The Republic. (Jowett's translation of the 
Dialogues of Plato. Clarendon Press Vol. II I). Page 
312. 
2. Page 293. 
of the social status quo is certainly interesting. It is 
true that the state which Plato creates would be a most 
undesirable place in which to live. It is true that in 
its mechanical perfection there is no room for the devel- 
opment of individuality. But at present that is not of 
importance. What does concern us is the insistence on 
discipline and order. These ideals which he preaches 
are more or less consonant with all early theories of 
jurisprudence. 
When we turn from a great Pagan believer in sub- 
mission to the greatest missionary of the early Christian 
Church, we find St. Paul inculcating doctrines of a very 
similar sort. St. Paul enjoins obedience not only to the 
will of God, but also to the ordinances of civil authority. 
He states that rulers are not a terror to good works but to 
the evil and the whole matter is finely summarized: "Render 
therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is 
due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to 
1. 
whom honour." As by Plato, so submission is the cardinal . 
duty enjoined by St. Paul. ' Both lay the emphasis on duties. 
It was a much later age which was to talk not about duties, 
but about rights. Lastly in this connection I come to 
Justinian's famous compilation of the law. I am not at 
present concerned with it as the crown of Romets greatest 
gift to the world - her perfectly co- ordinated legal system. 
The Institutes and The Digest are a collection of the laws 
which governed the Roman world described in the greatest 
detail. They are not primarily concerned with wide 
generalities. But what I do wish to refer to just now is 
the/ 
1. St. Paul. Epistle to the Romans, XIII, 7. 
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the famous opening sentence of The Institutes "Justice 
is the constant and perpetual wish to render every one 
1. 
his due" and the three maxims of the law which are stated 
to be "to live honestly, to hurt no one and to give every 
2. 
one his due." The language of course is different from 
that of Plato and St. Paul. The essential idea is the 
same. And that essential idea suum cuique tribuendi 
impregnates all early discussion as to the end and aim 
of law. It is the great pivot of the Security Theory. 
1. Institutes of Justinian, 1, 1, §1. 
2. Do. 1, 1, §3. 
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Chapter 4. 
Developments in the Security Theory and the Law of Nature. 
It is not of course the case that while the 
Security Theory of Law flourished the law remained un- 
progressive. Order, discipline and conformity may have 
been the watch words of the moulders of the law, but the 
evolution of Roman law from the barren crudities of the 
Twelve Tables to the finely developed system which we 
find embodied in the Digest of Justinian is from beginning 
to end a record of progress. I stated before that the 
further back we go the more sharply and crudely the im- 
plications of the Security Theory stand out. An eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth are the stern means by which 
early law secures order. The methods are ruthless and 
they are written in blood. As society advances, the 
implications are softened, but the underlying theories 
are still the same. It lies beyond my purpose to trace 
in detail the different lines along which Roman law evolved 
till it became the splendid instrument it ultimately was 
for securing justice. The Security Theory cannot however 
be seen in true perspective unless it is realized that it 
was not antithetical to progress. For that reason some 
reference to the development of Roman law is not out of 
place, and, in particular, I wish to refer to the influence 
on that development of the Law of Nature. What precisely 
is meant by the Law of Nature? To answer that question it 
is necessary to turn to the poets and philosophers of Greece. 
The/ 
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The contrast between those laws which men have 
always obeyed and those laws which were peculiar to 
particular times and places was always a favourite 
subject of discussion among the Greek poets and phil- 
osophers. The former on account of their universality 
were regarded as possessing a higher ethical validity, 
and, when they clashed with local law, they were held 
entitled to over -ride it. Such a clash between eternal 
immutable law and the arbitrary dictates of a tyrant is 
the subject of Sophocles' Antigone, and it is this eternal 
immutable law which Antigone speaks of in the well known 
lines: 
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"For these things live not for today or yesterday, but 
for ever, and no one knows whence they spring." 
The same idea occurs in the Apologia of Socrates where he 
regards himself as bound to obey the divine will rather 
than the authority of the state. This conception of law 
as something changeless and for all time is the foundation 
of the idea of the Law of Nature. How far the Law of 
Nature could actually be pleaded in a Greek court does not 
concern us, although it may be noted in passing that Aris- 
totle says that an advocate pleading a cause may appeal to 
2. 
it when he finds positive law against him. The Ati:ole 
conception of the Law of Nature forms part and parcel of 
the Stoic philosophy. It was regarded as one expression 
of their theory of reason as the guiding principle immanent 
in the Universe. 
In/ 
1. Sophocles. Antigone. lines 450 -451. 
2. Aristotle. Rhetoric, f, 10, and 13. 
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In the later development of Roman law the Law of 
Nature became a vital principle. It represented the 
goal which the law was ever striving to reach. The 
ideal came to be a law which should conform absolutely 
to the dictates of reason and it was towards the evolution 
of such a law that progress was directed. The introduc- 
tion of the conception as something practical was due in 
the first place to the existence of the dug pentium. The 
jus pentium has been distinguished from the jus naturae on 
one very important ground, namely that the former sanctioned 
1. 
the institution of slavery while the latter did not. But 
in spite of that distinction the two came ultimately to 
mean very much the same thing. The origin of the du_ 
gentium was the need for a legal system to regulate dis- 
putes between foreigners and between foreigners and citizens 
at Rome. The law which regulated the affairs of Roman . 
citizens, the jus civile,, was not applicable where foreign- 
ers were concerned, and, hence arose the need for an alter- 
native system. The pus pentium was doubtless coloured by 
the ideas of the ,ius civile, but it was a freer system in 
that it was not bound by tradition. It eminently admitted . 
of advancement along general lines of equity and reason. 
Ultimately the two systems became fused. Together, the 
two systems were able to advance towards a law based solely 
upon reason. In the early days of the Empire, the minds 
of all educated Romans became permeated with those phil- 
osophical notions of the Stoics to which I have referred. 
To the jurists of that and subsequent eras the Law of 
Nature/ 
1. Ulpian. Digest. 1, 17, 32. 
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Nature was no mere academic conception. It was the 
vital driving force in all their endeavours. What the 
Law of Nature meant to them has been very well summarized 
by Viscount Bryce in his essay on The Law of Nature. He 
says: "Speaking broadly, the Law of Nature represented 
to the Romans that which is conformable to Reason, to the 
best side of Human Nature, to an elevated morality, to 
practical good sense, to general convenience. It is 
Simple and Rational, as opposed to that which is Artificial 
and Arbitrary. It is Universal, as opposed to that which 
is Local or National. It is superior to all other law 
because it belongs to mankind as mankind, and is the 
expression of the purpose of the Deity or of the highest 
reason of men. It is therefore Natural, not so much in 
the sense of belonging to men in their primitive and un- 
cultured condition, but rather as corresponding to and 
regulating their fullest and most perfect social develop- 
ment in communities, where they have ripened through the 
1. 
teachings of Reason." 
I have dwelt so fully on the Law of Nature because 
I wished to show that during the period when the end and 
aim of law was conceived as being primarily the preserva- 
tion of order and security, the law had high ethical aims 
towards the realization of which it gradually approximated. 
It is obvious that if the primary end and aim of law is 
human freedom or human happiness, the law is definitely 
striving towards an ethical goal. When, however, its aim 
is merely the preservation of an existing state of affairs, 
this is not nearly so obvious. But the history of Roman 
Law refutes the notion that a law which simply defines 
justice as rendering to each man his due is stationary and 
incapable of progress. 




The Freedom Theorygf Law. 
It is necessary that I should now come to the 
second theory as to the end and aim of law, the theory 
which I called the Freedom Theory. that then is the 
Freedom Theory of Law? Put briefly this theory holds 
that the main end and aim of law ought to be to secure 
for each human being a maximum amount of freedom. Each 
man ought to be free to do what he chooses, provided only 
that his doing so does not interfere with a like degree 
of freedom on the part of his fellows. According to 
this theory the sphere of positive law should be as 
limited as possible. It should not extend beyond what 
is necessary to secure for each individual this maximum 
amount of freedom. On the other hand the sphere of 
contract law - that is the law which the individual makes 
for himself - should be correspondingly enlarged. Positive 
law will, of course, step in to secure that the individual 
performs these obligations which he has voluntarily under- 
taken. 
This theory marks a great advance from status to 
contract. No longer is an individual regarded as fixed 
in a certain position in the social order from which the 
law will not allow him to deviate. Instead, he is to be 
free to employ his energies in whatever direction he 
chooses. It must be noted however that these different 
theories as to the end and aim of law are not cut and dry. 
It is not to be supposed that while the Security Theory 
flourished/ 
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flourished, contracts could not be entered into or that, 
while the Freedom Theory has prevailed, no emphasis was 
placed on security. Such a conception is of course 
absurd. But at the same time, the whole spirit of the 
law, so long as these theories have prevailed, has been 
different. The sphere in which this is particularly 
marked is the sphere of legislation. When the Freedom 
Theory prevails, the whole trend of legislation will be 
in the direction of enlarging the individual's freedom. 
when the Security Theory prevails, the whole trend of 
legislation will be in the direction of preserving the 
security of the state. So, in that way, it is perfectly 
right to speak of the spirit of the law being vitally 
different under the two systems. 
The Freedom Theory really emerged at the end of the 
Middle Ages. Under the later Roman law considerable con- 
tractual freedom did no doubt exist, but with the advent of 
feudalism we have a return to a system, which is permeated 
through and through with conceptions of status rather than 
with conceptions of contract. Feudalism tended to allot 
to each individual a particular rung in the social ladder, 
a rung from which it was difficult for him to climb. The 
great sweeping change came with the Renaissance. Viewed 
politically, the Renaissance may be regarded as a great 
liberal movement. It stood for individual rights and 
liberties as against tyrannies and despotisms. In this 
country, the clash between these opposing forces came of 
course in the great Civil War. On the one hand were 
arrayed the Royalists, who were believers in political 
absolutism/ 
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absolutism, extending even to a belief in the Divine 
Right of Kings, and on the other hand the Parliamentarians, 
who were believers in political freedom. I think I have 
correctly described the spirit which impelled both parties. 
It does not follow that on the triumph of the Parliament - 
arians there ensued a more liberal regime. The Great 
Protector was hardly more tolerant than the Monarch whom 
he had displaced. The Puritan was never much of a liberal. 
It is however true that the result of the Civil War was a 
great and successful revolt against tyranny, but the final 
triumph of liberalism was not yet. The expulsion of the 
Stuarts marked a great step forward. From then onwards 
the rule of law as opposed to the arbitrary whims of des- 
potism was at least assured. The cause of freedom had so 
far been vindicated and in the century that followed there 
was no recrudescence of the former attacks on individual 
liberty. Individualism, however, had not yet become the 
gospel which it was later to be. At the same time, the 
sphere of legal freedom was continually being enlarged 
throughout the eighteenth century. Particularly is this 
observable in the field of mercantile law. Here it was 
not legislation which was enlarging the sphere of con- 
tractual freedom so much as judge made law. Under the 
enlightened administration of justice by Lord Mansfield 
great progress was made towards meeting the growing re- 
quirements of the mercantile community. 
It was in the nineteenth century that the movement 
which had its seeds sown in the Renaissance attained to 
its full growth. It was then that individualism and 
freedom/ 
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freedom became the great and all prevailing doctrine. 
I propose later on to trace the influence of various 
philosophers on this result. Meanwhile reference may 
well be made to Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations 
he stressed the advantages which would accrue when each 
individual was left free to manage his own concerns. Be, 
like all the classical economists, assumed that each man 
pursued his own economic good, and that the greatest good 
would result to the whole when everyone was allowed to do 
this unhindered. Be optimistically assumed that some 
*unseen hand" produced this beneficent result. One 
corollary of this was of course that the state stood to 
benefit most from enjoying freedom of trade, rather than 
when its traders were subjected to tariffs and restrictions. 
The whole trend of rationalistic philosophy was in favour 
of individualism. It is impossible to trace this out in 
detail but reference may be made to Nantes insistence upon 
the supreme value of the individual as a free willing 
rationalistic creature. The greatest force of all, 
however, so far as this country is concerned, was Jeremy 
Bentham. It is probably true to say that no one individual 
has left a greater impress upon legal development in this 
country than he has done. The whole of his work of re- 
forming the law was based upon the simple hypothesis that 
the end to be attained was "the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number ", and that this end was most likely to be 
attained when each individual was left as free as possible. 
The second part of the hypothesis is not a necessary logical 
consequent of the first, but it was accepted as such by 
Bentham, just as much as it had been by Adam Smith. The 
great aim which Bentham sought to attain was the rem oval 
of/ 
of all unnecessary restraints on individual liberty, and 
his life is a record of his service to this ideal. As 
examples of the restraints which he denounced, the follow- 
ing passage from his writings may be quoted. "The trade 
I was born to is overstocked: hands are wanting in another. 
If I offer to work at that other, I may be sent to goal for 
it. Why? Because I have not been working at it as an 
apprentice for seven years. What's the consequence? 
That, as there is no work for me in my original trade, I 
must either come upon the parish or starve. 
"There is no employment for me in my own parish: 
there is abundance in the next. Yet if I offer to go 
there, I am driven away. Why? Because I might become 
unable to work one of these days, and so I must not work 
while I am able. I am thrown upon one parish now, for fear 
1. 
I should fall upon another forty or fifty years hence." 
These are examples of the restraints which were 
removed in the march towards freedom of trade and freedom 
of labour. The crowning victory of the laissez faire 
movement came with the repeal of the Corn Laws. That 
represents the high water mark of the theory of law which 
treats as its supreme end and aim the removal of all un- 
necessary restraints upon the freedom of the individual. 
This theory of law was an emanation of the Industrial 
Revolution. The growth of the factory system completely 
transformed industrial conditions and the results were an 
enormous increase in the trade and material wealth of the 
country. It was seen that the best results could be 
obtained/ 
1. Jeremy Bentham. Truth Lgai.nst Ashurst Works, Vol. V. 
Page 234. 
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obtained when the activities of commerce were unimpeded. 
That there is a deplorably black side of the picture is 
of course equally true. While the wealth of the commer- 
cial sections of the community steadily increased, the 
conditions of large sections of the labouring classes 
were a terrible blot on the country's welfare. Poverty 
and slums were just as much a product of the Industrial 
Revolution as wealth and prospexy. These things were 
to lead, in turn, to a great reaction. It was to be 
found that laissez faire or unrestricted freedom instead 
of promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
too often led to the degradation of the masses. Out of 
that reaction modern socialism was born, but, for the 
greater part of the nineteenth century, most Englishmen 
were prepared to accept the fundamental canons of the 
laissez faire doctrine. These fundamental canons are 
very well described in John Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty. 
The kernel of Mill's doctrine is contained in the following 
passage, which contains much that we today may regard as 
very debateable, but which summarizes excellently the 
Freedom Theory of law. He says: The object of this 
Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled 
to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the in- 
dividual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the 
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, 
or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle 
is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number is self protection. 
That/ 
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That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his rill, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient 
warrant. The only part of the conduct of any one, for 
which he is amenable to society is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over 
1. 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." 
1. Mill. Liberty (Everyman Edition), Pages 72 -73. 
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Chapter 6. 
The Happiness Theory of Law. 
Finally there is the Happiness Theory. Little 
need be said of it, because it is the predominant theory 
of law in our own day, and it will fall to be discussed in 
full when I come to discuss present day legal tendencies. 
At present, it will be sufficient to say that laissez 
faire has not achieved what its most ardent supporters 
thought it would. Accordingly, today, the aim of law is 
rather directed towards meeting human needs rather than 
meeting the demand for freedom. The Freedom Theory 
tended to result in the exploitation of the many by the 
few. Accordingly law is directed, more and more, towards 
the enforcement of certain minimum standards of living for 
the masses, and, to secure this result, a huge new adminis- 
trative machinery bas been called into being. Compulsion 
is the new keynote. Compulsory education, compulsory 
insurance and compulsory hours of employment are all en- 
forced, and all are designed to secure the social well- 
being of the country as a whole. The same freedom of 
contract no longer exists. The machinery of statute has 
been devised to strengthen the hands of the weaker bargain- 
ing party. It is fallacious however to assume that legis- 
lation of this sort does necessarily diminish the actual 
freedom enjoyed by the worker. On the contrary, he is 
freer, because he is not subject to the same extent to 
exploitation/ 
exploitation as he was before. Today he can make a 
better bargain. It is to be noted that in all this we 
have, in a sense, a return to a law of status. have 
an enlargement of the sphere of positive law and a dimin- 
ution in the sphere of contractual law. Once again the 
state seeks to assume the role of a father towards its 
citizens who are its children. But this time the father 
thinks of something else than merely keeping his children 
in order. His great aim is the furtherance of their 
happiness and well being. The chief criticism which is 
levelled against these tendencies is that the state is 
attempting to do too much. The machinery may be becoming 
clogged and it is also, of course, enormously expensive 
to run. It is objected too that the individual's freedom 
tends to be smothered under a mass of bureaucratic. legis- 
lation. This is witnessed by the average man's dislike 
of what is popularly known as D.O.R.A. ", while he tends 
to forget the good which such legislation is designed to 
promote. It would be redundant, however, to go fully into 
these questions at the present stage as they will fall to 
be discussed towards the end of this thesis. 
This sketch of the three chief theories as to the 
end and aim of law cannot pretend to have been more than 
a sketch. The subject is vast and I have travelled as 
swiftly as possible over the juridical theories of the cen- 
turies. Now that I have mapped out the country on a large 
scale, I propose to study some of the territory more min- 
utely. It is to certain of the legal theories propounded 
in Great Britain during the last four hundred years that I 
now propose to direct my attention. 
Part II. 
LEGAL THEORIES IN ENGLAND IN THE 
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES. 
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Chapter 1. 
The English shìu. 
The predominant feature in the legal history of 
England during the sixteenth century is the clash between 
established constitutional doctrine and new Monarchie 
theories, tending in the direction of an absolutist form 
of government. The old constitutional theory had its 
roots in the feudal conception of government. This con- 
ception was entirely different from the Roman theory of 
Caesarism. According to the Roman theory of government 
the Emperor stood above the law. He was legally supreme. 
There was vested in him the power to make whatever changes 
in the law he pleased and no control of the Imperial will 
existed. Theoretically, at any rate, he owed no duties to 
his subjects. Here of course the difference between legal 
theory and actual facts requires to be noticed. Although 
from the legal point of view, the Emperor was the supreme 
magistrate and the supreme law giver in the state, it was 
impossible in the nature of things that such vast powers 
could be effectively wielded by any one man. The theory 
however, which is sometimes called the Byzantine Theory 
of Law, was as I have stated it to be. The traditional 
English conception of Kingship was quite different. 
Feudalism was based on a reciprocity of rights and duties. 
In the Feudal structure of society each vassal owed duties 
to his overlord, but the overlord owed corresponding duties 
to/ 
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to his vassal. At the apex of the Feudal structure 
stood the King. To him all his subjects owed duties of 
allegiance, but the King in turn owed definite duties to 
his subjects. He was not a Byzantine sovereign who could, 
in theory, freely disregard their wishes. The King was 
subject to the control of law. The dominance of law, or 
the Rule of Law, is expressed thus in old Norman French 
"La ley est le plus haute inheritance, que le roy ad; car 
par la ley it meme et toutes ses sujets sont rules, et si 
la ley ne fait, nul roy et nul inheritance sera." Or, 
as Bracton puts it: "Let the King attribute to the law 
what the law attributes to him namely dominant power, for 
there is no King where his will and not the law is dominant." 
Thus early then we come across the theory of balance 
of power in the Constitution. The King possesses wide 
powers, but he is not absolute. From the legal point of 
view he is not regarded as supreme, but as subject to the 
control of law. Again, it may be noted that this is the 
early legal theory of the constitution. In fact, early 
English kings often violated the spirit of the constitution. 
The controlling powers did not always function with due 
effectiveness. The Charter of Runnymede bears witness 
both to the fact that Kings did on occasion violate the 
law and also to what the law was conceived to be. It 
affirms the essential liberties of all Englishmen and 
declares that they cannot be deprived of these by any 
act of the royal prerogative. It may be noted in 
passing/ 
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passing, that it is still true, in a sense, to refer to 
Magna Charta as being existing law. It is existing law 
in this sense that the King is subject to law, that he is 
not an arbitrary despot, and that the rights of the indiv- 
idual can only be affected legally by Act of Parliament. 
It is one thing of course to affirm rights; it is 
another that these rights should be duly enforced. The 
existence of a controlling force was clearly necessary to 
impose an adequate restraint on royal power. In accord- 
ance with the English theory of government some such re- 
straint had always existed. In early days it had been a 
Royal Council, whose successor is the House of Lords. Of 
greater interest is the emergence of the House of Commons. 
Here we have the birth of that control on behalf of the 
people which is such a vital constitutional principle. The 
Constitution became stabilized in the reign of Edward I. 
From this time onwards we can trace that balance of power - 
which to some degree was present from the beginning - by 
which executive authority resides in the Government, while 
controlling and legislative authority resides in Parliament. 
The Constitution of England was definitely that of a con - 
stitutional monarchy, that is a Constitution in which the 
King rules in accordance with the law and is not above the 
law. There were five checks placed on Royal authority. 
First, the King could levy no taxes on the people without 
the consent of Parliament. Secondly, the previous assent 
and authority of Parliament was necessary for every new law 
whether of a temporary or a permanent nature. Thirdly, no 
an could be committed to prison except by a legal warrant 
specifying his offence. Fourthly, the fact of guilt or 
innocence/ 
innocence on a criminal charge was determined in a public 
court and in the county where the offence was alleged to 
have occurred, by a jury of twelve men from whose unanimous 
verdict no appeal could be made. Fifthly, the officers 
and servants of the Crown violating the personal liberty 
or other rights of the subject might be sued in an action 
for damages, to be assessed by a jury. They were not 
allowed to plead any warrant or command in their justifi- 
1. 
cation, not even the direct order of the King. From the 
time of Edward I also must be noticed a gradual growth in 
the power and authority of the central Courts, the Court 
of Kings Bench, administering the common law of the land 
and the Courts of Chancery administering an equitable 
jurisdiction. These were Courts to which the citizen 
might resort for the due enforcement of his legal rights. 
Under their influence the law of the land became unified 
and they supplied a powerful safeguard for the security of 
the rule of law. 
From the beginning of the thirteenth century we 
have a Constitution in being which is at least comparable 
to the Constitution of today. The main marks of it are 
the Monarch with limited powers, the control of Parliament, 
the Rule of Law. There are of course huge differences 
between the Constitution of the thirteenth century and the 
Constitution of today. The machinery of government was 
then vastly simpler. The prerogative was exercised by the 
King, not by a group of Ministers. There was no bureau- 
cracy; there was no universal democratic suffrage. Yet 
the essential resemblances strike very deep. In them will 
be/ 
1. See Hallam. Constitutional History of England (Everyman 
Edition), Vol. 1, page 8. 
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be found something which permeates and always has per - 
meated English law. The refusal to sanction despotism 
points to an innate love of freedom. The freedom of the 
Englishman of these days was certainly not the freedom of 
the Englishman of today - but, then, freedom is, in large 
measure, a relative term. The average Englishman of these 
days had his liberty curtailed in many ways which would now 
be regarded as intolerable. If the modern Englishman were 
derived of the right to employ his talents as he chose, if 
he were *tied to the soil*, if he were not allowed to be- 
lieve what he liked and to give free utterance to these 
beliefs, if he were deprived of his vote, he would think, 
and think rightly, that he was being deprived of his 
liberties. But a man who has never enjoyed any of these 
things, and who has never wished to enjoy them, may still 
in his own mind be a free man, and one of the most import- 
ant elements of freedom is the subjective element. The 
Englishman of the time I am referring to paid as much regard 
to his freedom as the Englishman of today does to his. 
The difference is that the range of things in respect of 
which he was free was very much smaller. But, let an 
attempt be made to deprive him of the liberties which he 
possessed, and his zeal for personal liberty would at once 
be fired. Let the executive interfere with his private 
property rights, or impose an illegal tax, and he would 
not be slow to show his resentment. This love of personal 
liberty, this unwillingness to submit to injustices, must 
be regarded as an inborn mark of the English character. 
It is not of course a love which is confined to Englishmen, 
but/ 
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but it is at least as characteristic of the Anglo Saxon 
race as of any other. George Santayana speaks of the 
English spirit as being "pregnant with many a stubborn 
1. 
assertion and rejection" and that puts the matter as 
definitely as it can be put. At the same time it would 
be untrue to regard personal freedom as the supreme end 
and aim of English law in the thirteenth, fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. Society had not yet advanced to 
that conception. The paramount need was still the pre- 
servation of society as it existed. Such marks of a 
Security Theory of Law as the desire to keep each man in 
his appointed place and the desire to preserve the social 
status quó were strongly in evidence. Dangers both at 
home and abroad had to be faced. Foreign wars engendered 
a patriotic spirit and it was natural that where personal 
desires conflicted with this, they should be treated with 
scant respect. National security, which could only be 
secured by cohesion and discipline, was first and foremost 
the end and aim of law. 
1. George Santayana. The British Character. (Hundred 
Best English Essays published by Cassell, page 744). 
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Chapter 24 
The Attempted Despotism of the Tudor Monarchs 
and Bodints Theory_ of Sovereignty. 
The essential element of the old English consti- 
tution was, as I have tried to show, government by a 
limited Monarch. With the approach of the sixteenth 
century, and in particular with the advent of the Tudor 
line of Kings, a new and very important development arose. 
This was nothing more nor less than an attempt to subvert 
the old and native ideas of responsibility in favour of a 
system of absolute government such as prevailed in France 
and Spain. Progress towards the new ideal of monarchy 
was naturally slow and difficult. It was hampered by 
the national spirit of independence which refused to 
submit to this invasion of traditional liberty. The 
issue was finally determined by the arbitrament of war. 
It is perhaps difficult to explain why the movement to- 
wards despotism should have occurred at this particular 
moment. The usual standby of despotic authority, a 
powerful standing army, did not exist and it also con- 
flicted with the great new liberal movement of the 
Renaissance. As against that, it has to be remembered 
that the influence of the Renaissance was late in being 
felt in England, in so far as it can be conceived as a 
movement colouring and pervading the average intelligence. 
Part of the attempted drive towards despotism may also be 
explained by the unsettled conditions produced by dynastic 
warfare/ 
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warfare, and the necessity felt by a reigning family, 
which had recently established its position, toireserve 
that position by force. Kings were nervous, and nervous- 
ness is a political symptom which gives rise to arbitrary 
methods and a frequent disregard of ordinary rights. 
The vehicle by which the new movement was in large 
measure sustained was the Court of Star Chamber. This 
body owed its descent to the ancient Royal Council acting 
in a judicial capacity. It had always possessed some 
sort of limited and rather undefined judicial authority. 
It now became the instrument of oppression. Taxation 
except with the consent of Parliament was illegal. This 
had always hampered the activities of government which 
were, of course, dependent upon sufficient supplies. 
Various expedients were resorted to in order to meet 
this difficulty. In particular the government had re- 
course to a system of what were miscalled 'benevolences' 
or voluntary levies. The individual who was bold enough 
not to pay what he was asked to pay "voluntarily ", was 
speedily brought to book. He might be confined in the 
Tower or some other state prison and the constitutional 
remedies for protecting persons from arbitrary imprison- 
ment were not by any means as efficacious as legally they 
should have been. Judges were unwilling to offend royal 
authority and it was not difficult to invent excuses to 
retard the course of justice. Another inroad on the part 
of royal authority was the attempt to legislate by pro- 
clamation. In the reign of Henry VIII, by an exceedingly 
1. 
important statute, this was actually legalized. Power 
was/ 
1. 31. Henry VIII, C. S. 
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was, by statute, conferred on the Ding to issue proclama- 
tions having legislative authority whenever the condition 
of the nation required that he should do so. The statute 
referred to was repealed some years later, but this did not 
prevent the practice being continued. Thus it is seen by 
proclamations issued by Elizabeth, that the Crown still 
claimed a supplemental right of legislation to perfect and 
carry into effect what the spirit of existing laws might 
require, as well as a paramount supremacy which sanctioned 
commands beyond the legal prerogative, for the sake of 
public safety. Thus, by proclamations at different times, 
Irishmen were commanded to depart into Ireland. The ex- 
portation of corn, money, and various commodities was 
prohibited. Excess of apparel was restrained. These 
are only examples of this new tendency. It is at once 
apparent how contrary to the whole spirit of the con- 
stitution all this was. Sooner or later a clash was 
bound to occur. It did not come in the reign of Eliza- 
beth but it did come during the reign of her Stuart 
successors. 
One of the worst features of this drive towards 
despotism was the deterioration in the administration of 
1. 
justice. The independence of juries became undermined 
as a result of prosecutions in the Star Chamber. Where 
juries failed to return verdicts in accordance with the 
royal wishes they were haled before this body and heavily 
fined. This was particularly so in treason cases. I 
have already referred to this as a period of royal 
nervousness. One instance of this was a law enacted in 
the/ 
1. See Hallam. Vol. 1. Page 50. 
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the reign of Queen Elizabeth which declared that the 
publication of seditious libels against the Queen's 
1. 
government should be a capital felony. The highhanded 
way in which the law was administered is well shown (to 
select one example) by the trial of one Udal. This un- 
fortunate man was indicted under the statute for an alleged 
libel on the bishops which was construed as an attack on the 
Queen's administration. Hallam, commenting on his trial, 
says that like most other political trials of the age it 
disgraced the name of English justice. It consisted 
mainly in a pitiful attempt by the Court to entrap Udal 
into a confession that the imputed libel wes of his writ- 
ing, as to which the proof was deficient. Though he 
avoided this snare, the jury did not fail to obey the 
2. 
directions they received to convict him. Prosecutions 
of this kind were extremely common during the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth. To quote Hallam again: "The glaring 
transgressions of natural as well as positive law which 
then prevailed rendered our Courts of justice in cases of 
treason little better than caverns of murderers. Whoever 
was arraigned at their bar was almost certain to meet a 
virulent prosecutor, a judge hardly distinguishable from 
the prosecutor, except by his ermine, and a passive 
3. 
pusillanimous jury." There is no reason for thinking 
that this description is in any way exaggerated. Refer- 
ence must also be made to the frequency of illegal commit- 
ments. The power of arbitrary detention has been unknown 
to/ 
1. 23. Elizabeth, C. 2. 
2. Hallam. Vol. 1, Page 194. 3. Page 216. 
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to the English Constitution (legally) from the days of 
Magna Charta. By usage nearly tantamount to constitu- 
tional right prisoners were entitled to be speedily 
brought to trial by means of regular sessions of goal 
1. 
delivery. Now the regular processes of law came fre- 
quently to be disregarded and this undoubtedly constituted 
one of the greatest assaults of all against the liberty of 
the individual, which threatened to becomi entirely swamped 
by the new and rising tide of uncontrolled despotism. 
The new powers of government which the Tudors had 
assumed constituted a great invasion of the traditional 
liberties of the English people. Politically, the age 
must be viewed as one of repression. If law is severed 
into two fields, public law and private law, there can be 
little doubt as to what the end and aim of public law then 
was. Public law sought and sought vehemently to uphold 
the power of the nation in general and the power of the 
nation's rulers in particular. It may be said that this 
is always the end and aim of public law, and up to a point 
this is perfectly true. But something quite new in the 
English polity was introduced in the Tudor regime. The 
powers of government had hitherto been legally controlled 
and tempered by a sense of responsibility and with a great 
regard to the interests of individual rights and liberties, 
this being in accordance with Teutonic theories of govern- 
ment generally. But now the interests of individual 
rights and liberties were allowed to slip into the back- 
ground. This was achieved in two ways, the one legally, 
the other extra -legally. The executive sought to and did 
succeed/ 
1. Hallam. Vol. 1, Page S. 
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succeed in arming itself with greater power by virtue of 
Acts of Parliament. It also assumed powers to which it 
had no legal right, relying on the weakness of Judges and 
the pusillanimity of juries for the unchallenged exercise 
of these illegal powers. The popularity of Queen Eliza- 
beth and a general sense that strong government was 
imperative for the national welfare allowed this to go 
unchallenged, nor was the government slow to avail itself 
of this intense national spirit. 
A certain fillip to despotic theories of government 
was also given by the works of the French writer, Jean 
Bodin, whose writings had a considerable influence on pol- 
itical thought in England during the reign of Queen Eliza- 
beth. He is outstanding as the originator of a definite 
theory of sovereignty and as a believer in absolutism, who 
saw in sound and firm government the only solution of the 
political difficulties of the day. His theories about 
law are expressed in his work, Six Books Concerning The 
State, which was published in 1576. Unlike certain later 
writers, he did not base his theory of sovereignty on any 
supposed social contract. He regarded society as having 
arisen from amalgamations of families living together, out 
of a common regard for each other and a desire for security. 
It may be noted that he regarded families and not individ- 
uals as forming the units in the state. The idea of the 
state and of sovereignty is however linked up with the idea 
of force. The essence of the state is the power by which 
the citizens are bound to the sovereign. The state is 
the ultimate form of association, holding together by 
supreme/ 
-47 - 
supreme power a mass of lesser associations and 
individuals. 
The ideas of sovereignty and the state go together. 
Bodints definition of the state is that "a state is an 
aggregation of families and their common possessions ruled 
1. 
by a sovereign power and by reason." Sovereignty, again, 
is defined thus, "Sovereignty is supreme power over 
2. 
citizens and subjects unrestrained by the law." "Sover- 
eignty," he goes on to sj, "has its chief and character - 
3. 
istic function in the making of laws." The fact that 
sovereignty and the state are so linked together, Bodin 
says, has been unnoticed by previous philosophers and 
jurists and he claims to be the first to have propounded 
it. Although Bodin talks of sovereignty as quite unre- 
strained, he nevertheless proceeds to admit that there are 
limits to sovereign power. A limit is set by the Law of 
Nature, which is regarded as an immutable code, no breach 
4. 
of which can admit of moral justification. For a 
violation of the Law of Nature the sovereign is, however, 
only answerable to God and his own conscience, not to the 
people. Thus no justification is given to rebellion. 
It is the duty of the people to submit. A distinction is 
however drawn by Bodin between the wise ruler and the 
5. 
tyrant. The wise ruler is he who respects the Law of 
Nature, which the tyrant, on the other hand, disregards. 
The omnipotence of a prince is only imperium, not dominatus, 
and/ 
1. Bodin. Quoted in Political Theories. by Dunning (pub- 
lished by Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1910, Page 86. 
2. Page 96. 3. Page 97. 4. Page 98. 
5. Page 1eO. 
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and Bodin cites a maxim of Seneca "Ad reges potestas 
omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas," and he adds 
that, without just cause, the sovereign cannot seize or 
1 
grant away the property of another. This at any rate 
is a protest against arbitrary despotism, although rather 
an ineffective one as no remedy is granted to the people. 
There also appears in the background what are called leges 
2. 
erg, by which the sovereign is supposed to be bound. 
These leges imperii differ from the law of nature in that 
they form a rather shadowy constitutional code. It is 
obvious that if the powers of the sovereign are limited 
by a constitutional code, this will result in a consider- 
able derogation from sovereign power. Nevertheless, 
there is no sanction in popular authority for these leges 
imperii any more than for the Law of Nature. Bodin's 
aversion to such authority was pronounced. Apopulus,, 
in his eyes, was identified with a disorderly mob. 
As I have already mentioned, Bodin regards legis- 
lation as the function of the sovereign. He rejects 
custom as a source of law. Custom, he regards, as having 
no legal validity, until it has received the sanction of 
the sovereign. This view is, of course, artificial and 
fundamentally untrue, but it is an interesting anticipa- 
tion of the Austinian theory of law. Bodin fully realizes 
that sovereign power may reside either in a monarch, an 
aristocracy, or a democracy. Be, however, prefers mon- 
archy as the most stable form of government and as the 
best guarantee against turbulence and violence. Bodin's 
significance/ 
i. Pages 99 and 100. 
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significance in the history of jurisprudence lies in his 
doctrine of illimitable sovereign power. His theory of 
law is in essence the Byzantine one of uncontrolled 
despotism, even if some recognition is accorded to the 
Law of Nature. It is obvious how popular Bodin's theories 
would be to the Tudors and still more to the Stuarts with 
their assertion of the divine right of Kings. 
Chapter 3. 
The Divine Right of Kings and the Absolutist 
Theories of Hobbes. 
The view which James I took of his constitutional 
position is well summed up in his discourse on the True 
Law of Free Monarchies published some years before he 
became King of England. It is a bold asseveration of 
the Divine Right of Kings. He says: "Monarchy is the 
true pattern of divinity and that kings may make daily 
statutes and ordinances enjoining such pains thereto as 
they may think meet, without any advice of parliament or 
estates; general laws made publicly in parliament may by 
the King's authority be mitigated or suspended upon causes 
only known to him; and that although a good king will 
frame all his actions to be according to the law, yet he 
is not bound thereto, but of his own will and for example 
1. 
giving to his subjects." How different a conception of 
2. 
kingship from that of Bracton which I have already quoted: 
James' view of his position as a sovereign is in full 
accordance with the theories of sovereignty set #brth by 
Bodin. Nor is it to be imagined that James I merely re- 
garded his conception of Kingship as a theoretical ideal; 
he regarded it as being in actual conformity with the law 
and it is upon this conception that he acted throughout 
his reign. With a strong and independent judicature such 
a/ 
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a position would not have been tolerated. Unfortunately 
the judges were far from showing a proper spirit of in- 
tegrity and independence. One example may be quoted. 
James in order to raise revenue had by mere royal command 
imposed a quite illegal duty on certain imports. One 
Bates refused to pay the duty. An information was 
exhibited against him in the Exchequer. Judgment was 
given for the Crown. Certain propositions in the judg- 
ment are worthy of note. 'The King's power," it was said, 
"is double - ordinary and absolute; and these have several 
laws and ends. That of the ordinary is for the profit of 
particular subjects, exercised in ordinary courts, and 
called common law, wbich cannot be changed in substance 
without Parliament. The King's absolute power is applied 
to no particular person's benefit; but to the common 
safety; and this is not directed by the rules of common 
law, but more properly termed policy and government, vary- 
ing according to bis wisdom for the common good; and all 
things done within those rules are lawful. The matter in 
question is matter of state, to be ruled according to 
1. 
policy by the King's extraordinary power." Such pro- 
positions, it need hardly be said, are entirely contrary 
to the true tenor of English law and are in fact wholly 
subversive of liberty. The language habitually employed 
by the King in his quarrels with his various Parliaments 
quite clearly shows that this judgment epitomizes his own 
view of his position. So also do the various illegal 
arrests made during his reign. 
The/ 
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The legal views of Charles f were inherited from 
his predecessor. The levies of tonnage and poundage 
without the authority of Parliament, the exaction of 
monopolies, above all the general exaction of ship 
money form articles in the indictment against his govern- 
ment, in so far as it relates to inroads on the subjects' 
property. Nor was the person of the subject held in 
greater respect than his property. To this the arbit- 
rary arrest and imprisonment of such men as Sir John Eliot 
and Hampden all bear witness. The position was fast 
becoming intolerable. Eventually it became evident that 
compromise was impossible between those who held that the 
Ding might impose his will how he pleased and those who 
held that like all his subjects he was himself subject to 
law. When the hour came to strike there is little doubt 
that each side acted with haste and intemperance. There 
is also no doubt of the enormous character of the issues 
which had to be decided. To settle them the country 
became a battlefield. The national house had collapsed 
and a new fabric had to be built. 
It is against this background of storm that the 
figure and philosophy of Hobbes emerge. Hobbes wrote at 
an epoch when the English world was in a welter of chaos 
and confusion. His main aim in his work by which he is 
best known, the Leviathan, is to assert certain principles 
of government of universal import. He holds that, if 
these principles had been observed in England, chaos and 
confusion would never have come into being. He is like 
Bodin the prophet of absolutism, the believer in strong 
government/ 
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government. His position as a philosopher is in strong 
contrast with most of the philosophical notions of his 
day. It was the era of dawning liberalism. Liberalism 
may not yet have been reflected in actual government, but 
it was, at any rate, the main driving force in seventeenth 
century political philosophy. This was the direct out- 
come of the Renaissance. The doctrines of Mediaevalism 
were being discarded. The Mediaeval world was a world 
of faith and acceptance; the world which had come into 
being was one of challenge and assertion. Dantets message 
to the world had been one God of the Universe, one Christ 
of the Church, one head of the family, one leader of the 
whole world, and he had believed that Rome was once more 
1. 
suited to assume the latter-role. The course of events 
in England on account of the Teutonic theory of government 
had been different. Absolutism was not a plant of native 
growth. Yet while political philosophy in Europe was 
protesting against absolutism, England had slowly been 
drifting in that particular direction, until further 
progress was stayed by the Civil War. Hobbes now cage 
forward as a believer in absolutist government, as a 
supporter of these tendencies at home, and as an opponent 
of the new philosophical notions prevailing abroad. 
Thomas Hobbes was born at Malmesbury in 1588. He 
went to school at Westport Church and in due course pro- 
ceeded to Oxford. After his University career was over 
he acted as tutor to two successive Earls of Devonshire. 
It/ 
1. See Allen. Law In The Making. Page 9. 
It is also to be noted that he knew Bacon for whom he 
sometimes acted as secretary. The mental qualities of 
the two men are in many respects very similar. He 
travelled abroad with his second pupil in 1634, and dur- 
ing this journey he met the famous scientists of the Con- 
tinent, becoming acquainted with Galileo among others. In 
1640 the prevailing troubles at home induced him to turn 
his attention from science, with which he had hitherto 
been chiefly occupied, to politics, his sympathies being 
of course with the Royalist cause. His preaching of 
absolutist doctrine was directly opposed to prevailing 
sentiment, and, guided by the example of Bishop Mainwaring 
who had been put in the Tower for similar activities, he 
betook himself to France. There he remained for the next 
eleven years and it was during that period that the Leviathan 
was written. Subsequent biographical detail may be passed 
over. He laterzeturned to England, having made his peace 
with those in authority. 
The first point to be noted about Hobbes is his 
entire lack of faith in human nature. No man was ever 
less on the side of the angels. His view of human nature 
is that each man plays deliberately for his own hand all 
the time. No doubt he would have admitted exceptions, 
but he regarded men in the bulk as being entirely selfish, 
so that the proposition may be stated in general form. The 
stakes too for which each man played were the same, namely, 
wealth and power. It was necessary for a man to be power- 
ful, not only because he thereby gratified his own lust for 
power, but also because he placed himself in a position of 
greater / 
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greater security. Bear, after ambition, is in his view 
the great driving force in human nature. He says: "In 
the first place, I put for a generali inclination of all 
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after 
Power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, 
is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, 
than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be con- 
tent with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the 
power and means to live well, which he hath present, without 
1. 
the acquisition of more." The criticism of course is 
obvious that this is taking a very limited and one sided 
view of human nature. The springs of human action are 
certainly far more complex than Hobbes allows. One does 
not require to be an idealist to state that love of one's 
fellow human beings may be and frequently is as powerful a 
motive of action as love of self. And it is quite untrue 
that ambition and lust for power in the crude sense indicated 
by Hobbes are the only things which move men to action. It 
may be true (although it is a conclusion impossible to state 
with any confidence) that some subtle self gratification is 
the occasion of even the most apparently altruistic acts. 
But, even if this were so, the good a man seeks to do by such 
altruistic acts is not good for himself (as Hobbes would have 
understood it) but good for another. 
Hobbes also states his theory of each man striving 
after his own personal good, interpreted in terms of ambition, 
as being a law of nature. A man cannot help himself. When 
he acts as Hobbes conceives him to do, he is not guilty of a 
breadh/ 
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breach of any moral law. The only sin a man can commit is 
a breach of his contract with society - a point I shall come 
to later. In other words, Hobbes' view of human action is 
essentially deterministic. True freedom of the will would 
be ruled out as a wants passions, of which the two most 
important are lust of power and fear, must inevitably propel 
him to act in such a way that he will be strong and powerful. 
It is very difficult to accept such a conception of human 
action as being anything like the whole story, but this 
appears to have been the view held by Hobbes. 
Hobbed' conception of humanity then is a mass of men, 
all struggling to secure the same end, namely the assertion 
of their own individual authority, and this with two further 
ends in view, the first the gratification of a lust for power, 
the second the continual desire for greater security. 
society comes into being each man is at war with his neigh- 
bour. All primitive life is a battlefield. It is a dis- 
satisfaction with such conditions which in his view calls 
society into being. The life of man before he has achieved . 
some form of society is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
1. 
short." It is a realization that greater security will 
result for each individual if he foregoes his individuality 
to the extent of joining with his fellows into some sort of 
society which explains the origin of the state. He says: 
"Feare of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek 
aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can 
2. 
secure his life and liberty." It is interesting to note the 
continual emphasis placed by Hobbes upon fear. The origin 
of/ 
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of the state is thus in his view artificial. That is to 
say, it is not simply a natural growth. It is the outcome 
of some form of contract. Hobbes thus places himself among 
the ranks of the believers in a social contract theory of 
society. In the light of discoveries which have been made 
since Hobbes' day, we know that this is not a true explana- 
tion of the way in which states have come into being. It 
is important, however, to note these deductions of Hobbes 
because they form the premises on which his subsequent 
argument is built up. It is needless to say that he offers 
no historical proof of his generalizations. In so far as 
they have a basis at all that basis is simply a process of 
á priori reasoning. 
The state or commonwealth is, in Hobbes' view, brought 
into being by contract. These conclusions are stated as 
follows: "A Commonwealth is said to be Instituted, when a 
Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, everyone with every- 
one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be 
given by the Major Part, the right to Present the Person of 
them all (that is to say to be their representative); every- 
one, as well as he that voted for it, as he that voted against 
it, shall authorise all the actions and judgments of that Man, 
or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his 
own, to the end, to live peaceably among themselves, and be 
1. 
protected against other men." It is very important to not ice 
that Hobbes' view of the social contract is quite different 
from the views generally put forward by upholders of the social 
contract theory such as Rousseau. In Hobbes' contract, the 
sovereign/ 
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sovereign is not a party to the contract. The reason for 
this difference is that the social contract theory has gen- 
erally been put forward as a defence for the innate rights 
of man. The view is that man has certain rights which no 
sovereign is entitled to filch from him. He makes a certain 
surrender of his individuality in becoming a member of society, 
but he retains certain prerogatives of which it is morally 
unjustifiable that he should be deprived. It is for that 
reason that despotism is an immoral system of government, 
because it makes inroads on the innate rights of man and 
because the sovereign acts in such a way as though heowed 
no duties to those whom he governs. But Hobbes' essential 
thesis is that the sovereign does not owe duties to his 
subjects. Every contract imposes duties on the parties to 
it, but as the sovereign has no duties he cannot be a party 
to the contract. The Hobbesian contract is therefore a 
contract between the different members of society to impose 
a sovereign upon themselves for their own mutual good, but 
to this contract the sovereign is not himself a party. One 
reason offered by Hobbes for this view of the social contract 
is that it is no use forming a contract unless you have some 
superior party who can enforce that contract. Otherwise 
there is no sanction. These conclusions are stated as 
follows: "Because the Right of bearing the Person of them 
all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely 
of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can 
happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; 
and consequently none of his Subjects, by my pretence of 
forfeiture/ 
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forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he 
which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Sub- 
jects before hand, is manifest: because either he must 
make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the 
Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every 
man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; 
because they are not as yet one person: and if he make 
so many severall covenants as there be men, these Covenants 
after he hath the Sovereignty are voyd, because what act 
soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach there- 
of, is the act both of himselfe and of all the rest, because 
done in the Person, and by the Right of everyone of them in 
1. 
particular." This reasoning is no doubt very sophistical. 
The whole theory is of course built upon sand and the 
arguments put forward hardly require critical examination. 
They are an attempt to offer a philosophical justification 
of despotism, but the theory is so entirely untrue and 
artificial, that no one today would ever think of justify- 
ing absolutist government upon such grounds. 
According to Hobbes it is only after society has 
come into being, that the actions of a man can be accounted 
just or unjust. Before society is formed a man is free to 
do what he pleases. He can with complete moral justifica- 
tion secure whatever ends he desires by whatever means he 
cares. The reason given for this is that all injustice 
is no more than the failure of a man to perform his covenant. 
If he has covenanted nothing, he can do no wrong. As a 
citizen, man has consented to denude himself of certain 
rights which he would otherwise possess. Accordingly it 
is/ 
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is wrong for the man, who has become a citizen, to assert 
such rights. But on account of Hobbes' view that the 
sovereign is not himself a party to the social contract, 
these considerations do not apply to him. He can day no 
wrong since he has been a party to no covenant. It is 
irrelevant to apply the epithets of "right" and "wrong" 
to the actions of the sovereign. The sovereign alone is 
judge of the wisdom of his actions. Such deductions need- 
less to say are hardly satisfactory. As I have already 
said Hobbes reasoning is based upon a hypothesis which has 
no existence in fact, and, even if it had an existence in 
fact, it would hardly follow that any social contract must 
be regarded as so sacred that no action on the part of a 
sovereign, however outrageous, would ever justify non 
adherence to it. Any such view is directly opposed to 
all natural ideas of justice. In Hobbes' defence, it 
should be remembered that he was tremendously impressed 
by the arbitrary violence which had interrupted the course 
of life in England. Old institutions had toppled over and 
the land was wracked with civil war. This, combined with 
natural pedantry, cai sed him to evolve a theoretical defence 
of absolutist goverment, which however much it might satisfy 
the strict logician, once the premises were granted, stood 
condemned as contrary to human nature and common sense. 
Although Hobbes does not expressly deal with the 
question of what the end and aim of law ought to be, it is 
not difficult to draw an inference as to his opinions on 
this subject. It is necessary to remember his view of 
human nature. All men are selfish, grasping and eager 
for/ 
- 61 - 
for power. The state is called into being for their 
mutual convenience, out of a desire for their own preser- 
vation. He says: "The finall Cause, End or Designe of 
men (who naturally love Liberty and Dominion over others) 
in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in 
which wee see them live in Commonwealths) is the foresight 
of their own preservation, and of a more contented live 
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from 
that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily 
consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturali Passions 
of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, 
and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of 
1 
their Covenants. " Accordingly the state must be held 
together by the bands of law. The sole end and aim of 
law, from Hobbes' point of view, is to keep the natural 
instincts of man at bay. The preservation of security 
is for him the supreme purpose of the law. Of freedom 
as an abstract conception he thinks little as is shown by 
the following passage: "But it is an easy thing, for men 
to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for 
want of Judgement to distinguish and mistake that for their 
Private Inheritance, and Birth Right, which is the right of 
the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed 
by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in 
this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition and 
2. 
change of Government." Men living in society must obey 
a sovereign, and, in the opinion of Hobbes, it is necessary 
that that sovereign should have absolute powers. It is 
such! 
1. Page 87. 2. Page 113. 
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such a sovereign that Hobbes would like to have seen on 
the English throne controlling the destinies of the English 
people. The final argument against him is that his theories 
are utterly opposed to the political instincts of the people 
on whom he sought to foist them. The voice of Hobbes 
remains that of one crying in the wilderness. 
-63- 
Chapter 4. 
Legal tendencies in Great Britain from the end of the 
Civil War down to the Revolution. 
The execution of Charles I was a landmark in the 
historic struggle between authoritarianism and libertarian- 
ism which was the greatest feature of English political 
history in the seventeenth century. It was not however 
the final point in that struggle. That came only with 
the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty in the Revolution of 
1688. The government of Cromwell was a breathing space. 
The temporary introduction of a Republican form of govern- 
ment was not a popular innovation as the very general joy 
on the Restoration of Charles IÌ sufficiently shows. None 
the less these years had been useful in "cleaning up" the 
constitution. The constitution from the time of the 
Restoration onwards may be regarded as being in a much 
healthier condition than during the reigns of Charles Ì, 
James Ì and the Tudor monarchs. This was so, because, 
while de lure the constitution had always remained a 
limited monarchy, de facto the trend prior to the Civil 
War had been in the direction of absolutism. Charles II 
however had at least learned enough from the fate of his 
father not to extend the bounds of his authority beyond 
their legal limit. That statement is at any rate a fair 
approximation to the truth. Hallam declares "The King 
was restored to nothing but what the law had preserved to 
him/ 
him. .... In the essential matter of proclamations the 
administration of Charles IÌ is very advantageously compared 
with that of his father; and considering at the same time 
the entire cessation of impositions of money without consent 
of Parliament, we must admit that, however dark might be 
his designs, there were no such general infringements of 
public liberty in his reigns as had continually occurred 
1. 
before the Long Parliament." The wheels of the constitu- 
tion accordingly ran much more smoothly after the Restoration 
than they had done before. It is too early as yet to refer 
to the great liberal movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries which was to find in freedom for the individual the 
great aim which law should secure, but the seeds of that 
movement were gradually being sown. The Civil War itself 
had been witness to the growth of a stubborn spirit which 
would not submit tamely to any dictates of Royal authority. 
It was at any rate certain that the doctrines of Bodin and 
Hobbes would find no acceptance in this country. 
In the reign which followed that of Charles ÌI , there 
was a danger of a temporary reaction, which in the end 
however served to clear the air still further. James IÌ 
was perhaps as foolish a King as ever sat on the English 
throne. A short account of the politics of his reign may 
be useful as illustrating the last throw of the dice so far 
as absolutism was concerned in this country. The lesson 
of the Civil War, so far as James was concerned, had 
definitely been lost. Once again, the ugly head of 
absolutism reared itself. James was himself a Catholic 
and/ 
1. Hallam. Vol. III. page 5. 
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and his energies were directed to restore, so far as lay 
in his power, the authority of the Roman Church. His 
intentions were revealed very early in his reign by his 
endeavour to secure the repeal of the Test Act. This 
act imposed various civil disabilities on persons who 
were not members of the Church of England, being levelled 
against Roman Catholics on the one hand and Non -conformists 
on the other. Such disabilities are quite repugnant to 
modern ideas. They represent - again to the modern mind - 
an unwarranted interference by the state in the religious 
convictions of its citizens. By the England of James IÌ, 
the Test Act was however regarded as a very necessary 
safeguard of the Established Church and also of the con- 
stitution. Needless to say it was not from any love of 
liberal ideas that James sought to repeal the Act. It 
was simply part of his plan for the Romanization of the 
country. His intention to repeal the Test Act might have 
been successful as the first Parliament which met after his 
accession was distinctly High Church in tendency. The King 
however went too fast. He filled civil and military posts 
with Catholics, which was more than even this Parliament 
was prepared to stomach. Events soon occurred which 
showed that whether the Test Act was repealed or not , the 
King was determined to force his policy on an unwilling 
nation. 
Matters reached a crisis in the famous case of 
Sir Edward Hales. The circumstances of this case are 
worth recounting as they illustrate very clearly the 
tendencies of the time. Sir Edward Hales had accepted 
a/ 
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a commission as colonel of a regiment without the previous 
qualification of receiving the sacrament in the Church of 
England. This was contrary to the provisions of the Test 
Act and an action was brought against him to recover the 
penalty of £500 imposed by that Act for such a breach of 
its provisions. The dispensing power of the Crown was 
pleaded on behalf of Hales and that plea was accepted by 
the Court. The implications of this judgment were exceed- 
ingly important. As Hallam rightly observes, the effect 
of the decision was to render nugatory the provisions of 
1e 
the Test Act. The King by virtue of his prerogative could 
over -ride the Act whenever he chose to do so. Hallam's 
comments upon this are "the unadvised assertion in a court 
of justice of this principle, which though not by any means 
novel, had never been advanced in a business of such 
universal concern and interest may be said to have sealed 
the condemnation of the house of Stuart. It made the co- 
existence of an hereditary line, claiming a sovereign pre- 
rogative paramount to the liberties they had vouchsafed to 
concede, incompatible with the security or probable duration 
of these liberties. This incompatibility is the true basis 
1. 
of the Revolution of 1688." 
The remaining events in the unhappy reign of 
James II are matters of general history. These now 
moved with great rapidity. Soon after the verdict in 
the case of Hales came the famous Declaration of Indulgence. 
This Declaration suspended the execution of all penal law 
concerning religion and freely pardoned all offences against 
them/ 
1. Hallam, Vol. III; Page 56. 
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them. It did away with the necessity for the various 
religious tests imposed on all who held offices of trust. 
It represented a supreme example of the dispensing power. 
Virtually, it meant the repeal of Acts of Parliament by 
virtue of the Prerogative. An order was issued that the 
Declaration should be read in all the churches, and it was 
the petition on the part of certain bishops in the church 
against this ordinance which led to the famous trial of 
the seven bishops. All these events completely estranged 
popular feeling. The King had lost the regard of his 
subjects and now found himself in a position on which he 
could rely on the loyalty and support only of a minority. 
When William of Orange landed in the country, following an 
invitation from those who collectively may be called the 
leaders of the opposition, he took to flight. The days 
of the Stuarts were over for ever. Their repeated contempt 
for the wishes of their subjects and their constant endeavours 
to flout the will of Parliament and to act outwith the spirit 
of the law had wrought their ruin. It is true that after 
the Restoration the excesses of previous reigns had not 
been resorted to. There had no longer been arbitrary 
imprisonments or illegal impositions of money, but the old 
arrogant spirit still remained. A deo rex are a lex had 
always been the motto of the Stuarts. This spirit of the 
divine right of Kings had marked the reign of James II just 
as much as his predecessors. Henceforth it was to have no 
part in the British system of government. 
The downfall of authoritarianism marks the end of an 
epoch/ 
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epoch in the history of political ideas and their in- 
fluence on the course of history. The theories which 
were thereafter to influence the trend of legislation 
were completely different, and it is appropriate that 
they should be considered in another Part of this 
Thesis. 
Part III. 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
THEORIES OF JAW. 
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Chapter l. 
The Revolution and the Constitutional Code contained 
in the Bill of Ri hts and the Act of Settlement. 
It is possible to trace something new as the End 
and Aim of Law subsequent to the Revolution of 1688. A 
new spirit became infused into British Law. ghat was this 
new spirit? Mainly it was the infusion of new ideas of 
liberty, which may be traced in various directions. 
Perhaps the point of greatest importance was the new 
fixity given to the law. The various boundary lines 
were drawn with new definiteness. The sovereign authority 
of Parliament became clearly marked. The inroads of Royal 
authority which had formerly caused so much anxiety were no 
more. A new impulse was given to the cause of freedom. 
The great advantage of the Revolution is declared by Hallam 
to have been the breaking of the line of succession. He 
declared that no other remedy could have been found against 
the unceasing conspiracy of power. He sums up the matter 
thus: "The Revolution was the triumph of those principles 
which, in the language of the present day, are denominated 
liberal or constitutional, over those of absolute monarchy, 
or of monarchy not effectually controlled by stated boun- 
daries. It was the termination of a contest between the 
regal power and that of parliament, which could not have 
1. 
been brought to so favourable an issue by any other means." 
It was in fact the triumph of libertarianism over author- 
itarianism. 
First, this triumph of libertarianism may be viewed 
from/ 
1. Hallam. Vol. III , page 90. 
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from the constitutional point of view. This is an easy 
task as the code is embodied in two great statutes the 
1. 2. 
Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. The Bill of 
Rights is largely a declaratory statute. It contains 
certain new provisions but for the most part it lays down 
cardinal constitutional axioms, which had always in theory 
been the law of the land. The most important of these are: 
"t(1). That the pretended power of suspending laws, or the 
execution of laws by Royal authority without consent of Par - 
liament is illegal. W. That the pretended power of dis- 
pensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by Royal author- 
ity, as it bath been assumed and exercised of late is illegal. 
(3). That levying of money for the uses of the Crown, by 
pretence of Prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for 
longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be 
granted is illegal. (4). That it is the right of the sub- 
jects to petition the King, and all commitments and prosecu- 
tions for such petitioning are illegal. (5). That the 
raising or keeping of a standing army within the Kingdom in 
time of peace unless it be with the consent of Parliament is 
against the law." 
It will be seen that these articles of the Declaration 
which I have quoted all deal with the law as it was generally 
understood to exist. Its emphatic declaration was none the 
less necessary in view of the policy which had been pursued 
by subservient Judges. Too often during the Stuart period 
they had upheld as legal arbitrary and despotic acts of 
the Crown. The situation required, as I have said, to be 
thoroughly "cleaned up" and this the Bill of Rights did. 
Little/ 
1. 1. Will. & Mary, C. 2. 
g. 12 & 13. 1111. III. C. 2. 
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Little comment is required upon these declaratory provisions 
because they speak quite clearly for themselves. They all 
go to show the determination of Parliament that for the 
future the law should rest upon a more stable basis. Royal 
legislation, both positive and negative, that is the intro- 
duction of new laws and the repealing of old ones, is com- 
pletely struck at. The declaration about levying of money 
without consent of Parliament deals with the old bone of 
contention between King and Parliament. The declaration 
that it is the right of subjects to petition the King deals 
with the issue raised in the trial of the Seven Bishops. 
Lastly, the provision as to the illegality of a standing 
army without consent of Parliament in time of peace 
settled an awkward difficulty. Two views prevailed with 
regard to the existence of such an army. One was that 
such an army was necessary for national security; the 
other that its existence was a constant threat to national 
liberty. The problem was how to reconcile these two 
opposing views. A solution was found in placing the 
army under Parliamentary control, and it may be added 
that this solution still holds good today, as the legality 
of a standing army is still dependent upon the passing every 
year of the Annual Army Act. 
The Bill of Rights is essentially a charter of 
freedom. It aims at the definite curtailment of these 
arbitrary acts of the executive which had hap hazarded the 
cause of freedom. Everywhere it is infused with this bold 
desire to place liberty on a more firm foundation and the 




I have sought to present the general policy of 
the Bill of Rights. It has been impossible to sketch in 
all its details. It has to be remembered of course that 
the Bill deals with questions of public rights. The 
advance towards greater liberty in private rights will 
have to be considered later. In matters of public rights 
the Bill of Rights is a great edifice in the establishment 
of freedom. Another edifice erected two years later is 
the Act of Settlement. Its main purpose was to secure a 
protestant succession to the Crown. It represents the 
fulfilment of the principle that the determination of the 
succession to the Crown lies within the province of Par - 
liament. It strikes at the principle of a prescriptive 
right inalienably vested in some particular family. One 
of its provisions is that the King must adhere to the Church 
of England. Roman Catholics are completely excluded. 
This was part of the general policy of the time, as it was 
felt that national liberty would be imperilled if a Papist 
were ever again to occupy the throne. 
On the general question of government it is import- 
ant to notice one vital change which was gradually being 
effected. Hitherto the Kings of England had in person 
controlled the government of the country. Executive 
authority had personally been wielded by them, but from 
the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards this auth- 
ority passed more and more into the hands of the King's 
ministers. Government by the Cabinet displaced government 
by the King. This change rendered any attempt at the 
establishment of despotism more and more impossible. The 
doctrine/ 
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doctrine of the responsibility of Ministers to the House 
of Commons came into being only gradually, but with its 
establishment, that House became the controlling body both 
in the executive and the legislative sphere of government. 
This gradual fusion of executive and legislative power is 
the most important governmental fact of the eighteenth 
century. It was a huge charge in the form of government, 
all the more striking in that it was established without 
any change in the law. It was in fact a change established 
not as a matter of law but as a matter of convention, but 
the convention was one which soon became too strong to admit 
of violation. The course was set towards the form of gov- 
ernment which prevails today, and acts of Royal despotism 
had become unthinkable anachronisms. 
The growth of Cabinet government and ministerial 
responsibility was responsible too for the rapid growth . 
of the party system. The terms "Whig" and "Tory" date 
back to the time of the .Exclusion Bill in the reign of 
Charles II. It was in the eighteenth century however 
that the party system became a vital feature in British 
politics. Power was alternatively wielded by Whig admin- 
istrations and Tory administrations. The general line of 
demarcation between these parties in the eighteenth century 
was that the Whigs were in the main upholders of the cause 
of freedom and the rights of Parliament, while the Tories 
mainly upheld the cause of the Crown and the conservation 
of established principles. It is to be noted however that 
these general principles were on both sides often obscured 
in/ 
?4 
in party and personal strife. The Whigs were essentially 
representative of the middle classes and in particular the 
mercantile section of the community, while the Tories were 
essentially representative of the landed aristocracy. 
Both these parties were however constitutional, that is 
they both upheld a limited monarchy as the essential feature 
of the British polity. The Whigs were no more Republicans 
than the Tories were believers in absolute government. 
Coincident with this gradual advance towards greater 
constitutional freedom, it is important also to observe the 
growth of the movement towards greater private freedom. 
The latter is of course dependent on the former, but it is 
important to remember that there was as yet no democratic 
suffrage. Governing power might be wielded by the House 
of Commons and not by the King, but the electors of the 
House of Commons formed a very small minority of the pop- 
ulation. Very great abuses still remained in the form of 
interference with private liberty. They still remained 
because it was not in the interests of the governing 
classes to remove them. The general spirit of the law 
was strongly on the side of property, especially landed 
property, and strongly loaded against the labouring classes. 
It was still possible for example for landlords to set man 
traps. There were very hard and unjust restrictions on 
the trade which a man might follow, and the sphere within 
which he might follow it. Yet even in the early part of 
the eighteenth century changes in the law occurred which 
demonstrate the demand for a greater degree of freedom. 
At the same time such changes as occurred were changes of 
a/ 
-75 - 
a nature which did not effect the economic privileges of 
the wealthier classes. For example we have the growth of 
a greater spirit of toleration in religious matters. The 
maxims of persecution were silently abandoned. Here there 
was no legislative change, but rather a change in the spirit 
with which the law was administered. Greater freedom in 
the expression of opinion came to be allowed. The old 
restrictions upon printing were abolished. Books no 
longer required to be registered before they could be 
published. A great impetus was given to the publication 
of books and tracts on all subjects and criticism of the 
government was fully permitted. This was at least one 
virtue of the party system, because if the party in office 
were to suppress the publications of the party in opposition, 
they would have no cause for complaint if the other party, 
when its ministers formed a government, pursued a similar 
policy. After the reign of Queen Anne a period of thirty 
yearst peace ensued and during this period there was a great 
accumulation of national wealth. As a result the power and 
influence of the mercantile classes was steadily in the 
ascendant, and this served still further as a buffer against 
a policy of reaction. The prosperity of the nation was 
gradually increasing and with it there increased throughout 
the nation at large the growth of more liberal ideas. The 
demand was more and more for individual liberty. 
Wre may sense this demand for individual liberty and 
the spirit of toleration as being "in the air ". It may 
be said that the sphere of freedom was gradually being 
extended while the sphere of repression was gradually being 
limited/ 
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limited. To the politically minded Englishman of the 
eighteenth century repression was regarded as unhealthy. 
More and more this increasing demand for freedom finds a 
place in the political writings of the times. The earliest 
writer in whose works we find this strongly in evidence is 
Locke, and it is to him that I now propose to turn. 
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Chapter 2. 
Lockets Essay on The True Qriginal Extent and End 
of Civil Government. 
The English Revolution of 1688 was the great 
triumph of the Whig movement. Broadly speaking that 
movement stood for the assertion of the rights of the 
subject, for the rule of law and for a denial of any 
sovereign right in the Kings of England to abrogate the 
law. The greatest expression of these aims is continued 
in John Lockets Essay on The True Ori final Extent and End 
1. 
of Civil Government. Lockets position as a writer on 
topics of jurisprudence has of course been cu ershadowed 
by his eminence in the field of more general philosophy. 
At the sane time this essay deserves to be better known 
than it is, because it sums up in admirable form all the 
things for which the Revolution stood. Sir Frederick 
Pollock has said of it that it is "probably the most 
important contribution ever made to English constitutional 
2. 
law by an author who was not a lawyer by profession." The 
importance of the essay lies in this that it is an exposi- 
tion of the views of the times. In clear cut fashion it 
states the prevailing doctrines as to legal theory in 
general and the application of these doctrines to Great 
Britain in particular. It may be said that it is legal 
theory in general with which Locke is mostly concerned, 
but/ 
1. Locke, Two Treatises Of Civil Government (Everyman 
Edition). 
2. Introduction, Page I. 
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but it is not difficult to read between the lines and 
apply what he is saying to the contemporary position in 
Great Britain. Locke may (in one sense) be included in 
the group of eighteenth century writers on legal topics, 
although the work being considered was published in 1690. 
The reason for this is that it is thoroughly in tune with 
the rationalistic conceptions of law so typical of the 
eighteenth century. Beyond everything else however the 
essay is an expression, the great expression, of the Whig 
point of view dominant in England immediately after the 
Revolution. 
There are four cardinal points in Locke's legal 
philosophy. The first of these is that law is an eman- 
ation of human reason. Law is for him a matter of con- 
venience and expediency. Men are rational beings and it 
is natural that their relations with each other should rest 
upon a rational basis. The innate reasonableness of man 
prescribes certain rules for him in his dealings with other 
men. Every man owes his fellows certain duties, such as 
respecting their lives and liberties, and these duties 
constitute the "Law of Nature's. This Law of Nature is of 
universal import and its ultimate basis is simply man's 
inherent reasonableness. The second point is that all 
human society is based upon a "social contract ". Man sees 
that he will obtain greater security by living in society 
rather than in isolation. It is this desire for greater 
security which is the origin of all civil society. The 
third point is that the social contract is revocable. If 
society does not furnish the individual with the security, 
which/ 
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which was the sole reason for his entering society at all, 
he is at liberty to abandon society and return to "nature ". 
A fortiori if organized society becomes a menace to the 
possessions of the individual, if the rulers in society 
attempt to wrest these things from him, he is at liberty 
to forego his alliegance to it. The fourth point is that 
government is in its nature a trusteeship. Government 
exists solely for the good of the governed. If the 
governors in society violate the trust, which has been 
reposed in them, they may be displaced. Ultimate sovereign 
power is held to belong solely to the people, and this in 
appropriate circumstances provides an adequate justification 
for rebellion. I now propose to examine in greater detail 
these four tenets of Lockets legal theory. 
The first of these tenets is that law is an emanation 
of human reason. Locke regarded man as essentially a 
reasonable animal. His view may be said to be that each 
man desires to conserve his own possessions and to live in 
amity with his fellow men. It is essentially unreasonable 
for a man to trespass upon the goods of his neighbour as 
each man has an inborn sense of equity and fair play. Very 
little attention is paid to the struggle for existence, and 
it seems to be tacitly assumed that there is enough for all, 
if only man is reasonable enough to see it. In this con- 
ception of mankind Locke is radically different from Hobbes. 
Hobbes it will be remembered regarded man as an animal 
driven along predetermined courses by lust for power and 
fear of his fellow men. For him human nature was entirely 
selfish. In an ultimate analysis Locke too might have 
regarded/ 
regarded human nature as essentially selfish, but for him 
this selfishness was at least tempered with reasonableness. 
It is this reasonableness which produces the Law of Nature. 
In his own words, "the freedom then of man, and liberty of 
acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having 
reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to 
govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to 
1. 
the freedom of his own will." 
The main points in the law of nature code are simply 
that all men are equal, that is they all enjoy equal rights, 
and that it is the duty of everyone to respect these rights. 
It is contrary to the Law of Nature for one man to steal the 
property of another or to endanger the life of another or to 
make another his slave. Again in Lockers own words, "the 
state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every- 
one, and reason, which is that law teaches all mankind who 
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, 
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty 
2. 
or possessions." It may be noted in passing that private 
property is recognized by the Law of Nature, the theory 
being that each man is entitled to the fruits of his own 
industry. It is assumed that in a state of nature most 
men will be prepared to respect nature's law, but as there 
are unreasonable men it is quite within the law for reason- 
able men to repulse attacks on their property, if necessary 
killing the offender. Locke recognizes that there is no 
authoritative record of men living in the state of nature, 
entirely free of civil society. He can accordingly only 
draw/ 
1. Page 146. 
2, Page 119. 
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draw shadowy conclusions about it, but he does not 
envisage it like Hobbes to have been a scene of perpetual 
warfare. The main purpose of the discussion of the "state 
of nature" and the "Law of Nature" is to furnish a back- 
ground for his subsequent conclusions. 
The second tenet which is to be noted is Lockets 
adherence to the social contract theory of the origin of 
society. As I have already pointed out this theory is 
devoid of historical justification. It was always however 
the popular explanation of social origins before the re- 
searches of a later date were able to prove that society is 
something which has evolved out of the family organization. 
It was perfectly natural for Locke to accept the theory of 
the social contract. He recognizes himself that history 
offers no proof of it, and he explains that the reason for 
this is that de facto government is always antecedent to 
i 
records of its origin. Be is thus obliged to fall back 
upon a priori reasoning, and this reasoning leads him un- 
questionably to the conclusion that civil society owes its 
origin in every case to a social contract. He states quite 
dogmatically that that which begins and actually constitutes 
any political society is nothing but the consent of any 
2. 
number of freemen to unite and incorporate into a society. 
A civil society is formed when men forego their native right 
of avenging personally wrongs done to them and hand this 
3 
power over to the state. It is only when men unite into 
one society so that everyone abandons his executive power 
of the Law of Nature and resigns it to the public that there 
is a political or civil society. 
The/ 
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The nature of Locke's social contract is quite 
different from that of Hobbes. Hobbes postulated that 
the sovereign was not a party to the contract and that 
once men had set up a sovereign over them there was no 
reason, or practically no reason, that would ever justify 
their deposing him. But Locke - and this brings us to 
the third point I mentioned above - regards the contract 
as revocable. Men enter into the contract in order that 
the freedom and security which are their innate rights by 
the law of nature may be better preserved. Although man 
does lose a certain portion of his native freedom by enter- 
ing society - that is he loses the executive power of 
avenging wrongs - it is contrary to the law of nature that 
he should ever become a slave. Accordingly, if the rulers 
in society do attempt to enslave him or rob him of his 
possessions, he is entitled to renounce the contract and 
to return to his original freedom. The existence of 
slavery he regards as denoting a state of war and as quit e 
contrary to the true basis of civil society in that no man 
is a slave of his own free will. It is true, of course, 
that this discussion of the Law of Nature is too abstract 
and theoretical. It deals with a world of ideals rather 
than one of actuality. Its purpose however is to justify 
man's desire for freedom and his hatred of oppression and, 
even if there never was a "state of nature" in the sense 
envisaged by Locke, man does have these desires which 
Locke transposes into rights. But if they are "rights ", 
they are not rights owing their origin to the fact that they 
were actually enjoyed in a state of nature. 
It/ 
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It is interesting to observe the constant emphasis 
which is placed by Locke upon freedom. WPe get for the 
first time a shifting from society considered as a mass 
to the individual in society as being the important thing. 
We have here a very definite approach towards a freedom 
theory of law. Perhaps the following passage is the 
earliest enunciation of the freedom theory of law by any 
English writer. He says: "For law in its true notion, 
is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free 
and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes 
no further than is for the general good of those under that 
law. Could they be happier without it, the law as a use - 
less thing would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves 
the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs 
and precipices. So that however it may be mistaken, the 
end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve 
1. 
and enlarge freedom." The historical importance of this 
dictum will readily be recognized. It states that the 
true end and aim of law is simply the preservation of the 
individual's liberty and that society exists simply for 
the welfare of its component individuals. 
Holding these views Locke is the avowed enemy of 
arbitrary power. Perhaps it would not be incorrect to 
describe him as the forerunner of philosophical radicalism. 
He regards government as being in its nature a trusteeship 
for the governed - the fourth tenet to which I referred 
above. It is here that Locke enters more definitely into 
the fields of current political controversy. In discussing 
the/ 
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the legal position of Parliament, he gives definite 
expression to what is now accepted as its true legal 
position, namely that it enjoys sovereign supremacy. 
Parliament, technically the King in Parliament, had 
always in English legal theory been the supreme sovereign 
power in the state, although that supremacy had suffered 
checks from the arbitrary policy pursued both by the 
Tudor and Stuart Kings and also from the decisions of 
the law courts, given by prejudiced Judges, whose tenure 
of office was dependent upon their enjoying the favour of 
the Crown. The Revolution of 1688 definitely brought to 
an end the pretensions of the Crown to enjoy a power of 
overriding the statute and common law of the realm. In 
the following passage, encumbered as it is by philosophical 
considerations, Locke states the true legal position. "The 
legislative is not only the supreme power of the common- 
wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the 
community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of 
anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by what 
power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a 
law which has not its sanction from that legislative which 
the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the 
law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to 
its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom 
nobody can have a power to make laws but by their own 
1. 
consent and by authority received from them." 
Today the passage just quoted is trite law, but at 
the time when Locke was writing it was, as we have seen, a 
doctrine/ 
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doctrine by no means free from challenge. This definite 
legal position is grounded by Locke upon the Law of Nature, 
and his philosophy takes him a step further. Ultimate 
sovereignty for him is vested not in the legislature, but 
in the people themselves. He says: "The legislative 
being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there 
remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or 
alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act 
1 . 
contrary to the trust reposed in them.'t Finally it is the 
people who are de facto sovereign. This is not, of course 
legally true, but it does describe the position in actual 
fact. Although to the lawyer there are no limits to what 
Parliament may do, its powers are obviously circumscribed 
by the wishes of the majority. In that sense Parliament 
is, as Locke describes it, a trustee on behalf of the 
nation. 
One further point may be noticed. Wre have seen how 
the controversies of the times had largely centred round 
the question of the King's prerogative. The powers of 
the prerogative are of course very wide. Locke does not 
discuss the legal limits of the prerogative, but he does 
deal with the question of the way in which it ought to be 
exercised within its legal limits. He says, for example, 
that the prerogative is not an arbitrary power to do things 
hurtful to the people, and again, that the prerogative is 
nothing but the power of doing good without a rule. He 
means by this that the executive does enjoy certain dis- 
cretionary powers, but that these discretionary powers are 
not/ 
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not to be exercised contrary to the public interest. 
What Locke has in mind is the idea of trusteeship and 
also, of course, although he does not say so, that the 
Stuart Kings had definitely violated their trust and 
that the Revolution of 1688 was amply justified. The 
whole treatise is in fact a vindication of the principles 
of the Revolution, and it is that which gives it so much 
interest. It is a broad survey of contemporary politics 
from the Whig point of view, written with cogency and 
directness. 
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Chapter 3. 
Montesguieu's Spirit of the Laws. 
I have already quoted Mr. Allen's epitome of 
eighteenth century legal theory, where he says "Law 
itself becomes an emanation from a natural order of 
things, a natural rule of reason, and breach of law 
1. 
is merelydvarying from the right rule of reason.'" 
Locke's constitutional essay, which I have just con- 
sidered, is impregnated with such conceptions. So 
also is Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, to which I 
now wish to turn my attention. 
The Spirit of the Laws is mainly an analytical 
study of different types of government. It aims at 
showing the kind of law which is likely to prevail under 
different types of government, and it is also concerned 
with the influence of such factors as race, climate and 
religion upon the law. Montesquieu and Locke may be 
ranked together in the world of legal philosophy, in 
opposition to the views of Bodin and Hobbes. The 
position of Montesquieu may be made clear by contrasting 
him with the latter writer. They differ in this respect 
(among others) that Hobbes wrote to further a definite 
political cause, while Montesquieu did not. Hobbes 
wrote to further the cause of despotism as represented 
by the Royalist party in England. He was a believer 
in uncontrolled despotism as the best form of government. 
It/ 
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It is not so easy to say what Montesquieu regarded as the 
ideal form of government, other than by drawing conclusions 
from his worship of the English constitution. It is at 
any rate certain that Montesquieu was a believer in some 
sort of morality behind the law. In that sense he belongs 
to the Law of Nature school. Hobbes acknowledged no sort 
of duties other than those which flowed from the social 
contract. Montesquieu on the other hand (like Locke) is 
a believer in the validity of certain moral conclusions 
which do not admit of violation. These views are simply 
based on the qualities of human nature, and no social com- 
pact is invented. 
It is difficult however to define with clearness 
Montesquieuts own position as his task was as I have said 
analytical. He seeks to interpret states as they did in 
fact exist. It was not his business to formulate any ideal 
code of law. One other point of difference between Hobbes 
and Montesquieu may be noted. Hobbes as a philosopher 
stood apart from the general philosophical tendencies of 
his time. Montesquieu on the other hand is allied with 
the general rationalistic movement in philosophy. It is 
in reason that he discovers the basis of law. "Law in 
general," he says, "is human reason, inasmuch as it governs 
all the inhabitants of the earth; the political and civil 
laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in 
1. 
which this human reason is applied. ° The criterion then 
by which the laws of a nation are to be judged is found in 
human reason. Different nations on account of their form 
of/ 
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of government and for other reasons have different laws, 
but for all nations the general test remains or should 
remain that of reasonableness. Throughout his work he 
endeavours to show how far that is the case. 
Montesquieu begins by postulating three principal 
1. 
types of government - republican, monarchial and despotic. 
By a republican government is meant one in which either the 
whole body of the people or only a part of it is possessed 
of extreme power. Republican governments are thus divided 
into two classes which he calls aristocratic and democratic 
respectively. A monarchial government is one in which a 
single person governs by fixed and established laws; a 
despotic government is one in which a single person without 
laws directs everything by his own will and caprice. It 
is to be noted that in talking of monarchial governments he 
includes contemporary European governments, even that of 
France. In talking of despotic governments he is thinking 
mainly of Eastern potentates. There are difficulties about 
this classification arising from the fact that power in a 
state need not necessarily be concentrated. Executive 
power may be wielded by one person or body, while legis- 
lative power is wielded by another. Also it is difficult 
to fit into the scheme our present day system of government 
by the King in name, but in reality by Ministers responsible 
to a popularly elected Parliament. One cannot of course 
blame Montesquieu for that. Each of his three different 
types of government gives rise to a different type of laws. 
In each case he makes out the spirit and principle of the 
law will be different. This is no doubt true, although 
it/ 
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it may be noted in passing that the form of government is 
itself a product of the law. Montesquieuts main thesis 
that the spirit of the law varies in different countries 
according as various external factors vary may be accepted 
as perfectly true, but the way in which he works out a 
principle which is quite correct is full of difficulty. 
One discovers difficulty at the outset when Mon - 
tesquieu declares that virtue is the principle of repub- 
lican governments, that honour is the principle of monarchial 
government and that power is the principle of despotic gov- 
ernment. What precisely does he mean by this? The first 
principle is explained thus. "There is no great share of 
probity necessary to support a monarchial or despotic 
government. The force of law in one and the prince's arm 
in the other are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. 
But in a popular state one spring more is necessary namely 
1. 
virtue." But this is full of that difficulty I have re- 
ferred to. One may well ask is probity and virtue not 
just as necessary in a monarchial government as in a 
democratic one? Surely also the force of law is required 
to "preserve the whole" in a democracy just as much as in a 
monarchy? The principle of honour, as the exclusive prin- 
ciple on which the wheels of government turn, in monarchies 
is just as difficult to appreciate. These general con- 
clusions are far from being nonsensical. In monarchies, 
since the citizens are denied a share in the government, 
honour rather than necessary virtue may control the actions 
of the government. But at best that is a vague ethical 
conclusion/ 
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conclusion. Most of these conclusions are in fact rather 
dogmatic and artificial. None the less, it is true that 
the spirit of the law varies in accordance with the type 
of government. Generally speaking, in a democratic state 
the individual will have greater private freedom. Mon- 
tesquieuts ideas are worked out with great elaboration and 
possess considerable interest, but there is no time to 
examine them fully. I must confine myself to his general 
position as a philosopher. Two of the underlying prin- 
ciples of The Spirit of the Law are of extreme importance. 
The first of these is that law has in general its basis in 
human reason and secondly that variety in external circum- 
stances produces different types of law. These conclusions 
are exceedingly important as marking a philosophical attitude 
towards law, which is utterly opposed to the attitude of 
Hobbes and his doctrine of absolutism. It is always to 
be noted that Montesquieuts task is that of interpretation. 
He is concerned with what is, not with what ought to be, 
and, being so concerned, these are the conclusions which 
he reaches. 
It is in accordance with Montesquieuts doctrine 
that variety in external circumstances produces different 
types of law, that the end and aim of law in different 
countries will also be different. This he fully recog- 
nizes. He says "Though all governments have the same 
general end, which is that of preservation, yet each has 
another particular view. Increase of dominion was the 
view of Rome; war, of Sparta; religion, of the Jewish. 
law/ 
law; commerce, that of Marseilles; public tranquillity, 
that of the laws of China; natural liberty, that of the 
1. 
policy of savages." He then goes on to declare "One 
nation there is also in the world, that has for the direct 
end of its constitution political liberty. We shall exam- 
ine presently the principles on which this liberty is 
founded: if they are found, liberty will appear as in a 
2 
mirror." The nation referred to is England. It is 
interesting in the highest degree that a Frenchman writing 
in the eighteenth century should have regarded the end and 
aim of Jaw in this country as the promotion of constitutional 
political liberty. The statement is followed by a chapter 
in which the Constitution of England is described in great 
detail. In every feature of our constitution Montesquieu 
seems to discover some excellence. Thus he says "In a 
state there are always persons distinguished by their birth, 
riches or honours; but were they to be confounded with the 
common people, and to have the weight of a single vote like 
the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and 
they would have no interest in supporting it, as most of 
3 
the popular revolutions would be against them." This is 
his justification for the place in the Constitution occupied 
by the House of Lords. The aristocratic tone is to be 
noted. The voice of Montesquieu was far from being the 
voice of the proletariat. At the same time he does 
recognize that the Upper Chamber should have no other 
share in the legislation relating to supplies than the 
power of rejecting and not that of resolving. Again he 
states/ 
1. Page 175. 2. Page 176. 3. Page 181. 
-- 93 - 
states: "The executive power ought to be in the hands of 
a monarch; because this branch of government, which has 
always need of expedition, is better administered by one 
than by many; whereas, whatever depends on the legislative 
power is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a 
1. 
single person." This is his justification for our tradi- 
tional form of government. Montesquieu does not notice 
however the gradual tendency prevailing at the time towards 
government being performed by the King's Ministers rather 
than by the King in person. Be does not in fact look with 
favour on the idea that executive power should be in the 
hands of persons, who are at the same time members of the 
legislature, because, as he goes on to add: "If there was 
no monarch, and the executive power was committed to a 
certain number of persons, selected from the legislative 
body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reason 
the two powers would be united, as the same persons would 
actually sometimes have, and would moreover be always able 
2. 
to have, a share in both." As a matter of fact this 
describes what in large measure has taken place, although . 
it is not true that this per se has resulted in a diminu- 
tion of liberty. 
Montesquieu, in fact, while praising the English 
Constitution, takes a somewhat antiquated view of it. On 
certain points he is legally incorrect. For example he 
says "It is not proper that the legislative power should 
have a right to stop the executive. For as the executive 
has its natural limits, it is useless to confine it; besides 
the executive power is generally employed in momentous 
3. 
operation."/ 
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operation." That may or may not be a sound maxim in 
political philosophy, but it does not correctly describe 
the position of the Parliament of Great Britain, which 
Montesquieu is professing to describe. It denies that 
Parliament legally enjoys sovereign supremacy. Montes- 
quieu finishes his description of the Constitution with 
this rather melancholy reflection: "As all human things 
have an end, the state we are speaking of will lose its 
liberty, it will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and 
Carthage perished? It will perish when the legislative 
1. 
power share be more corrupted than the executive." We 
may think if we are pessimistically inclined that we are 
approaching the era so described by Montesquieu. 
His conception of the liberty prevailing in this 
island is so strong that Montesquieu goes so fax as to 
say: "Their laws not being made for one individual more 
than another, each considers himself as a monarch; and 
indeed the men of this nation are rather confederates than 
fellow subjects." One may feel inclined to smile on read- 
ing this. It is ludicrously wide of the mark when one 
considers how greatly the common law of the land favoured 
the interests of those who owned large landed estates and 
also when one considers the huge economic inequalities that 
prevailed. It is none the less a tribute to British in- 
stitutions, as they existed in the eighteenth century, that 
they should have presented themselves in so favourable a 
light to one who belonged to a country, whose King regarded 
the state as completely embodied . in his own royal person. 
Montesquieu's conclusions speak eloquently of a certain 
freedom/ 
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9 
freedom which Englishmen did enjoy in common in spite 
of all social and economic differences, and that Mon - 
tesquieu should so have regarded this country and its 
laws is full of significance. 
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Chapter 4. 
The_ age of Judicial Optimism Blackstone and Pale . 
Montesquieuts glowing picture of the freedom which 
he regards as prevailing in these islands finds its counter- 
part in the writings of many Englishmen of the same period. 
The latter half of the eighteenth century may well be 
described as a period of judicial optimism. This is re- 
flected both in the writings of the period and in the 
absence of substantial legislative changes. Professor 
Dicey describes the years between 1760 and 1830 as years 
1. 
of legislative stagnation. The absence of any substantial 
changes in the law during the first thirty of these years 
was due in the main to a general feeling of contentment and 
wellbeing. There did exist anomalies and hardships, but 
it was generally felt that it was impossible ater to have a 
system of law which should be logically perfect, and, as 
that was so, the best policy was to let well alone. This 
describes the conservatism which governed British affairs 
between 1760 and 1790. It was a conservatism which re- 
garded the end and aim of law to be the preservation of 
security and freedom and which regarded jealously any 
attempt to lay impious hands upon that previous structure, 
the Constitution. To the governing classes it seemed to 
be a Constitution which was almost ideal, and, so far as 
they were concerned, it doubtless was so. After 1790 
these/ 
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years of legislative stagnation still continued, but the 
motive was different. It was no longer a general feeling 
of optimism which stood in the way of reform, but a great 
wave of reaction, engendered by the excesses of the French 
Revolution. The general temper of the time was to assoc- 
iate all reformers with Jacobins and revolutionaries, and 
so to postpone necessary and salutary changes. One result 
of this lengthy period of legislative quiescence was that 
in 1827 the constitution of the country, if one excepts 
the Scottish and Irish Unions, was, from a legal point of 
view, practically the same as it was after the Revolution 
1. 
Settlement in 1689. During this long period great changes 
had been introduced in the actual working of the constitu- 
tion, but these changes were rather matters of convention. 
Wile the continuance of legislative stagnation was due 
then to dread of revolutionary violence, it owed its 
genesis to that spirit of judicial optimism, to which I 
have referred. 
This judicial optimism is no where more clearly seen 
or indeed set forth more extravagantly than in Blackstone's 
Commentaries, published between the years 1765 and 1769. 
Blackstone viewed the Constitution with reverence and 
veneration, and its reform in any vital part he regarded 
as sacrilege. He is the great defender of the common law, 
and, as the upholder of much that was then anachronistic 
and absurd, he was hotly assailed by the reforming zeal of 
Bentham. The attitude of Blackstone towards the Constitu- 
tion was however that of the typical Englishman of his day. 
It may be summed up in the following passage from the 
Commentaries/ 
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Commentaries "Of a constitution, so wisely contrived, so 
strongly raised and so highly finished, it is hard to speak 
with that praise, which is justly and severely its due: - 
the thorough and attentive contemplation of it will furnish 
its best panegyric. It hath been the endeavour of these 
commentaries, however the execution may have succeeded, to 
examine its solid foundations, to mark out its extensive 
plan, to explain the use and distribution of its parts, and 
from the harmonious concurrence of these several parts, to 
demonstrate the elegant proption of the whole. We have 
taken occasion to admire at every turn the noble monuments 
of ancient simplicity and the more curious refinements of 
modern art. Nor have its faults been concealed from view; 
for faults it has, lest we should be tempted to think it of 
more than human structure; defects, chiefly arising from 
the decays of time, and the rage of unskilful improvements 
in later ages. To sustain, to repair, to beautify this 
noble pile, is a charge entrusted principally to the 
nobility, and such gentlemen of the kingdom, as are 
delegated by their country to parliament. The protection 
of The Liberty of Britain is a duty which they owe to them- 
selves, who enjoy it; to their ancestors, who transmitted 
it down; and to their posterity, who will claim at their 
hands this the best birthright and the noblest inheritance 
1. 
of mankind." The spirit of adulation shown in these 
flowing periods made Blackstone rather a blind worshipper. 
He saw nothing wrong in the antiquated formalism of the law, 
in the favours which it extended to the wealthy and the 
powerful and its tolerance of abuses. Blackstone regarded 
the/ 
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the form of government as ideal because it comprised the 
three elements of the Crown, the nobility and the commons, 
each element being independent of the other. The advant- 
ages of each of these forms of government were present 
without any of the defects and the mingling of the three 
forms served to preserve an equitable balance. In crit- 
icism of this it may be said that Blackstone rather fails 
to notice that so far as the King's share of the government 
was concerned, it was passing into the hands of his ministers 
and that these ministers comprised the leaders of the 
largest party in the House of Commons. It may also be 
noticed that the distinction between the aristocratic 
portion of the government, that is the House of Lords, 
and the democratic portion, the House of Commons was not 
so very great, the electors of the latter being a very 
small oligarchic minority of the whole nation. According- 
ly whatever virtues there are in democratic government 
would not be evidenced by the government of Great Britain 
in the eighteenth century. The essential points about 
Blackstone however are his unshakeable belief in the 
British Constitution as the best of all possible Consti- 
tutions, his slavish adherence to the doctrine that what- 
ever is is right, and his vigorous opposition to reform. 
A very similar view of the Constitution is presented 
1. 
in a very interesting dhapter of Paley's Political Philos- 
ophy. This chapter is an outline sketch of the Constitution 
as it existed at the time when Paley was writing. Paley, 
like Blackstone, regarded the Constitution as ideal in that 
it/ 
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it formed a unique combination of monarchic, aristocratic 
and democratic government, in which each portion balanced 
the other two. Precisely the same criticism applies of 
course to this view as applied to the views expressed by 
Blackstone. The most interesting part of Paley's chapter 
however is that dealing with the unreformed House of Commons. 
1 
He gives an elaborate description of the various anomalies 
which then prevailed in regard to the election of its 
members. He shows for example that two hundred of the 
five hundred and forty eight members were elected by seven 
thousand persons, and that a majority of these seven thousand, 
without any title to superior weight and influence in the 
state, might, under certain circumstances decide a question 
against the opinion of as many millions. Again he mentions 
that about one half of the members of the House of Commons 
obtained their seats in that assembly, not by the election 
of the people, but by the nomination of single proprietors 
of great estates. It is natural for a modern democrat to 
regard that as a fantastic way of electing the members of a 
professedly popular House. Paley, however, has no such 
qualms. The position might be anomalous, but in his view 
it was perfectly justified by the results. "If men the 
most likely by their qualifications to know and to promote 
the public interest, be actually returned to parliament, it 
signifies little who return them. If the properest persons 
2. 
be elected, what matters it by whom they are elected." In 
reply to all this it may be said that the assembly was not 
a democratic one at all, and the argument is really one 
against/ 
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against democratic government, proceeding on the assumption 
that the ruling classes are likely to know better than the 
people themselves what is for the good of the people. The 
governing classes comprised a small oligarchy, consisting 
of the great families of the nation. 
This position is quite recognized by Paley. He says: 
'whatever may be the defects of the present arrangement, it 
infallibly secures a great weight of property to the House 
of Commons, by rendering many seats in that House accessible 
1. 
to men of large fortunes, and to such men alone.'} That 
was certainly true: Again he says nhen such boroughs are 
set to sale, those men are likely to become purchasers, who 
are enabled by their talents to make the best of the bargain: 
.when a seat is not so]d , but given by the opulent proprietor 
of a burgage tenure, the patron finds his own interest con- 
sulted, by the reputation and abilities of the member whom 
he nominates. If certain of the nobility hold the appoint- 
ment of some part of the House of Commons, it serves to 
maintain that alliance between the two branches of the 
legislature, which no good citizen would wish to see dis- 
2. 
severed." Paley is nothing if not ingenuous, and the 
modern democrat will probably smile on reading these 
passages. Here we have the existence of pocket burghs 
and the control of the lower by the upper House defended 
as the best arrangements in the interests of the country. 
We have certainly travelled a long way since the chapter 
was written! Paley's main concern is the preservation of 
balance in the Constitution. A completely independent 
House/ 
1. Page 225. 2. Pages 226 -227. 
- 102 - 
House of Commons, that is one uninfluenced either by the 
Crown or the House of Lords, would in his view be a 
danger to the state. For that reason he defends royal 
influence at elections. He declares that he is opposed 
to clandestine rewards of any kind, but, on the other hand, 
he believes in the Crown, maintaining its influence by 
holding forth the expectation of public preferments to 
those members of the House of Commons, who will fall in line 
with its wishes. It may be suggested that the boundary 
between the "public preferments" which he has in view and 
"clandestine rewards" is rather a thin one. It is only by 
such stratagems however that Paley conceives the existence 
of Parliament to be compatible with the existence of the 
monarchy. No doubt difficulties of this sort may arise in 
constitutions where there is a complete "separation of the 
powers ". In such constitutions there is always a danger 
of conflict between the executive and the legislature. Even 
at the time when Paley was writing however executive power 
was wielded not by the King in person so much as by his 
Ministers, and as they were members of the legislature 
conflict was unlikely. This new constitutional develop- 
ment appears to be unnoticed by both Blackstone and Paley. 
The supremely important point about this chapter is 
its note of acceptance. It is, too, impossible to excuse 
Paley, as one might well accuse Blackstone, of being a 
purblind Tory. Paley was a man prepared to think along 
independent lines, an attitude of mind which is illustrated 
by the famous simile of the pigeons, in which he compared 
mankind to a flock of pigeons settled in a cornfield. 
Those/ 
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Those pigeons, he regards, as not eating the corn them- 
selves but collecting it assiduously for the delectation 
of one bird who sat by and did nothing: It is perhaps 
remarkable that the man who wrote that should also be the 
strenuous upholder of the British Constitution - a Con- 
stitution which encouraged that sort of conduct among its 
pigeons! It indicates very clearly indeed the whole 
tendencies of this age of judicial optimism, an age of 




The Social Contract Theory of Rousseau and the 
"Natural Law't Theory of Quesnay. 
If the years between 1760 and 1790 were years of 
judicial optimism in Great Britain, they were certainly 
far from being that on the other side of the Channel. It 
is significant to contrast the satisfied conservatien of 
Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1765 with the 
clamant liberalism of Rousseau's Social Contract published 
in 1761. Both may be taken as typical of the temper pre- 
vailing in the respective nations of their publication. 
The ideas expounded in The Social Contract, although not 
productive of the same tremendous effects in Great Britain 
as in France, must none the less be examined here. The 
Social Contract is a landmark which it is impossible to 
pass by. 
The fires which it stirred up on the Continent give 
it the greatest historical importance. It was one of the 
sparks which kindled the French Revolution. If it were 
not for the historical interest which it possesses The 
Social Contract would contain little of permanent interest. 
There are very few ideas in it which are not found in either 
Locke or Hobbes. It is rather on account of the effect 
which the book produced than for anything which it contains 
that it remains as a: landmark today. It affirms such 
doctrines as the social contract theory of society and the 
sovereignty of the people, doctrines quite familiar to 
English/ 
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English readers from the works of the two authors, whom I 
have mentioned. It has also this in common with their 
works, a practically entire disregard of historical auth- 
orities. In dealing with the social contract, Rousseau 
can no more produce historical evidence for his statements, 
than Locke or Hobbes could. Like them he simply assumes 
that it must be so, and on similar premises he builds up 
his conclusions by a priori reasoning. At the same time 
although the ideas in The Social Contract are for the most 
part not original, they are usually expressed with very 
great force. There is an element of fire in the work. 
And this of course could not be otherwise when the man and 
the conditions under which the book was written are remem- 
bered. Rousseau has a telling gift of phrases and the 
book is written with missionary fervour. an is born 
1 
free and he is everywhere in chains" is an expression that 
one remembers. France more than any country in Europe 
suffered from the misgovernment of arbitrary despotism 
in the year 1761, the year when The Social Contract was 
published. It is not part of my business to describe 
the manifold injustices of its rotten and corrupt system 
of government, but it is to be remembered that it was 
against such a background that The Social Contract was 
written. 
Everywhere The Social Contract is impregnated with 
a burning desire for freedom. The book opens with an 
intense expression of this. The wrongs and injustices 
which/ 
1. Rousseau. The Social Contract (Published by P. 
Putnam's Sons Ltd., London). Page 2. 
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which flow from tyranny come freely under the lash. The 
sentence I have already quoted "ì/lan is born free and he is 
everywhere in chains" strikes the keynote. This of course 
is a purposely exaggerated statement. Ban however is (in 
Rousseau's view) entitled to be free. That is his innate 
privilege as man. It follows that a tyrannical system of 
government is an immoral system of government. The only 
legitimate basis of government he affirms is government 
based upon agreement - an agreement which flows of course 
from the social contract. The argument that the only 
legitimate basis of government is government based upon 
agreement follows from his theory that no man has any 
moral authority over his fellow men. Force confers no 
such moral right. Iie says: "Strength is physical power. 
I do not see what moral force could result from its action. 
1 . 
To yield to force is an action of necessity not of will." 
And again: "The words slave and right are contradictory; 
2. 
they mutually exclude each other." All this is quite in 
accordance with the views of Locke that each man has a 
right to be free based upon an eternal and immutable "Law 
of Nature". It is typical of the new value placed upon 
the individual. It is in full accordance with the shift- 
ing of emphasis from society considered as an organic whole 
to society considered as a mass of individuals, each one of 
whom is entitled to his freedom. 
All legitimate government is then in Rousseau's 
view based upon agreement, the agreement being referable 
to the social contract. There is much generalization 
about/ 
1. Page 7. 2. Page 17. 
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generalization about this social contract, although there 
is not, as of course there could not be, any proof of its 
ever having taken place. The nature of the contract is 
summed up thus: "If we remove from the social contract 
all that is not of its essence, it will be reduced to the 
following terms. Each of us gives in common his person 
and all his force under the supreme direction of the 
general will; and we receive each member as an indiv- 
1. 
isible part of the whole." The social contract is the 
pivot of all Rousseau's political reasoning. It provides 
a theoretical basis upon which arguments as to the rights 
of man can be based. It came to be a theory of the 
greatest political moment and its exposition and popular - 
ization provided in due course fuel to feed the ardour of 
the French Revolutionaries. It is interesting to note 
that a theory which led to such a vast political upheaval 
and which altered the whole trend of political thought not 
only in France, but also in Great Britain, should have 
rested on such a shallow foundation. It is also note- 
worthy that the theory which served Hobbes as a philosophic 
justification for absolute government should have served a 
later generation as a philosophic justification for revolu- 
tionary violence in order that the rights of man might 
thereby be secured. 
It is this theory of the social contract and its 
moral consequences which is the most important thing in 
The Social Contract, but certain other of its doctrines 
may also be noted. Rousseau like Locke regarded the 
social contract as revocable. When rulers cease to merit 
the/ 
1. Page 22. 
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the confidence which has been placed in them, society 
may be dissolved and thereafter set up upon a new basis. 
He says: "The instant the government usurps sovereignty, 
the social compact is broken; and all the citizens re- 
gaining by right their natural liberty are forced to obey, 
1. 
but are under no obligation to do so." It is part of 
this doctrine that legitimate government only exists as 
long as the citizens are consenting parties to the form 
of government. In other words legitimate government only 
exists as long as the citizens are the ultimate sovereign 
body in the state. It is the citizens who are sovereign; 
they themselves are not (necessarily) the governors. But 
they are sovereign in that for their own common good they 
consent to be governed. These ideas are worked out with 
a considerable degree of elaboration and ingenuity, but 
the broad conception is as I have stated it to be. 
It may at first sight appear surprising that 
Rousseau is not a democrat. He does not believe that 
democratic government is superior to aristocratic or mon- 
archic government. It is all a question for him of what 
the citizens desire and they do not necessarily desire 
democracy. He is as a matter of fact contemptuous of 
democracy. In one passage he says "If there were a 
people of gods, its government would be democratic. So 
2. 
perfect government is not suitable for men.!! It may be 
noted however that his conception of democracy was quite 
archaic. He regards democracy as a state where all the 
citizens assemble at regular intervals to decide upon 
questions of law and policy. He makes one statement 
which/ 
1. Page 133. 2. Page 104. 
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which might well stagger the Briton of today: "In a 
1. 
democracy the people is lightly taxed:" He shows in 
fact no appreciation of the principles of representative 
government. The following passage contains a good deal 
that is absurd. "Any law which the people in person has 
not ratified is null; it is not a law. The English 
people think they are free, they deceive themselves: they 
are free only during the election of members of Parliament: 
as soon as they are elected the people is enslaved and has 
2. 
no power." Ill considered statements such as that do 
appear from time to time. It is typical of Rousseau's 
frequent lack of knowledge of the facts he is discussing, 
and it injures the logical value of the whole argument. 
It may be noted that there is not much of the "back to 
nature" cry in The Social Contract. There are however 
occasional passages in which he expresses contempt for 
the sophistications of society and a desire for a simple 
and more honest life, as in his glorification of the early 
days of the Roman Republic, which he conceives as being in 
accordance with his ideals. 
The Social Contract may be summed up by saying that 
it is a cry for freedom. It is a protest in the name of 
justice against the wrongs which flow from arbitrary gov- 
ernment. It is written with much eloquence and it did 
serve to inspire the revolutionary movement in French 
politics. Although the book is written with much passion, 
its primary concern is to present a reasoned case. This 
is of course in full accordance with the methods adopted 
by most eighteenth century writers on philosophic subjects. 
A/ 
1. Page 123. Page 145. 
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A supposed factual basis is taken and on this a case is 
built up. The weakness of the position is that the 
factual basis is only a supposed one. If the rights 
of man are taken to rest upon his free consent in entering 
society, they are being made to rest upon a basis which 
has no historical foundation. It is true that the rights 
of man need not rest upon any such basis, but, when that 
is admitted, we have not got rid of all the difficulties. 
We may accept the sovereignty of the people as a political 
axiom, but who is to say when that sovereignty is flouted? 
The people do not act and think as one, and the question 
of when rebellion is to be held as morally justified is 
not really faced. Rousseau writes as a philosopher; he 
does not argue with the accurate precision of a lawyer 
nor with the historical sense of a historian. Accuracy 
and sure knowledge of his facts seems rather to be despised 
than sought after. Yet when all that is remembered the 
book still remains a landmark in political writing. The 
doctrine it preaches is that of revolutionary liberalism 
and it was to be a powerful instrument in bringing the old 
order of things to an end. 
It is interesting to compare The Social Contract 
with the work of another French writer, Francois Quesnay. 
Quesnay was born in 1694. He had an eminent career as a 
medical practitioner, being appointed in his later years 
to the post of physicien to Madame de Pompadour and also 
to the King. Late in life he turned his attention to 
the study of economics. He occupies a very considerable 
niche in the history of that subject, as the originator of 
the/ 
the so called physiocratic school. The principle tenet 
of that school was the doctrine of non -intervention, that 
is the belief that the state ought not to interfere in 
matters of trade and that freedom of trade was the ideal 
which ought to be sought. He is the real originator of 
the doctrine of laissez faire, about which something will 
fall to be said later. What is important here is that 
the economic theories which Quesnay preached were a part 
of the wider views which he held on topics of jurisprud- 
ence. The main article of his faith was a strenuous 
belief in what he called droit naturel. It is rather 
difficult to define precisely what he meant by droit 
naturel. Fundamentally it appears to mean certain 
inviolable rights which man ought always to enjoy. It 
is morally right that he should enjoy these rights and 
it is morally wrong that he should not. These rights 
rest on no other basis than their innate reasonableness. 
The doctrine really harks back to the jus naturale of 
1. 
Roman Law, which I have already discussed. Jus naturale 
in Roman Law represented in the main an ideal - the ideal 
of reasonableness to which the actual jus civile ought as 
far as possible to conform. 
Quesnay defines droit naturel as le droit que 
2. 
l'homme a aux choses propres a sa jouissance. This is 
certainly rather a vague and sweeping statement and 
further particularity of definition is required. Quesnay 
explains that the right in actual practice is limited to 
the things of which man can obtain the enjoyment aux 
choses/ 
1. See Part I, Chapter 4. Supra. 
2. Quesnay. Le Droit Naturel (Dnchen's complete edition), 
page 359. 
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1. 
choses done i.1 ,peat obtenir la ióuissance. He explains 
this by a metaphor. He says that the swallow might be said 
to have a right to all the flies that dance in the air, but 
in fact the swallow's rights are limited to those it can 
2. 
catch. This is not very satisfactory because (if such a 
thing can be supposed) in the event of two swallows each 
wanting and each able to catch the same fly, which swallow 
has a natural right to it? Obviously more requires to be 
said limiting the things which a man can enjoy before that 
will serve as a basis of natural right. In the first place, 
a man is entitled (in Quesnay's view) to own and enjoy the 
fruits of his own labour. He is also entitled to the owner- 
ship of anything of which he takes effective possession, 
provided he does not disturb the previous possession of 
someone else. Labour and possession are thus taken to be 
the basis of the right of private property, which is one of 
the fundamental rights secured to mankind by droit naturel. 
The right of a man to everything which he can enjoy is only 
an ideal; his actual right is limited to the private proper- 
ty which he has lawfully acquired either by labour of poss- 
ession. These are rights which a man is supposed to enjoy 
in a state of nature. When man comes to live in society, 
these rights will be increased, if the constitution of the 
society respects the fundamental rights of men, which it is 
3. 
evidently most advantageous to men that it should do. 
Quesnay draws a distinction between droit naturel 
(which has already been defined) and droit legitime. 
Droit legitime is the actual law which is imposed by the 
state/ 
1. Page 366. 2. Page 367. 3. Page 368. 
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state and may be taken to be analogous to the ,jus civile 
of Roman Law. Quesnay declares that droit naturel is 
recognized by the light of reason only and is obligatory 
independently of any sanction, whereas droit legitime is 
obligatory by reason of the pains and penalties imposed 
for any breach of it. Droit naturel he regards as sup- 
erior to droit legitime. This is so because the former 
is an ideal, whereas much enacted law is absurd. The 
lois naturelles he talks of as being immutables et 
1 
irréfra ables et les meilleures lois possibles. In spite 
of this praise, he supplies no definite code of what droit 
naturel consists. Nor does he discuss the question of 
how far men are bound by the droit naturel as the superior 
law when the dictates of the droit legitime are opposed 
to it. Presumably in such circumstances, resistance to 
the droit legitime would be justified. For Quesnay the 
end and aim of law would appear to be the preservation of 
individual liberty and the rights of private property. 
These are the rights which are immutables et irréfragables 
et les meilleures lois possibles. But it is here that 
the weakness of all theories of natural law reveals itself. 
The law of nature can never be immutable artel its content 
must always remain indefinite. This is so because what 
is reasonable does not remain a constant, and even the 
most fundamental articles of the creed, like private 
property and personal freedom, have not been accepted at 
all times and in all places. 
Certain of Quesnayts ideas are in some respects not 
very far removed from those of Rousseau. The language of 
the/ 
1. p. 375. 
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the two writers, it is true, is different. The insurgent 
violence of Rousseau is not present in Quesnay, but cer- 
tain of the fundamental ideas of both writers are very 
similar. They both insist strongly on the morality 
which ought to permeate all positive law. Where this 
morality is not present the law is bad and resistance is 
justifiable. This morality is based upon the innate 
rights of man and its basis is simply inherent reasonable- 
ness. Both writers, too, give freedom an important share 
in that morality. They differ on important issues, and 
the accents of Rousseau are much more strident than those 
of Quesnay, but it is possibly the doctrines of the latter 
which have had the more lasting effect. Quesnay occupies 
an important position among those writers who have written 
on the Law of Nature, and the strength and weakness of all 
such theories are well exemplified in his work. 
Part IV. 
NINETEENTH CENTURY THEORIES OF LAW. 
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Chaxt er 1. 
The Opening Years Of The Century. 
There can be little difficulty in stating what 
the end and aim of law was, as viewed by the government 
of Great Britain, in the opening years of the nineteenth 
century. A resolute conservatism and the ruthless stamp- 
ing out of all movements, which might in any way be re- 
garded as seditious, were the distinguishing features in 
the policy of successive British. governments. The result 
of that policy was the continuance of these years of 
"legislative stagnatiori; to which I have already referred, 
a policy not now due to a supreme faith in the goodness of 
British institutes', but to a nervous dread of change and 
all that change implied. Events in France at the time of 
the Revolution had struck deep into the consciousness of 
most Englishmen and encouraged a policy of repression in 
home affairs. Dread of France was encouraged by the fear 
that the new Republic intended to place itself at the head 
of a confederation of republics and in particular that 
Great Britain was the principle object of their hostile 
machinations. To quote Burke, the French Republicans 
had begun "by establishing correspondences, communications, 
2. 
and a sort of federal union with the factious here." 
"This tyranny of a licentious, ferocious and savage mul- 
titude without laws, manners or morals, was insolently 
endeavouring/ 
1. See Page 96 Supra. 
2. Edmund Burke. Works. Vol. 6. Appeal from The New 
to the Old Whigs. P. 89. 
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endeavouring to alter all the principles and opinions which 
have hitherto guided the world, and to force them into con- 
1 
formity with their views and actions." It is interesting 
to note how even the language of history repeats itself. 
These fulminations of Burke might easily have failed from 
the lips of present day Tories denouncing the rulers of 
Soviet Russia: The Napoleonic Wars in turn led to a 
hardening of this policy of repression. It is impossible 
to enter in detail into the legislation passed by success- 
ive British Parliaments during these years. I may note 
however the almost entire absence of ameliorative legis- 
lation. Such legislation as there was was mainly 
reactionary in tendency. 
We have, for example, the Combination Act of 1800, 
which, speaking generally, made illegal all combinations 
of masters and servants for the purpose of controlling 
wages, hours of employment, and other industrial questions. 
It was primarily an act for the suppression of trade unions 
2. 
and strikes. Thus it was made illegal to assist in main- 
taining men on strike. Other legislation of the same 
reactionary tendency was the group of laws known as the 
six acts of 1819. "They were," to quote Professor Dicey, 
'certainly the work of Tories, who filled with dread of 
sedition and rebellion, wished to curtail the right of 
public discussion, and these enactments, which aimed, 
among other objects, at the prevention and punishment of 
blasphemous and seditious libels and at effectually pre- 
venting seditious meetings and assemblies out of doors, 
a 
aroused grave fears among all friends of freedom." 
The/ 
1. Appeal From The New to the Old Whigs . Page 94. 
2. Dicey. Law and Opinion. Page 96. 
3. Dicey. Law and Opinion. Pages 102 and 103. 
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The whole trend of the law was favourable to the 
interests of the squirearchy who ruled the country. I 
have already in discussing Paley's account of the unre- 
formed House of Commons mentioned bow the election of 
that body was largely controlled by the landed aris- 
1. 
tocracy. That same landed aristocracy was of course 
supreme in the House of Lords. The incidence of taxa- 
tion was eloquent of the entire spirit of the law. 
Practically all commodities were subject to duties of 
considerable amounts. Thies fell very hardly on the 
poorer sections of the community, while the impost of 
these duties was hardly felt by the wealthy. There 
was a land tax, but its burden was not heavy. In par - 
ticular the corn law duties may be referred to - a tax 
which fell with particular hardship on the working classes. 
The game laws may also be mentioned as illustrative of the 
way in which the squirearchy sought to protect its own 
interests. A law was actually passed making the sale of 
2 
game illegal, although it largely failed in its effect. 
In England no man had a legal right to kill game, who had 
3 
not £100 a year in landrent. It was perfectly legal for 
landlords to set spring guns to keep down poaching. It 
is not untrue to say that the law placed a higher value 
on the sport of the landed classes than it did on human 
life. The way in which these things were looked at is 
made abundantly clear by a statute passed in the year 1820, 
1 George IV. C. 56. This is an act for the summary pun- 
ishment in certain cases of persons wilfully or maliciously 
damaging/ 
1. See supra page 100. 
2. Sydney Smith. Works. Vol. II. pages 47 -63. 
3. Do. Vol. 1. page 306. 
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damaging or committing trespasses on public or private 
property. The act imposes certain penalties for these 
offences and then it goes on to provide - and this is 
what is important - an exception for mischief done in 
hunting and by shooters who are duly qualified. The 
comments of Sydney Smith may be noted. "Is there, upon 
earth, such a mockery of justice as an Act of Parliament, 
pretending to protect property, sending a poor hedge - 
breaker to jail, and specially exempting from its opera - 
tion the accusing and the judging squire, who, at the tail 
of the hounds, has that morning, perhaps, ruined as much 
wheat: and seeds as would purchase fuel a whole year for a 
1. 
whole village ?" This act demonstrates very clearly indeed 
where the sympathies of the unreformed legislature lay. 
At the same time when acts such as that just cited 
were being passed the most glaring and horrible abuses were 
allowed to continue unchecked. The House of Commons in 
1824 and again in 1826 refused to allow the introduction 
of a bill to permit persons on trial for felony to be re- 
presented by counsel. It is rather difficult to realize 
today that a measure, which seems so entirely reasonable 
and indeed to accord with the most elementary notion of 
justice, should have met with this opposition. It shows 
very clearly the prevailing temper. The growth of the 
industrial system, too, had led to the most terrible 
abuses. The system of child labour in the factories was 
revolting in the extreme. So also, to quote another 
instance, was the brutal treatment of boys employed as 
apprentices to sweep chimneys. Sydney Smith in one of 
his/ 
1. Sydney Smith. Yorks. Vol. 1. Page 411. 
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his articles gives a vivid description of the horrible 
tortures they had to endure at the hands of vicious and 
1. 
unprincipled masters. It would be unjust to the Parlia- 
ment of these days to say that it was unwilling to listen 
to the claims of humanitarianism. Its members may have 
been perfectly well intentioned. The opposition to re- 
form was not due to lack of sympathy. It was simply due 
to the all prevailing dread of change in any form. 
Another field in which the opposition to reform 
revealed itself was in the antiquated rules of procedure, 
which continued to exist in the law courts. Certain of 
these are described in Professor Diceyts book on Law and 
Public minion in England in the Nineteenth. Century. 
Dealing with legal fictions, Professor Dicey says: The 
ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court of Kings Bench 
rested upon the absurd fiction that the defendant in an 
action, e.g. for a debt, had been guilty of a trespass. 
The ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer 
rested upon the equally absurd fiction that the plaintiff 
in an action was a debtor to the king, and, owing to the 
injury or damage done him by the defendant, was unable to 
pay his debt to the king. If A brought an action for a 
wrong done him abroad by X, as, for instance, for an assault 
committed at Minorca, his right to sue was justified by 
the fiction that the assault had taken place 'at Minorca 
(to wit) at London in the parish of St Mary le Bow in the 
2. 
ward of Cheap.'" The learned author comments that these 
long labyrinths of judge made fictions seem to a lawyer of 
today as strange as the most fanciful dreams of Alice in 
Wonderland. 
Such/ 
1. Sydney Smith. Works. Vol. 1. pages 347 -361. 
2. Dicey. Law and Public Opinion. Pages 91 and 92. 
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Such then were certain of the conditions which 
existed towards the end of the period of legislative 
stagnation. The year 1830 may be taken as a convenient 
date to mark the termination of that period. The years 
which followed were years of the most intense legislative 
activity. In a great measure the reform movement was 
stimulated by the writings of Jeremy Bentham, and before 
discussing the achievements of the reform movement, it is 
right that some account should be given of the life work 
of its harbinger. 
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Chapter 2. 
Bentham and Theories of Law Reform. 
The part played by Bentham in the reform movement 
is well summed up in these words of Lord Brougham. "The 
age of law reform and the age of Jeremy Bentham are one 
and the same. He is the father of all the most important 
branches of reform, the leading and ruling department of 
human improvement. No one before him had ever seriously 
thought of exposing the defects in our English system of 
jurisprudence. All former students had confined them- 
selves to learning its principles - to make themselves 
masters of its eminently technical and artificial rules; 
and all former writers had but expounded the doctrines 
handed down from age to age. .... He it was who first 
made the mighty step of trying the whole provisions of 
our jurisprudence by the test of expediency, fearlessly 
examining how far each part was connected with the rest, 
and with a yet more undaunted courage, inquiring how far 
even its most consistant and symmetrical arrangements were 
framed according to the principle which should pervade a 
code of laws - their adaptation to the circumstances of 
society, to the wants of men, and the promotion of human 
1. 
happiness." That may be taken as a correct description 
of the tremendous influence exercised by Bentham on the 
development of English law. Perhaps indeed no man has 
ever lived who has left a profounder mark on the laws of 
his/ 
1. Brougham. Speeches II, pages 287 and 288. 
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his country. The first point to be noticed is that 
Bentham appeared on the stage at exactly the right time. 
The early years of his manhood were coincident with the 
period of legal quiescence. He supplied the corrective 
required to waken his countrymen from the prevailing 
torpor. Bentham's writings served as a flail. His 
later years coincided with the period of reaction, and 
once more a flail was required. The final years of his 
life saw the adoption of many of the schemes and projects 
of reform, which he had advocated so strenuously. It is 
satisfactory to think that he lived to see the adoption 
of so many of these schemes, even if the full effect of 
his life's work only became apparent after his death. 
Bentham was born in London in 1748. His father 
and grandfather had both been attornies and young Bentham 
was also designed for a legal career. He was educated 
first at Westminster School and afterwards at Christ Church 
College, Oxford. He went to Oxford at the age of twelve. 
It is significant that even at that tender age the note of 
rebellion is present. Bentham could only matriculate 
after signing a form declaring his belief in the Thirty 
Nine Articles. He did not fully believe in the creed 
there laid down, and he signed only under protest. After 
taking his degree he proceeded to Lincoln's Inn. While 
there, he used to attend the Court of the great Chief 
Justice Mansfield, whom at that time he held in high 
admiration. He did not intend however to pursue an 
active career at the Bar. He did not possess the 
qualities! 
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qualities which go to make a successful advocate: he 
was rather a shy recluse who preferred to devote his life 
to scholarship. From the beginning his attention was 
taken up with the theoretical side of the law, rather than 
with the day to day practical side of it in the law courts. 
The philosophy which impregnates all Bentham's work 
is that of utility. He was not the first of the utilit- 
arians. The creed of utility was more or less the 
accepted creed of English philosophy of the day. The 
main tenet of the doctrine is that happiness is the 
criterion of the moral worth of any action. Bentham 
was however the first (if we exclude Beccaria) to take 
this doctrine and apply it systematically to the study 
of law. He first appears to have been drawn to it from 
certain essays of Hume. But it was in the works of 
Beccaria, the Italian legal philosopher, that he found 
the famous phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number." Beccaria in the introduction to his famous 
Treatise Of Crimes And Punishments declares "If we look 
into history, we shall find that laws have been for the 
most part the work of the passions of a few or the con- 
sequences of fortuitous or temporary necessity; not 
dictated by a cool examiner of human nature, who knew 
how to collect in one point the actions of a multitude 
and had this only end in view, the greatest_happiness of 
the greatest number." Again, he says: "Good legislation 
is the art of conducting men to the maximum of happiness 
and to the minimum of misery." This proposition seemed 
to/ 
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to Bentham entirely reasonable, and to supply the univer- 
sal criterion for all law. He made it the motto of his 
life work. What Bentham himself meant by the principle 
of utility he explains at the beginning of his Princï lea 
of Morals and. Legislation. He says: "By the principle 
of utility is meant that principle which approves or dis- 
approves of every action whatsoever, according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish 
the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: 
or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or 
1. 
to oppose that happiness." The doctrine is in Bentham's 
view beyond the reach of argument. He says: "Is it 
susceptible of any direct proof? It should seem not: 
for that which is used to prove everything else cannot 
2. 
itself be proved." It is along these lines then that 
in his view the reform of English law ought to proceed. 
The question to be asked always was "What is the greatest 
good of the greatest number ?" and the answer given should 
always determine the future development of the law. 
The first important work of Bentham is his Fragment 
On Government which appeared anonymously in 1776. It was 
for the most part an attack upon certain passages in 
Blackstone's Commentaries. The attack on the author of 
the Commentaries is very severe, and it cannot be denied 
that Bentham is successful in showing the hollow and 
meaningless character of the passages with which he deals. 
In the first place Bentham makes a bold bid for the right 
of/ 
1. Bentham. Principles of Morals and Legislation. Works. 
Vol. 1. Page 1. 
2. Do. Page 2. 
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of criticism - in counter distinction to Blackstone who 
regarded the British Constitution as standing beyond the 
pale of criticism. Bentham is right when he says: "This 
much is certain that a system that is never to be censured 
will never be improved: that if nothing is to be found 
1. 
fault with nothing will ever be remedied." With the 
laborious attack made by Bentham on the Commentaries it 
is unnecessary to deal; on the other hand it is interest- 
ing to learn Bentham's opinions on the topics brought under 
discussion. The first topic discussed is the favourite 
one of the formation of society. It is uncertain how far 
Blackstone accepted the theory of the social contract be- 
cause his language is vague, but, so far as Bentham is 
concerned, he rejects it altogether. He regards it as a 
fiction with which he will have nothing to do. He is 
unable however to bridge the gap between what he calls 
"natural society" and "political society". This is not 
surprising because the subject is one of which both authors 
were entirely ignorant. Another subject discussed by 
Bentham in this treatise is the illimitable character of 
sovereign power. His assertion of the supremacy of the 
sovereign power in the state is a necessary part of 
Bentham's theory of jurisprudence as in his view the 
whole field of law should consist of nothing but the 
commands of the sovereign power. There is no idea which 
crops up with greater frequency in his work than a demand 
for the codification of the laws. These doctrines were 
later elaborated by Austin, and form the basis of the 
Austinian theory of law. 
Perhaps/ 
1. Bentham. Fragment On Government. Vol. I. Page 230. 
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Perhaps the most damning criticism which can be 
brought against Bentham is his entire lack of historical 
perspective. As Mr. F. C. Montague points out, Bentham 
scarcely regarded history as anything better than an 
1. 
almanac out of date. This is revealed in one passage 
where he says: "That which is law, is, in different 
countries widely different: while that which ought to be, 
2.. 
is in all countries to a great degree the same." What 
the law actually is in any country is the product of a 
number of forces, such as the history of the people, 
racial development, local customs and so forth. Yet 
Bentham entirely disregards these local variations. His 
tendency is too much to treat men as automata, who must 
dance to the beats of the utilitarian orchestra. This 
same error is present in his constant demand for the 
codification of the law. He is the inveterate enemy of 
that portion of the law which flows from decisions of the 
Courts. He regards Judges as biassed. It is not in 
their interest that the law should be improved. It is 
the antiquated absurdities of the law which furnish 
lawyers with a job. "As to the lawyer, this man adds 
another sinister interest, peculiar to his own tribe: 
an interest, in that system, by which while not so much 
as a chance for justice is allowed to any but a compara- 
tively few, even those few are kept in a state of oppres- 
sion: oppressed, by factitious delay, vexation and 
expense, created by lawyers, in the situation of Judges 
and/ 
1. F. C. Montague. Introduction to his Edition of Frág- 
ment On Government. Page 30. 
2. Bentham. Fragment On Government. Vol. I. Page 229. 
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and legislators, for the sake of the profit extracted by 
1. 
the fraternity out of the expense." This is certainly a 
formidable indictment: It is exaggerated and unfair, but 
again it serves to show the dogmatic nature of Bentham's 
demands. Judges must cease to be legislators and con- 
fine themselves to the business of interpreting the code. 
It is of course obvious that no code could be sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover all the cases which arise in prac- 
tice, but this is a fact which Bentham chooses to ignore. 
These criticisms of Bentham's theories of juris- 
prudence ought not to blind us to the magnitude of his 
achievements. Benthatints labours were crowned with 
success along four different lines: (1) the transference 
of political power into the hands of a class which it was 
supposed would be large enough and intelligent enough to 
identify its own interests with the interests of the 
greatest number, (2) the promotion of humanitarianism, 
(3) the extension of individual liberty and (4 ) the creation 
of adequate legal machinery. The transference of political 
power to the middle classes was the sine gua non of all 
reform. The existing form of government in Great Britain 
was inadequate, in Bentham's view, to effect the legis- 
lative changes which he deemed necessary. The "sinister 
interests" of the governing classes presented an effective 
obstacle to all efforts at reform. Power must therefore 
be transferred into the hands of the people. These con- 
clusions are stated with emphasis in the preface to the 
second/ 
1. Bentham. Fra anent On Government. Vol. 1, Page 254. 
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second edition of The Fragment On Government. "So long 
as the form of government continues to be what it is, not 
better and better but continually worse and worse must the 
condition of the people be, Of the several particular 
interests of the aristocrat in all his shapes, including 
the fee fed lawyer and the tax fed priest, all prostrate 
at the fact of the throne - is composed the everlastingly 
and unchangeably ruling interest. Opposite to the inter- 
est of the greatest number - opposite through the whole 
field of government - is that same ruling interest. 
Vain, therefore - vain for ever will be all hope of relief, 
unless and until the form given to the Government is such, 
that those rulers in chief, whose particular interests are 
opposite to the universal interest, shall have given place 
to others whose particular interests have been brought into 
1 
coincidence with that same universal interest." Bentham 
therefore stood identified with reform along what was then 
understood to be the most radical lines. For the feeble 
half measures of the Whigs he had no use. At the same 
time when Bentham talks of transferring power into the 
hands of the people, what he really means is into the 
hands of the middle classes. He did not contemplate 
universal suffrage. He thought that if the middle 
classes became the governing classes they were suffic- 
iently numerous to legislate with a view to the greatest 
good of the greatest number. He apparently did not see 
that these middle classes might also be representative of 
sinister interests just in the same way as the squirearchy 
was/ 
1. Bentham. Fra lent On Government. Vol. I. Page 245. 
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was. What he did think was that they represented all 
that was best and soundest in the country, and that they 
could be trusted to legislate with the welfare of the 
whole mass of the people as their one consideration. 
Bentham may have been a radical, but he was cer- 
tainly no revolutionary. Towards the methods of the 
French revolutionaries he was no more sympathetic than 
Burke. The Declaration Of Rights left him cold. For 
Bentham it was a meaningless document. He asserts 
roundly that what men require to be reminded about is 
their duties not their rights. The paramount requisite 
in the state is that there should be security. For him 
this is a condition precedent for the existence of happi- 
ness. Accordingly while the aim of the legislator ought 
always to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
this in his view can only be attained through security. 
He has no sympathy with the "levelling" doctrines of 
1. 
communism. He is utterly opposed to any system in- 
volving an equal division of the wealth of the community 
among the members of the community. Here again his 
affinities are those of the middle class. 
The driving force of utilitarianism as a political 
creed lay however in its insistence upon individual 
liberty. There is nothing in Bentham's teaching of more 
vital importance than the stress he places upon individual- 
ism. Nor is there any respect in which the influence of 
his teaching has been more profound. Individualism is 
not a necessary logical consequence of utilitarianism, 
although/ 
1. Bentham. Principles of The Civil Code, Vol, I. 
Page 302. Also Pages 358 -364. 
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although it was accepted as such by the nineteenth 
century utilitarians. They rejected the idea of a 
paternal state controlling the welfare of its citizens. 
Yet it might quite well be maintained that those in auth- 
ority knew better than the great mass of the citizens 
what was good for them. It is quite possible to defend 
benevolent despotism on utilitarian grounds. The view 
held by Bentham however, and later elaborated by John 
Stuart rill, was that each man was the best judge of his 
own happiness, and that the individual ought to be left 
as free, as a like degree of freedom allowed to all other 
individuals would permit. This has proved to be the most 
potent part of Bentham's teaching. It entirely revol- 
utionized the traditional ideas as to the function of the 
state and the individual. The idea which had held good 
up till the beginning of the nineteenth century was that 
the security of the state was the paramount consideration 
of the law. The new idea was that the security of the 
state was of importance, only because individual liberty 
was thereby secured. In other words the most important 
function of the law was to preserve individual freedom. 
If freedom is regarded as the supreme end and aim of law, 
security must be also, because while there may be pol- 
itical security without political freedom, there cannot 
be political freedom without political security. What 
we have is a new way of thinking about the relations 
between the state and the individual, which places a new 
emphasis upon the individual. 
Bentham was the strenuous advocate of this new 
individualism/ 
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individualism, but it is important to realize that the 
movement was also fostered by the doctrines of the 
classical ,school of political economy. The fountainhead 
of that school is Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations 
he asserted that the greatest good accrued to the state 
when each individual was left free to manage his own 
concerns. For that reason he was the strong opponent 
of interference by the state in the affairs of industry 
and commerce. He denounced all barriers which prevented 
the flow of trade along its natural channels and which 
sought by artificial means to divert it into particular 
channels. The doctrine preached by him was that of 
laissez faire laissez passer. Be regarded tariffs gen- 
erally speaking as harmful to national prosperity and he 
thought that the economic policy of the country ought to 
be in the direction of attaining the ideal of free trade. 
With typical eighteenth century optimism, he speaks of 
some "unseen hand" bringing about the most beneficent 
result for all, when each man is left as the master of 
his own concerns. While Adam Smith and his followers 
were preaching this economic doctrine, similar doctrine 
in the more general field of jurisprudence was being 
taught by Bentham. He argued in favour of each man being 
left free to make what use he could of the talents with 
which he had been endowed, and that without let or hin- 
drance. This demand is seen in such publications as 
1. 
Truth Against Ashurst. The doctrine in fact permeated 
all his writings and was the most fruitful source of their 
influence/ 
1. Bentham. Works. Vol. V. pages 231 -238. 
- 132 - 
influence on subsequent legislation. 
I have referred to two other lines along which 
Benthames teaching influenced law reform, namely the pro - 
motion of humanitarianism and the creation of adequate 
legal machinery. The criticism is often brought against 
individualism that it is a harsh creed which, while it 
promotes the interests of certain individuals, relentlessly 
sacrifices the interests of others. The ground for this 
criticism is that individualism permits of unrestricted 
competition in which the weak and helpless go to the wall, 
while the strong are allowed to flourish unchecked. In 
other words the rich are permitted to grind the faces of 
the helpless poor. That however is a manifestation of 
individualism, which did not reveal itself until a later 
date. The creed of radicalism, as expounded by Bentham, 
was strongly tinged with humanitarianism. It is true 
that it was rigidly opposed to socialism, but much of 
the indignation aroused against existing abuses owed its 
force purely to such considerations. This side of Bentham 
is particularly well illustrated by his interest in prison 
reform. He constructed an ingenious model building to 
which he gave the name Panopticon. The particular feature 
of the building was that from the centre of it, it was 
possible to see what went on throughout the entire building. 
With this were combined many improvements in the details of 
construction. Bentham built the highest, and it must be 
confessed quite absurd, hopes of what the adoption of such 
buildings (not merely for prisons but various other in- 
stitutions) would bring about. He prophesied that an age 
of/ 
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of social regeneration would result from the general 
adoption of his plans. At one time there was a prospect 
of the government agreeing to build a prison upon Bentham's 
model. The plan broke down however owing to obstinate 
opposition on the part of King George TII, Bentham was 
recompensed by the Treasury for the time and trouble which 
he had taken, but he took very much to heart the ultimate 
rejection of the project. It possibly helped to sharpen 
the references to the monarchy, which we find in his later 
writings. The important point about the Panopticon scheme 
is that it shows very clearly, the humanitarian side of 
Benthamts nature. This is also shown by his favouring 
1, 
the relief of indigent suffering. He thought that this 
should be done by law and not left to private charity, 
although he insisted that schemes of relief should be on 
a basis, which would not"punish industry for the benefit 
of idleness." An extreme individualism would no doubt 
reject all forms of poor relief, although obviously such 
an individualism is impracticable in the modern state. It 
is significant however that Bentham should hold such views, 
and in his expression of them he shows qualities of good -- 
heartedness, not often present in his strictly intellectual 
writings. 
Lastly there is the question of the reform of 
judicial machinery. I have already referred to the 
contempt with which Bentham regarded the common law, and 
the way in which he would have swept it aside, replacing 
it by a code framed by the legislature. Sweeping plans 
of that sort could not hope to succeed, but, at azy rate, 
Bentham/ 
1. See Bentham. Principles of The Civil Code, Vol. 1, 
Pages 314 -316. 
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Bentham drew attention to many practical matters in which 
reform was overdue. Some of these matters are discussed 
in his Rationale of Judicial Evidence. At the time when 
Bentham wrote the plaintiff and defendant in an action 
were not allowed to give evidence, although they were the 
parties who probably knew most about the matter in dispute. 
In drawing attention to such absurdities Bentham rendered 
genuine service to the cause of justice, and this side of 
his influence ought not to be forgotten. 
It has been impossible to discuss in any detail the 
great mass of Bentham's writings. He was extraordinarily 
prolific, and owing to his curiously laboured and verbose 
style, much of his writing is very unreadable. It has 
only been possible to deal in broad outline with certain 
aspects of his teaching. The most important points have 
however been touched upon, and it is now perhaps approp- 
riate that I should indicate briefly the effect of these 
theories upon the actual course of legislation. 
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Chapter 3. 
The Triumph of Individualism. 
It is impossible to assign any exact date to the 
point of transition in British politics from the period of 
reaction to the period of legislative activity. The two 
periods shade into each other. But the fact of the new 
and changed outlook was clearly evident after the year, 
1830. The change was brought about by the feelings and 
opinions which permeated the great mass of the people. 
The general opinion was that in many respects the law was 
antiquated and out of touch with the developments which 
were taking place in the social and industrial life of the 
nation. This feeling was fostered in great measure, as 
I have shown, by the writings of Bentham and other re- 
formers. Their ceaseless propaganda had made its in- 
fluence felt on the popular mind. It had become 
impossible for the dread of revolutionary violence to 
keep back the tide of reform. Revolution was a bogey 
completely laid at rest, and it was felt that the reform 
of our institutions was in accordance with sober common 
sense. The greatest question of all which had to be 
tackled was the reform of the House of Commons. The 
unreformed House of Commons was completely unrepresenta- 
tive of the mass of the people and it was felt to be a 
body unsuited to deal with the issues which had now arisen. 
The landed aristocracy whose interests it represented was 
likely/ 
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likely to prove an effectual bar to the carrying through 
of a reform programme. The new industrial cities were 
unrepresented and the wealthy manufacturing classes had 
no real say in the government of the country. The demand 
for reform became particularly fierce. The temper of 
the country was stirred as it had not been for a hundred 
years, and there was a real danger that, if some measure 
of reform were not conceded, there would be an outbreak 
of revolutionary violence. As it was, the various bills 
embodying proposals for reform met with the most strenuous 
opposition in Parliament on the part of those whose inter- 
ests were being attacked. At the end of the day the House 
of Lords only consented to the passing of a measure of 
reform under the threat of the creation of a sufficient 
number of new peers to swamp the opposition in that House. 
The Reform Act of 1832, judged by the standard of 
subsequent Reform Acts, was a very mild measure of reform. 
Its main provisions were the abolition of the representa- 
tion of the rotten boroughs and the according of repres- 
entation to the new industrial cities. In the towns a £10 
household franchise was established, while in the counties 
copyholders and leaseholders were added to the electorate. 
There were similar Reform Acts extending the basis of the 
franchise in Scotland and Ireland. Altogether the new 
electorate numbered about half a million. The mildness 
of the measure ought not however to be allowed to conceal 
its supreme importance. At one blow Great Britain ceased 
to be governed by a small oligarchy of the landed classes, 
and/ 
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and the power of government was transferred into the hands 
of the middle class. They were left masters of the sit- 
uation and it was they who guided the general reform 
movement. 
The most important factor in British politics after 
the passing of the Reform Act was the supremacy of indiv- 
idualism. The clearest manifestation of this was the 
new importance attached to contractual freedom. It 
became the aim of legislation to secure that every indiv- 
idual should be free to enter into whatever contracts he 
chose and that all barriers in the way of contractual 
freedom should as far as possible be swept aside. This 
is seen for example in the abolition of the laws about 
forestalling and regrating. So also the various laws 
dealing with usury were repealed between the years 1833 
and 1854. The motive here was simply that each individual 
should be left free to incur whatever obligations he chose. 
Again, the old Navigation Laws were repealed in 1844 and 
1849. The new importance attached to contractual freedom 
had been evident even before the passing of the Reform Act. 
The question had arisen very sharply over the position of 
the trade unions. This is seen in the two acts dealing 
with trade unions, passed in the years 1824 and 1825 
respectivél.y. The Act of 1824 specially legalized com- 
binations of workmen for the purpose of bargaining about 
conditions of employment. It provided that workmen should 
not be liable to criminal proceedings in respect of being 
members of such combinations. The act was, of course, a 
complete reversal of the act of 1800 which declared all com- 
binations/ 
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combinations of workmen to be illegal. The aim of the 
legislature in 1824 was to extend the freedom of the 
workers by giving them greater bargaining power. The 
passing of the 1824 act led to a number of strikes, and a 
general fear arose that so far from increasing liberty, 
trade unionism and liberty were incompatible ideals. The 
act passed in the following year was to a certain extent 
another reversal of policy. It permitted çombinations of 
workmen for certain limited purposes, but severe penalties 
were imposed on all forms of intimidation. The most 
important point to be noted here is that the framers of 
both acts had as their end in view the extension of 
individual freedom. The 1824 act sought to give the 
workers greater freedom in entering into contracts. The 
1825 act sought to preserve freedom by seeing that the 
liberties given to workmen were not abused. 
The new movement towards contractual freedom is 
also seen in the triumph of the free trade cause, culmin- 
ating in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The argu- 
ments for free trade, which eventually carried the day, 
were mainly economic, but they were linked up with the 
general question of individualism, which. I have been dis- 
cussing. The economic aspect of the question was cham- 
pioned by the speculative zeal and fervour of Richard 
Cobden and the burning eloquence of John Bright. With 
the economic arguments in favour of free trade it is 
impossible to deal here,-but some idea of the larger 
spirit which animated its supporters may be got in the 
following/ 
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following passage from John Morley. "The interest of 
that astonishing record of zeal, tact, devotion and 
courage, lies principally for us in the circumstance that 
the abolition of the protective duties on food and the 
shattering of the protective. system, was, on one side the 
beginning of our great modern struggle against class pre- 
ponderance at home, and, on another side, the dawn of 
higher ideals of civilization all over the world. The 
promptings of a commercial shrewdness were gradually en- 
larged into enthusiasm for a far reaching principle, and 
the hard- headed man of business gradually felt himself 
touched with the generous glow of the patriot and the 
1. 
deliverer." The greatest hopes were entertained from 
the downfall of the protectionist system in this country. 
It was felt that under free trade the commercial prosper- 
ity of the country would increase as never before. Pro- 
fessor Dicey says: "The Exhibition of 1851 had a signif- 
icance which is hardly understood by the present generation. 
To wise and patriotic contemporaries it represented the 
universal faith that freedom of trade would remove the 
main cause of discord among nations and open an era of 
2. 
industrial prosperity and unbroken peace." It is a 
matter for regret that these hopes were not realized. 
Free trade undoubtedly gave a fillip to industrial pros- 
perity in Great Britain in the years following its adop- 
tion, but the greed and cupidity of "sinister interests" 
(to use Bentham's phrase) in most foreign countries pre- 
vented its universal adoption. Today it has become a 
doubtful/ 
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doubtful and controversial question how far free trade 
is beneficial to one country in a world generally pro- 
tectionist. But the important point to be observed 
meantime is that the introduction of free trade marks 
the high water mark of the cause of individualism. 
One other aspect of individualism may briefly be 
referred to. This is the new toleration extended to 
every form of belief. It was felt that it was no con- 
cern of the state what a mants beliefs happened to be. 
Each individual should be free to hold whatever beliefs 
he chose and the holding of any particular belief should 
not be allowed to prevent his free participation both in 
the affairs of government and also in his own personal 
concerns. Thus the Oaths Acts had the twofold effect 
of opening Parliament to any person otherwise eligible 
without any reference to his religious beliefs and of 
enabling even avowed atheists to give evidence and there- 
fore enforce their rights in Courts of Justice. This 
toleration of all beliefs was also given effect to in the 
Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829 and the Nonconformists' 
Chapel Act of 1846. These then are certain of the lines 
along which individualism was the controlling force in 
legislative activity, and I now wish to consider what may 
be taken to be the greatest expression of the individual- 
istic faith, John Stuart Hillis famous essay on Liberty. 
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Chapter 4. 
John Stuart Mill and The Ph.ilosóphy of Individualism. 
John Stuart sailles Essay on Liberty may be taken 
to be the most characteristic expression of the thought 
and faith of its author. It is probably the most famous 
of his writings. It was published in 1859, although it 
had been planned and written some years earlier. It is 
a panegyric on individualism and a plea for the fullest 
possible development of individual personality. As such 
it was fully in accordance with thelrevailing trend of 
thought, with its belief in the theory of non intervention 
on the part of the government and in the desirability of 
a maximum of freedom for each individual. It is of 
extreme importance to observe that the theory of non 
intervention and the desirability of a maximum of 
individual freedoth are two quite separate things. They 
are often assumed to run in harness, because it is (or 
it might be more correct to say "was') almost blindly 
accepted as axiomatic that the less intervention there 
is on the part of the government, the greater must be 
the amount of individual freedom. That was certainly 
assumed to be axiomatic by the vast majority of people 
in the middle of the last century, but it is a truth of 
very doubtful validity. Actually - although at first 
blush it may appear paradoxial - the more government 
interference/ 
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interference there is the greater may be the degree of 
liberty for the majority of individuals in the state. 
Legislation which compulsorily limits hours of employ- 
ment is an obvious example. Government intervention 
gives the workers a freedom which their own bargaining 
power would be insufficient to secure for them. I have 
stressed the difference between the doctrine of non 
intervention and the doctrine of the desirability of a 
maximum of freedom at this point, because Mill in his 
Essay on Liberty is for the most part concerned with the 
latter. In the main like most of his contemporaries, he 
believed that the two doctrines did run in harness. This 
is established in the last two chapters of the Essay. 
The first three chapters are however concerned almost 
wholly with the ideal of securing the maximum of individual 
freedom. As such they are not in opposition to much 
modern socialistic thought. Mill's conclusions in his 
first three chapters would in great measure be accepted, 
I expect, by the majority of thinking people today, 
whether they are socialists or so called individualists. 
The point which I wish to stress is that there is no 
necessary antithesis between socialism and individualism, 
and Mill's conclusions on the value of individualism, while 
fully in accordance with the best side of nineteenth cen- 
tury individualism withits belief in laissez faire, are 
not, speaking generally, opposed to the best side of 
twentieth century socialism. 
Mill begins by declaring what is the principle which 
he/ 
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he wishes to assert. He says: "The object of this 
essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled 
to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether 
the means used be physical force in the form of legal 
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. 
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted, individually or collectively, in inter- 
fering with the liberty of action of any of their number, 
is self protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be com- 
pelled to do or forbear, because it will be better for him 
to do so, because it mill make him happier, because, in 
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. 
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or 
reasoning with him, or persuading him; or entreating him, 
but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil 
in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct 
from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated 
to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the 
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, 
is that which concerns others. In the part which merely 
concerns himself, his independence is, of right absolute. 
Over himself, over his own mind and body, the individual 
1. 
is sovereign." Underlying that statement is a belief in 
both doctrines, that is of non intervention and the 
desirability/ 
1. Mill. Liberty (Everyman Edition). Pages 72-73. 
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desirability of a maximum of individual freedom. As I 
have already said, Mill regards as axiomatic that the two 
doctrines run in harness, but it is necessary for us to 
try to disentangle them. Leaving aside then for the time 
being the doctrine of non intervention, let us examine the 
statement as a pure expression of individualistic faith. 
The conclusions stated are of course very general. 
How far they can be accepted depends upon the precise mean- 
ing to be attached to them. The principle that the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community is too vague to admit 
of unqualified acceptance. We have to ask what acts of 
the individual will do harm to other members of the com- 
munity. It is not easy to draw a sharp line of distinc- 
tion between acts which are purely self regarding and acts 
which are of a social nature. From one point of view, 
all acts are of a social nature. The state is not merely 
a collection of individuals who come in contact with each 
other only for the business of government. It is a social 
organism and the majority of acts even when they appear to 
be purely self regarding do have a social significance. 
This fact is insufficiently realized by Mill. Thus the 
acts of the fornicator, the drunkard and the gambler while 
self regarding in a sense in which the acts of the thief 
and the murderer are not do have obvious social reper- 
cussions. It is impossible to separate (as Mill in one 
1. 
passage tries to do) the mere acts of fornication, drunken- 
ness and gambling from their social consequences, because 
as/ 
1, Page 138. 
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as man does not live in isolation these social conse- 
quences are bound to follow. I am not arguing that it 
is desirable or expedient for the state to step in and 
apply coercion to prevent these things. All I am con- 
cerned with is the declaration that the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilised community against his will is to prevent . 
harm to others. That I say is an unsatisfactory test. 
It is too wide for the reason that all acts have social 
repercussions and cannot be regarded as merely self re- 
garding. When Mill laid down this test he did not have 
a sufficient appreciation of the organic nature of the 
state. 
Although Ni ll t s general principle cannot be 
accepted much of his elaboration of it is eminently 
reasonable. The second chapter of his Essay is taken 
up with a lengthy argument upon liberty of thought and 
discussion. Be makes a noble and eloquent plea for the 
right of the individual to hold whatever views and opinions 
he chooses and for his right to give free expression to 
these views and opinions. what he says on this head is 
not likely to be challenged by any school of political 
thought today, in this country at any rate. The rulers 
of other countries, notably Italy and Russia, would still 
appear to think it desirable to muzzle the free expression 
of opinion, but we, in this country, are generally speaking 
tolerant of the right of free discussion. Mill says that 
the time is gone by when any argument would be required 
against permitting a government not identified in interest 
with/ 
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with the people from prescribing opinions to them and 
1. 
determining what doctrines they shall be allowed to bear. 
This is certainly true of all countries the governments of 
which have become permeated with the influence of liberal- 
ism. The danger, as Mill sees it, in countries where the 
government is identified in interest with the mass of the 
people is that minorities may be denied the liberty of 
freely expressing their opinions on account of the intol- 
erance of the majority. Against this he protests in the 
strongest terms. He says: "I deny the right of the 
people to exercise such coercion. The power itself is 
illegitimate. The best government has no more title to 
it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, 
when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when 
in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one were of 
one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing 
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be 
2. 
justified in silencing mankind." Vith this it is possible 
to express entire agreement. It is unnecessary to examine 
the detailed argument by which the validity of these con- 
clusions is justified. One point may however be noticed. 
Mill protests warmly not merely against the free expression 
of opinion being prevented by the action of the government, 
but also against it being prevented by the social stigma 
which attaches to the holder of unpopular views. He 
deprecates the social constraint which proscribes such 
views. It may be said that, viewing the matter from an 
idealistic/ 
1. Page 78. 2. Page 79. 
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idealistic point of view, Mill is undoubtedly right. It 
is wrong that any stigma should attach to the holder of 
views which are anathema to the majority, but again Mill 
rather tends to forget the social nature of mankind. It 
is impossible to prevent such social ostracism other than 
by constant teaching of the virtue of tolerance. 
Having discussed the right of free expression of 
beliefs and opinions, Mill proceeds to discuss the right 
of individuals to act freely in accordance with their 
beliefs and opinions. It is certainly the case that 
more barriers must be erected against freedom of conduct 
than against freedom of speech. Before discussing how- 
ever what barriers must be erected, Mill proceeds to show 
that the greatest value accrues to the state when each 
individual does enjoy a maximum of freedom. This, as I 
have already mentioned, is one of the two cardinal 
doctrines of the Essay, and is the one which will gain 
the greatest amount of support. The doctrine is well 
summed up in these words of Wilhelm Von Humboldt which 
are quoted by Mill. "The grand leading principle, to- 
wards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly 
converges, is the absolute and essential importance of 
1. 
human development in its richest diversity." That 
epitomizes Mill's political thought. To him the develop- 
ment of individual personality and character is of supreme 
importance in enriching the resources of the nation's man- 
hood. He protests strongly not only against the cramping 
of personality by government interference, but also by the 
pressure of social opinion. He emphatically disapproves 
of/ 
1. Page 62. 
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of the tyranny of habits and conventions which result in 
moulding all individuals in a machine like pattern. He 
expresses his contempt for small minds which regard as 
insane persons who are in the least degree original in 
their mode of living. Let us have more eccentricity is 
what he says, and it is difficult not to concur in his 
views. "Eccentricity has always abounded when and where 
strength of character has abounded; and the amount of 
eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional 
to the amount of genius, mental vigour and moral courage 
it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric marks 
1. 
the chief danger of the time. " This certainly shows 
how fully Mill's philosophy is impregnated with a sense 
of the supreme value of individualism and personality. 
So far the worship of individualism. The question 
remains what barriers are to be imposed on the conduct of 
the individual. As we have already seen Mill lays down 
the formula that the individual ought to be free to do as 
he chooses, provided that what he does involves no harm 
to other people. For the reasons I have already men- 
tioned this formula cannot be accepted without consider- 
able reservations. In several of the examples given by 
Mill it is quite possible to agree that it is no one's 
business to interfere, but not for the reason that the 
conduct is purely self regarding. One of the most inter- 
esting illustrations taken by Mill is the question of 
Sunday amusements. He takes up the position that it is 
no one's business how a man chooses to amuse himself on a 
Sunday. Two quotations will serve to illustrate this. 
He/ 
1. Page 125. 
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He says: "How will the remaining portion of the community 
like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to 
them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of 
the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, 
with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively 
pious members of society to mind their own business? 
That is precisely what should be said to every government 
and every public, who have the pretension that no person 
1 
shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong." And 
again: "Though the feeling which breaks out in the re- 
peated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in 
the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, 
has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of 
mind indicated by it is fundartentally the same. It is a 
determination not to tolerate others in doing what is per- 
mitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by 
the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not 
only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not 
2. 
hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested." Accordingly, 
if, for the sake of argument, one particular form of amuse- 
ment is abhorrent to nine out of every ten members of the 
community but to the liking of the odd one, that odd one 
ought nevertheless to be free to indulge in that particular 
amusement. That view is quite intelligible, but it is 
certainly contrary to the opinion of a great number of 
people. It is certainly contrary to the opinions of 
those whom Mill calls "the intrusively pious ". One 
interesting limitation placed by Mill upon the principle 
of freedom deserves special notice. He says that no 
person/ 
1. Page 143. 2. Page 147. 
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person ought to be free to sell himself as a slave as 
no principle of freedom can require a person who is free 
1. 
not to be free. It would have been more interesting if 
Mill had carried his conclusions on this head a little 
further. A workman who is driven by starvation to 
accept particular terms of employment is not "free" 
when he does so. It is here that the intervention of 
trade unions or legislation may in reality extend freedom 
by forbidding workmen to enter into contracts except upon 
certain conditions. 
The final chapter of the Essay contains interesting 
views on the functions of the government. In the main, 
Mill expresses belief in the doctrine of non -intervention. 
When the state does interfere in industrial matters it 
generally, in Mill's opinion, does so disastrously, and, 
in any event, it is undesirable to increase the powers of 
the government by giving it power to intervene in such 
matters. The growth of the bureaucracy is particularly 
distasteful to Mill. Through this chapter there runs 
like a thread the belief that the more power there is 
reposed in the government, the greater is the menace to 
the liberties of the individual. Mill fails adequately 
to recognize that whatever freedom is enjoyed by the 
citizens of a state is enjoyed by virtue of a government 
strong enough to enforce the laws, and it is far from 
following as a matter of course that pari Raaall with every 
increase in the power of the government there will IA a 
diminution of individual liberty. Theoretically it is 
possible for that result to follow, but the converse is 
equally/ 
1. Page 158. 
- 151 - 
equally possible theoretically. As a matter of fact 
Mill does insist that there are matters beyond the pre- 
servation of security which are legitimately within the 
province of the government. Thus he thinks with certain 
reservations that the state ought to make itself respons- 
1. 
ible for the education of its citizens. He also goes 
so far as to suggest that the state ought compulsorily 
to prevent marriage between parties who are not in a . 
position to maintain a family. No government in this 
country has so far dared to interfere to such an extent 
with individual liberty, although, if such a step were 
expedient, there are good arguments in favour of it. 
Generally, however, Mill views every accession to the 
power of the government with suspicion and mistrust. 
His views are largely those of the majority of his 
contemporaries, and that is why I have dealt with 
them at some length. On the other hand, much of 
the emphasis is purely personal to himself. But on 
the subject of non intervention he is fully at one 
with his age. 
1. Pages 160 -163. 2. Page 163. 
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Chapter 5. 
Herbert S encer and Darwinian Political Theory. 
Individualism (in the sense of a policy of non- 
intervention or laissez -faire) reached its high water 
mark in British politics in the years between the repeal 
of the Corn Laws and the publication of Millis Essay on 
Liberty. Thereafter the tide began to recede. A 
sense of misgivings with the progress of events is not 
present to any great extent in Millis Liber, in spite 
of the rebuke he administers to the insufficient apprec- 
iation of the value of individual development in its 
highest form. At the time when the Essay was written 
the nascence of a socialistic element in legislation had 
hardly taken place. The change which came after the 
publication of the Essay is, however, seen in the works 
of Herbert Spencer. The particular writings of his with 
which I wish to deal here are four essays, which were 
published under the title of The Man Versus The State. 
They first appeared, in the Contemporary Review in 1885. 
They are marked with a very lively sense of misgivings 
with the new trend of events in British legislation. 
Spencer was much more of an uncompromising individualist 
than Mill. The faint leanings towards socialism which 
occasionally appear in the Essay on Liberty are quite 
absent in The Man Versus The State, It is a defence of 
individualism in its most extreme form. The doctrine 
preached/ 
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preached is bleak and austere. Spencer also links up 
his creed of individualism with that of biological 
evolution. The teaching of Darwin in the realm of 
natural history is transferred by him into the realm 
of politics. The lessons of natural selection and 
survival of the fittest are made to wear a political 
garb, and the doctrine of "nature red in tooth and 
claw" is made the groundwork of Spencer's political 
faith. Evolutionary teaching has been made to yield 
a political moral by various subsequent writers, but 
Spencer was probably the first to introduce Darwinism 
into the science of jurisprudence and pal,itics. 
The first of these essays is entitled The New 
Toryism. The word "toryism" is given a very wide con- 
notation. It is used in antithesis to "liberalism ". 
By "toryism ", Spencer means a policy which views favour- 
ably a maximum of state intervention and control, whether 
that state intervention is in the form of paternal govern- 
ment in the old sense or socialism in the new. On the 
other hand, by "liberalism ", Spencer means a policy which 
views favourably a minimum of state intervention and 
control, and which aims at removing from the individual 
every shackle placed by the government on his freedom. 
He regards "toryism" as standing for status, in opposition 
to "liberalism" which stands for contract. To mention 
still another antithesis, "toryism" is taken to stand for 
a militant type of society, in opposition to "liberalism" 
which stands for an industrial type. These distinctions 
are of course largely academic and do not correspond to 
the/ 
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the actual differences between the two dominant parties 
at the time when Spencer was writing, but they serve to 
show where Spencer's political sympathies lay. Briefly, 
"the new toryism" was the legislation of the previous 
twenty years, which had become faintly tinged with 
socialistic ideas. In the jargon of present day 
politics, such socialism as had been introduced was 
a very mild pink, but it marked the introduction of 
what was regarded by Spencer as a thoroughly pernicious 
principle. The main offenders, too, had been successive 
liberal governments. Instead of standing, as they ought 
to have done, for individualism in a pure and undiluted 
form, they had deserted their ancient principles, and, 
prompted by vague ideas about public good, had actually 
sponsored restrictive legislation. Apparently, in 1885, 
the liberal party was as incapable of standing firm for 
liberal principles as it is in 1931: Spencer is strongly 
insistent that the true aim of liberalism is the preserva- 
to do so 
tion of individual freedom. It has no business /and it 
is worshipping false gods, when it passes legislation, 
such as Factory Acts. Spencer accordingly regards the 
end and aim of law simply as being to secure a maximum 
amount of freedom for each individual, which maximum 
amount of freedom can only be secured by an absence of 
state intervention. 
These ideas are further developed in the two 
following essays, The Coming Slavery and The Sins of 
Le .islators. Each new Act of Parliament which involves 
some new element of state control is regarded as a step 
in/ 
- 155 - 
in the downward direction. Each step taken tends to 
accelerate the process, and there is an increasing need 
for compulsions and restraints which result from the 
unforeseen evils and shortcomings of preceding compulsions 
1 
and restraints. The bureaucracy steadily increases in 
numbers. "Every extension of the regulative policy in- 
volves an addition to the regulative agents - a further 
growth of officialism and an increasing power of the 
2 
organization formed of officials." This is largely 
true and is an evil if we admit the Spencerian hypothesis. 
We are gradually approaching, Spencer says, the coming 
slavery, which, in his eyes, is simply the socialistic 
state. The whole drift, and it is a harmful one, is 
from freedom to restraint, from contract to status, from 
voluntary co- operation to compulsory co- operation. The 
final result will be a revival of despotism. "A discip- 
lined army of civil officials like an army of military 
officials gives supreme power to its head. That those 
who rose to power in a socialistic organization would not 
scruple to carry out their aims at all costs we have good 
3 
reason for concluding.' It is this process against which 
he vehemently protests. His main thesis is that legis- 
lation which sets out to be beneficent is in reality 
harmful on account of the forces which it sets in motion 
and on account of what the ultimate and logical result of 
the process will be. For that reason a policy directed 
towards helping the poor is in his view fraught with 
extreme harm. 
It/ 
1. Herbert Spencer. The Man Versus The State. (Williams 
and Norgate Edition of 1902) . Page 33. 
2. Page 28. 3. Page 42. 
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It is difficult to accept these conclusions of 
Spencer. There is a complete clash in outlook between 
that of Spencer and that of the average man (no matter to 
what political party he belongs) today. The difference 
in outlook is summed up in these words written by a modern 
writer, who, at any rate, stands for something close to 
the Spencerian philosophy. He says: "They (the Vic - 
torians) knew that civilized life, from its very nature, 
is, and always must be a struggle with the forces of 
nature. They entertained no foolish illusions about 
the possibility of organizing comfort and happiness. 
Indeed comfort and happiness in their more manly phil- 
1. 
osophy were not altogether respectable things." How 
far are these implications true? Is there, indeed, no 
possibility of man transcending this struggle with the 
forces of nature? Can he not by organization free him- 
self from this dependence? Is it not possible by organ- 
ization to bring comfort and happiness into the lives of 
the majority of people? Is it not true to say that such 
an ideal is a manly one? Spencer would answer all these 
questions in the negative, while our average man of today 
would tend rather to answer them in the affirmative, al- 
though he might feel obliged to attach qualifications to 
his answers. It is certainly true that our plight today 
is not due to an inability to struggle against the forces 
of nature. There is no lack of supplies in the world, 
although there is mal- distribution of them. Modern 
legislation has unquestionably improved the lot of the 
people in giving them higher standards of health and 
happiness/ 
1. Sir Ernest Benn. Account Rendered (published by 
Ernest Benn Limited 1930). page 13. 
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happiness. Also, one may hazard the remark that to 
regard such ideals as unmanly is absurd. That is the 
credit side of the account. On the other hand, there is 
the debit side. We have the increase of state control 
prophecied by Spencer. Whether it can justly be called 
slavery is another question. We have also an enormous 
increase in public debts and in the scale of taxation. 
How far these disadvantages outweigh the advantage or 
whether the converse is true is a subject I shall discuss 
later. These points are simply mentioned here in crit- 
icism of Spencer's uncompromising individualism. 
The Spencerian philosophy is, as I have already 
said, closely linked up with evolutionary teaching. That 
is the ideas of the struggle for existence and the sur- 
vival of the fittest are brought into the domain of human 
politics. Spencer is not to be taken as thinking that 
instincts of benevolence and philanthropy ought to play 
no part in human affairs. But it is his view that these 
instincts ought to show themselves in private and not 
public action. He has no quarrel with private charity, 
which he fully commends, but he strongly dissents to any - 
thing in the nature of public charity - as being entirely 
outwith the proper sphere of government. He draws also 
a distinction between the family and the state. It is a 
duty within the family for its members to help each other, 
but it is not the duty of the state to help its weak and 
errant members. He says: "Society in its corporate 
capacity, cannot without immediate or remote disaster 
interfere with the play of these opposed principles under 
which/ 
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which every species has reached such fitness for its 
mode of life as it possesses, and under which it main- 
tains that fitness. I say advisedly - society in its 
corporate capacity: not intending to exclude or condemn 
aid given to the inferior by the superior in their in- 
dividual capacities. Though when given so indiscrim- 
inately as to enable the inferior to multiply, such aid 
entails mischief; yet in the absence of aid given by 
society, individual aid, more generally demanded than now, 
and associated with a greater sense of responsibility, 
would, on the average, be given with the effect of foster- 
ing the unfortunate worthy rather than the innately un- 
1. 
worthy." The idea that human life is a struggle just 
as animal life is a struggle and that the weakest must 
go to the wall is summed up in the following character- 
istic sentence. "The poverty of the incapable, the 
distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation 
of the idle, and the shouldering aside of the weak by 
the strong are the decrees of a large far seeing 
2. 
benevolence." 
These may well seem extraordinary conclusions. 
How, it may well be asked, can pain and suffering be 
regarded as the decrees of a "large far seeing benevolence ?" 
It is true no doubt that man is ennobled by suffering, 
but not even the Stoic philosophy regarded pain as 
having moral value. It is not my purpose to introduce 
theological considerations, but Spencer certainly appears 
to attribute very unamiable characteristics to the Deity. 
In any event Spencerts parallel between the brute struggle 
for/ 
1, Herbert Spencer. The Man versus The State, page 66. 
2. Page 67. 
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for existence and human politics is far from satis- 
factory. His view is dismal and pessimistic in the 
extreme. Surely man is suited for something higher 
than an insensate struggle for existence? He is en- 
dowed with faculties with which the lower creation is 
not. He is able to formulate consciously and work 
towards definite ends, which are quite outwith the 
capacity of the brute creation. Spencer seems to 
eliminate the idea of progress, and it is here the 
parallel fails, for surely evolution involves progress 
towards higher things - a progress from brutes incapable 
of shaping their ends and the ends of the race to beings 
capable, to some extent at any rate, of shaping their 
ends and working towards certain ideals. For that 
reason it seems impossible to accept the view that 
when human governments attempt to improve the lives 
of their citizens by beneficent legislation they are 
doing what is biologically impossible. It is true 
that private charity and benevolence within the family 
are good ideals, but that does not mean that public 
charity and benevolence outwith the family are bad 
ideals. These ideals are not mutually opposed. They 
are complimentary and there is plenty of room for both. 
Spencer's argument is summed up in the final essay 
entitled The Great Political_SupArstition. The great 
political superstition of the past was he says that of 
the divine right of kings. The great political super- 
1. 
stition of the present is the divine right of Parliament. 
In his view there is a constant antagonism between the 
individual/ 
1. Page 78. 
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individual and the state. He conceives that the govern- 
ment has no business to interfere with him as an individual, 
provided he does not interfere with other people. This 
is back to the contentions of Mill. He has no objections 
to being asked to take part in the common defence of the 
state nor has he any objections to paying taxes for these 
ends. But he does object to having his freedom of con- 
tract limited by pettifogging restrictions and he likewise 
objects to being taxed to pay the cost of beneficent 
legislation. He draws a parallel to membership of a 
1. 
private society. He says that a member who happened 
to be a catholic would protest, and rightly so, if the 
funds of the society were, by a resolution of the maj- 
ority of the members, to be devoted to the furtherance of 
anti -catholic propaganda, if that was outwith the original 
purpose of the society. But this is another unsatisfactory 
parallel. Spencer disregards, just as Mill disregarded, 
the organic nature of society. It is not simply a col- 
lection of individuals who agree tacitly to live together 
for the purpose of mutual security and the preservation of 
freedom. It is a social organism and analogies of the 
kind suggested by Spencer are quite inappropriate. His 
analogy is as inappropriate as the contention, not infre- 
quently heard today, that the affairs of the state should 
be run in the same way as those of a limited liability 
company. 
Spencer is strongly insistent upon innate human 
rights - the right of a man to be free, the right of a man 
to own private property, the right of a man not to be 
taxed/ 
1. Page 82. 
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taxed to support the unworthy. Certain philosophers 
have denied the existence of any human rights, but the 
view that they are wrong is the more acceptable. The 
difficulty is to reconcile the rights of all human beings 
within the state. The preservation of the rights of 
Herbert Spencer might well mean the denial of the rights 
of the suffering and oppressed poor, while, contrariwise, 
some recognition of their rights might mean the curtail- 
ment of the rights of Herbert Spencer. But is that a 
bad thing? If some theory of happiness as the end and 
aim of law is accepted, the answer must be in the negative. 
For Spencer, of course, the whole end and aim of law was 
the preservation of liberty, and it is, as one of the 
most interesting and extreme exponents of that faith, 
that I have discussed him here. 
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Chapter 6. 
Legislative Tendencies Of the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Centurry. 
Herbert Spencer, writing in 1885, was unquestion- 
ably right when he perceived the fundamental change, which 
had taken place in the legislative policy of the country. 
Successive British governments bad come to regard the end 
and aim of law as being the attainment of a social ideal, 
the welfare of the great mass of the people. For the 
most part, they were unconscious of the ultimate destina- 
tion of the path which they were treading. It is true 
that Bentham had enunciated as the end and aim of law the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. But, although 
happiness was regarded as the ultimate goal by Bentham, 
the practical aim of Bentham's legislation had been the 
securing of a maximum amount of independence. liar had 
been waged against privilege - against the privilege of 
the Crown, the Church, and the landed aristocracy who then 
ruled Great Britain. Bút Benthamite legislators had 
failed to perceive that a twist could easily be given to 
their dogma of the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, which would deflect it from the ideal of freedom 
to quite different ideals. As I have already pointed out 
the doctrine of laissez faire is not a necessary logical 
consequent of the doctrine of utilitarianism. Socialism 
is in fact quite as likely a consequent of utilitarianism 
as classical liberalism. Happiness may as readily be 
taken/ 
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taken to be the immediate end and aim of law as freedom, 
and it is in no way contrary to the fundamental utilitar- 
ian theory to regard freedom not as conducive, but as 
antagonistic to happiness. The new twist given to the 
happiness theory began to be more and more evident as 
the century advanced. It is highly significant that 
in the year following the repeal of the Corn Laws, there 
was passed the Ten Hours Act. This act was mainly the 
work of philanthropic tories and was bitterly opposed by 
the radicals, whose efforts had been instrumental in re- 
pealing the Corn Laws. The Ten Hours Act was an inter- 
ference with that freedom of contract; which they con- 
sistently upheld, and marked the beginning of a new era 
in British politics. 
The forces responsible for this change were dis- 
satisfaction with Benthamite legislation, which had 
failed to improve the lot of the people and the growth 
of humanitarian sentiment. The years prior to the 
repeal of the corn laws had been marked by much suffer- 
ing by the working classes. The removal of the taxes 
on food did much to alleviate the conditions of the masses, 
but the feeling of discontent remained. The feeling that 
all was far from well is seen in the writings of men with 
such diverse outlooks as Southey, Thomas Carlyle and 
Dr. Arnold. The latter wrote in 1838: "This neglect 
(to provide a proper position in the state for the manu- 
facturing population) is encouraged by one of the falsest 
maxims which ever pandered to humai selfishness under the 
name of political wisdom - I mean the maxim that civil 
society/ 
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society ought to leave its members alone, each to look 
after their several interests, provided they do not employ 
direct fraud or force against their neighbour. That is, 
knowing full well that they are not equal in natural 
powers - and that still less have they ever within his- 
torical memory started with equal artificial advantages; 
knowing, also, that power of every sort has g tendency to 
increase itself, we stand by and let this most unequal 
race take its course, forgetting that the very name of 
society implies that it shall not be a mere race, but 
that its object is to provide for the common good of all, 
by restraining the power of the strong and protecting the 
1. 
helplessness of the weak.' That quotation exemplifies 
a complete distrust of the doctrine of non intervention. 
All the three writers, whom I have mentioned were deeply 
alive to the "condition of England" question, and to the 
manifest abuses which went on unchecked under a system of 
laissez faire. Feeling was deeply stirred by the employ- 
ment of women and children in the factories and the long 
hours which they had to work. Resentment was stirred up 
against mill owners and other industrialists who coun- 
tenanced this system. It was this feeling of resentment 
which was largely instrumental in leading to the change 
from pure individualism to state intervention. The same 
feelings were shown by the Chartist movement. The chart- 
ists were not as a matter of fact socialists. Socialism 
played no direct part in their aims, but the People's 
Charter was evidence of the intense feeling of dissatis- 
faction with the existing state of affairs. 
I/ 
1. Dr. Arnold. quoted by Dicey. Law and Opinion, page 216. 
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I have mentioned socialism in the preceding pages 
in reference to the trend of politics in this country in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. It also re- 
quired to be noticed however that "socialism" was very 
little talked of in Great Britain during these years - 
outside the circle perhaps of the Fabian Society. As I 
have said the legislators of that period were hardly con- 
scious of the ultimate destination of the path which they 
were treading. By "socialism" I simply mean legislation 
which involves interference on the part of the state with 
the free activities of the individual, and I shall use the 
word throughout in this very broad sense. I shall not use 
it to denote the drastic policy which demands the national- 
ization of all means of production, distribution and 
exchange and the abolition of private property. As a 
matter of nomenclature it will be desirable to refer to 
that policy as "communism". Using "socialism" then in 
the sense I have indicated, it is largely true to say that 
we are all socialists nowadays. The difference between 
the socialist party today and the other parties really 
turns upcn how far the process ought to be carried. The 
socialism of the second half of the nineteenth century was 
the work of conservative and liberal governments. It is 
sometimes a matter of jealousy between these two parties 
which has done most for the welfare of the masses, but, 
if they are competing for the honour of being the authors 
of socialistic legislation, they are probably equally 




Dissatisfaction with individualism and feelings of 
humanitarianism were the main forces, which, towards the 
middle of the nineteenth century brought about this pro - 
found change in legislative activity. It was further 
hastened by certain characteristics of modern commerce 
and the introduction of household suffrage. The forma- 
tion of big combines as one of the most characteristic 
features of modern industrial activity had begun to make 
itself felt by the middle of the century. This tendency 
is illustrated particularly by the development of railways. 
Compulsory powers for the acquisition of land were sought 
from and granted, by Parliament. Legislation of this 
sort familiarized the idea of state intervention. It 
was regarded as natural that the state should step in and 
grant these powers. In this way the state tended more 
and more to interfere with private rights and something 
of a jar was given to the idea of the absolute inviola- 
bility of private property. This then was one of the 
tendencies which helped to promote socialistic legislation. 
Another was the introduction of household suffrage. The 
Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 took exclusive power out of 
the hands of the middle classes and transferred it in 
large measure to the working classes. The old system 
of laissez faire had not conferred on them the advantages 
which taken all over it had conferred on the middle classes. 
There is always an inherent tendency for the class which 
possess political power to legislate in its own interests. 
Not that different classes in the state are necessarily 
selfish. But each class in the community inevitably tends 
toi 
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to identify its welfare with the welfare of the state as 
a whole. It is open to question how far democracy does 
actually favour socialistic legislation. It is not 
absolutely in the nature of things that a democratic 
state should tend to be socialistic. In theory demo- 
cracy and socialism may be poles apart, because it is 
often part of the contention of the socialist that he 
knows much better than the people themselves do what is 
good for them. The United States, which in the second 
half of the nineteenth century was far more democratic 
than this country, was far less socialistic. In this 
country however socialism and democracy have advanced 
hand in hand. The Reform Act of 1867, it is worthy of 
note, was carried by a conservative government. The 
conservatives thought they could afford to take the 
people into their confidence. This was the fruit of 
Disraelits idea of Tory democracy, and the strange sit- 
uation occurred that this revolutionary extension of the 
franchise was carried by the party in the state usually 
identified with reaction, while it was viewed with con- 
siderable misgivings by the party usually identified with. 
1. 
progress. The liberals had good cause for alarm, for 
liberalism in the classical sense had begun its long decay, 
and the introduction of household suffrage was one of the 
nails in its coffin. 
It is impossible to deal here in much detail with 
the legislation which actually resulted from this new 
conception as to what the end and aim of law ought to be, 
but speaking broadly it manifested itself in four different 
directions/ 
1. See Welter Bagehot. The English Constitution 
(Nelson and Sons Edition). Pages 14 -17. 
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directions. These were (1) the extension of the idea 
of state aid ) restrictions on freedom of contract 
(3) preference for combined action as contrasted with 
individualistic action, and (4) equalisation of advan- 
1. 
tages. I propose to discuss very briefly each of these 
four lines of legislative activity. The first of them 
the extension of state aid is seen in the new regard paid 
by the state for the welfare of various classes of its 
citizens. The welfare of certain classes had always been 
regarded as being the concern of the state, even by 
thorough going individualists. Thus, in the heyday of 
individualism, it was felt that the state owed duties of 
protection towards infants and lunatics. Even Cobden 
protested against the employment of children in factories 
and stated that he did not intend his theories of non- 
intervention to apply to them. This moral obligation of 
protection by the state was gradually extended. Re- 
strictive legislation was passed controlling the employ- 
ment of women. The Ten Hours Act and subsequent factory 
legislation extended protection to all classes of workmen. 
The same influence can be traced in the Employers Lia- 
bility Act and in the various 1orkmens Compensation Acts, 
the first of which was passed in 1897. The same concern 
for protecting the welfare of the citizens is shown in the 
various measures dealing with public health. It is also 
shown in the Adulteration of Food Act of 1860, and the 
Sale of Food and Drugs Act of 1899. It may be said of 
all this legislation that its aim was protective. Few 
would/ 
1. See Dicey. Law and Opinion. Page 260. Most of what 
follows is based on Dicey. 
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would quarrel with the principle of these acts. The 
motives of the legislature were excellent, but they all 
involved the appointment of inspectors to see that the 
provisions of the acts were duly carried out. They in- 
volved the element of state control and for that reason 
were socialistic measures according to the wide definition 
of socialism, which I gave above. 
The element of restriction upon freedom of contract 
is also seen in the great mass of labour legislation. It 
is a cardinal principle of such legislation that the work- 
man should not be free to contract out of the provisions 
of statutes devised for his protection. In other words 
the position of the workman in relation to his employment 
comes to be partly based on status as well as on contract. 
The same movement from status to contract is shown in 
various Agricultural Holdings Acts. By common law, a 
tenu was allowed no compensation for improvements made 
during his tenancy, in the absence of special terms in the 
lease. Legislation was passed to secure that, in the 
absence of special terms, a tenant should be entitled to 
compensation. This was the first step which still pre- 
served liberty of contract. The next step was legislation 
to ensure that a tenant should receive compensation and 
contracting out was forbidden. So far as the question 
of compensation was concerned, the relation between land- 
lord and tenant was made to rest on status and not on 
contract. 
The next element of socialistic legislation which 
I referred to was the preference shown to combined action. 
Legislation giving the sanction of legality to combined 
action/ 
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action is seen in the Trade Union Act of 1871 and the 
Combination Act of 1875. The theory behind these acts 
was the need for protecting workmen in bargaining with 
employers. It is obvious that free trade in labour placed 
the individual workman at a disadvantage. He was unable 
to fight the individual employer in view of the immense 
resources of the latter. The only way in which workmen 
could bargain on anything like equal terms was through 
their trade unions. The act of 1871 accorded legal 
recognition to trade unions. They were not, however, 
made completely legal associations. Thus the violation 
of the rules of a trade union by one of its members was 
not allowed to give rise to a right of action for breach 
of contract. Under the Combination Act of 1875, nothing 
done in furtherance of a trade dispute by a body of men, 
which would be legal if done by one man, is indictable as 
a conspiracy. Although no criminal liability could attach 
to such acts, it was still possible for acts done in further- 
ance of a trade dispute to give rise to civil liability. 
The law was carried a step further (mainly in view of the 
famous Taff Vale decision) by the Trade Disputes Act of 
1907, which enacted that no civil liability should attach 
to a trade union in respect of acts done in furtherance 
of a trade dispute. All these measures are indicative 
of the new sympathy of the legislature for combined action. 
The fourth element of socialistic legislation which 
I referred to was that of equalization of advantages. This 
has been carried to a far greater extent in the twentieth 
century than it ever was in the nineteenth. The machinery 
of / 
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of taxation has been used with a view to providing 
social services on a scale quite uncontemplated by the 
legislators of the last century. None the less the 
theory that advantages possessed by the wealthy members 
of the community should not be entirely denied to the 
masses of the population was a theory which found ready 
acceptance in the nineteenth century. This is particular- 
ly seen in the legislation making elementary education 
compulsory. Not only was education made compulsory, it 
was made compulsory at the expense of the community. One 
other aspect of nineteenth century socialism may be re- 
ferred to in conclusion, and that is the immense increase 
in municipal trading. Municipalities made themselves 
responsible for the supply of gas, water, electricity and 
transport under the statutory powers accorded to them. 
Their activities in this field are amusingly illustrated 
in this quotation from Sydney Webb. It shows (although 
in rather exaggerated form) how socialistic ideals had 
come to be accepted by people who would never have dreamt 
of calling themselves socialists. He says: "The prac- 
tical man, oblivious or contemptuous of any theory of the 
social organism or general principles of social organisa- 
tion, has been forced, by the necessities of the time, 
into an ever- deepening collectivist channel. Socialism, 
of course, he still rejects and despises. The individ- 
ualist town councillor will walk along the municipal pave- 
ment, lit by municipal gas, and cleansed by municipal 
brooms with municipal water, and seeing, by the municipal 
clock in the municipal market, that he is too early to meet 
his/ 
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his children coming from the municipal school, hard by 
the county lunatic asylum and municipal hospital, will 
use the national telegraph system to tell them not to 
walk through the municipal park, but to come by the 
municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading 
room, by the municipal art gallery, museum and library, 
where he intends to consult some of the national publica- 
tions in order to prepare his next speech in the municipal 
town hall, in favour of the nationalization of canals and 
the increase of Government control over the railway system. 
'Socialism, Sir,' he will say, 'don't waste the time of a 
practical man by your fantastic absurdities. Self -help, 
Sir, individual self -help, that's what's made our city 
1. 
what it is."' It is to be hoped that the individualist 
town councillor did not use the word "municipal" quite so 
often in his telegram as Sydney Webb does, but there is a 
considerable degree of underlying truth. The tremendous 
difference in legislative outlook is no where better 
illustrated than in this quotation from John Morley's 
Life of Cobden written in 1881. 'fie have today a com- 
plete, minute and voluminous code for the protection of 
labour; buildings must be kept clear of effluvia; 
dangerous machinery must be fenced; children and young 
persons must not clean it while in motion; their hours 
are not only limited, but fixed; continuous employment 
must not exceed a given number of hours, varying with the 
trade, but prescribed by the law in given cases; a stat- 
utable number of holidays is imposed; the children must 
go to school, and the employer must every week have a 
certificate/ 
1. Sydney Hebb. quoted in Dicey Law and Opinion, Pages 
287 -288. 
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certificate to that effect; if an accident happens, 
notice must be sent to the proper authorities; special 
provisions are made for bake houses, for lace making, for 
collieries, and for a whole schedule of other special 
callings; for the due enforcement and vigilant super- 
vision of this immense host of minute prescriptions there 
is an immense host of inspectors, certifying surgeons, 
and other authorities, whose business it is 'to speed 
and pest over land and ocean' in restless guardianship 
of every kind of labour, from that of the woman, who 
plaits straw at her cottage door, to the miner who 
descends into the bowels of the earth, and the seaman 
who conveys the fruits and materials of universal industry 
to and fro between the remotest parts of the globe. But 
all this is one of the largest branches of what the most 
importunate socialists have been accustomed to demand; 
and if we add to this vast fabric of labour legislation 
our system of Poor Law, we find the rather amazing result 
that in the country where socialism has been less talked 
about than any other country in Europe, its principles 
1. 
have been most extensively applied." If that picture 
was true in 1881, it is more than ever true today. The 
only difference is that we now do talk of socialism, be- 
cause we have seen (only too well as the individualist 
would think) what socialism means. 
I have necessarily given rather a sketchy outline 
of the legislation of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. It may however serve to show that happiness and 
not freedom had come to be the great end and aim of law by 
the conclusion of the century. 
1. John Morley. quoted in Dicey. Law and Opinion. 
Pages 289 -290. 
- Part V. 
MNTMH CENTURY THEORIES OF LAW. 
-1.74- 
Chanter 1. 
The Law of Nature with a Variable Content 
and the Legal Theories of I. Duguit. 
The most remarkable feature of twentieth century 
jurisprudence has been a recrudescence of the Law of Nature 
Theory. The Law of Nature is not referred to to any great 
extent by the most characteristic of contemporary writers 
on jurisprudential topics, yet their work is in reality 
permeated with belief in such a creed. By the Law of 
Nature I simply mean a strenuous insistence upon ethical 
considerations and a protest against arbitrary law. All 
theories of the Law of Nature are tinged with humanitarian- 
ism and this is precisely what we find today. The real 
core of the Law of Nature is its ideal of the fullest 
possible life for each individual, that is an insistence 
that each individual should be free to develop to the high- 
est possible degree whatever personality he possesses. He 
must not be bound down; he must not simply be a cog in the 
machine; he must be free to develop all his innate cap- 
acities. The jurists of the twentieth century have, how - 
ever, approached the problem from quite a different angle 
from that of the jurists of the eighteenth century. Writers 
on the Law of Nature of the latter century, such as Quesnay, 
thought their ideals would best be served by securing for 
the individual a maximum of personal freedom, a minimum of 
state/ 
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state intervention, and full preservation of the rights of 
private property. The progress of events in the nineteenth 
century blasted these ideals, and today the Law of Nature 
is approached through the medium of state intervention. 
It is realised that men require to be organised and their 
affairs controlled by governmental action, if the aims of 
the idealists are ever to be realised. This is the tran- 
sition from freedom to happiness as the end and aim of law. 
Yet the real aim does still, to a considerable extent, in- 
volve the necessity of freedom as an ingredient of the 
desired happiness. This again involves the paradox that 
the freedom of the individual must be curtailed in order 
that a greater freedom may ultimately be secured. 
These conclusions are embodied in rather a remark- 
able essay by Oscar Wilde entitled The Soul of Man Under 
1. 
Socialism. With Wilde's exuberant conclusions of the 
happiness which would result from the entire abolition of 
private property, it is not necessary to agree, but there 
is truth in his doctrine that socialism properly directed 
ought to increase the sum total of individualism, in that 
it gives to the masses of the people a fuller opportunity 
of self development. The matter is thus epitomized by 
Wilde. 'With the abolition of private property, then, we 
shall have beautiful healthy individualism. Nobody will 
waste his life in accumulating things, and the symbols for 
things. One will live. To live is the rarest thing in 
2. 
the world. Most people exist, that is all." The language, 
of/ 
1. Printed in The Hundred Best English Essays. (Cassell), 
p. 595. 
2. Hundred Best English Essays, Page 601. 
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of course, is extravagant, but it represents the kernel of 
much twentieth century jurisprudence, if we except the 
communistic idea of the total abolition of private property 
and substitute for it a wise form of state intervention. 
Briefly the matter may be summed up thus. We have today 
a new Law of Nature. Like the old Law of Nature, it has 
& humanitarian and ethical conception of the function of 
law. Like the old Law of Nature, it has for its ideals 
individual development of personality and well being. 
Unlike the old Law of Nature, it thinks that these Meals 
can best be achieved through the medium of state interven- 
tion and state control. 
These ideas are illustrated in the works of the 
famous French writer, M. Duguit, who is one of the most 
outstanding of contemporary writers on jurisprudential 
topics. M. Duguit has evolved a conception of law in 
which, in iconoclastic fashion, he has demolished the 
traditional ideas of state personality, state sovereignty 
and the rights of the individual. Be has sought to pres- 
ent what he regards as a wholly realistic picture of law 
and to banish all metaphysical ideas of it. Law, he re- 
gards simply as a set of social facts, divorced from all 
1. 
ideas of rights. Bis two main objects are first the 
denial of any sovereign right on the part of the state to 
impose laws on the citizens in accordance with its sub- 
jective will, and secondly the denial of any subjective 
right on the part of the individual to private property 
or/ 
1. Duguit. Law in the Modern St te. (published by George 
Allen and Unwin Limited . Page 49. 
or private freedom. It might be supposed that a theory 
of law which denied individual rights of all sorts was 
the very antithesis of the Law of Nature. Here, however, 
we once more come up against the paradox that by denying 
individual rights, individual happiness may actually be 
increased - a result which is, of course, the paramount 
ideal of the Law of Nature. The criticism of Mr. Allen 
is very much in point. He says:' "M. Duguit has laid 
himself open to the criticism that his ultra materialism 
is in reality only a form of idealism - that in postulat- 
ing the irrefragible social law, which he calls a mere 
existing fact, he is really postulating a constant of 
ideal law; which other jurists would call natural law or 
1. 
'natural law with variable contente." In other words, 
M. Duguit, protest as he may against metaphysical theories 
of law, cannot escape from an ethical ideal. The ethical 
ideals of service, self development and freedom permeate 
his work and this links him up with the long succession of 
Law of Nature jurists, although his particular expression 
of the Law of Nature theory is novel and marks a complete 
break away from the juristic theories of the past. 
A fairly complete statement of M. Duguit's views 
2. 
is contained in his book Law in The Modern State. His 
main thesis is that the conception of sovereignty hitherto 
accepted by most jurists and, in particular, by the jurists 
of the nineteenth century, must be discarded as being no 
longer in conformity with the facts. The classical theory 
of/ 
1. Allen. Law in the Making. 
2. Duguit. Law in the Modern 
published by George Allen 
Page 344. 
State (Laski's translation 
and Unwin Ltd . ) 
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of sovereignty which M. Duguit attacks is the theory that 
sovereign power reposes ultimately in the people, who 
confer it upon their governors, who thereupon act as 
trustees on behalf of the people. This was the theory 
of sovereign power held by Locke. It was likewise the 
theory of sovereignty held by Rousseau. Its principles 
were recognized in the American Constitution and the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man. The doctrine received 
another form in the hands of Austin. All law is reduced 
by him to the commands of the sovereign power in the state. 
This sovereign power is simply the supreme legislative body 
in Great Britain, the King in Parliament. This sovereign 
power owes no obligations whatever of a legal nature to 
its subjects. It may owe moral obligations. But sover- 
eign power has no responsibilities. Its business is to 
command. M. Duguit regards all such doctrines as having 
outlived their usefulness, and as being in reality nothing 
but legal fictions. One or two typical passages illus- 
trative of his point of view may be quoted. "The class- 
ical theory of sovereignty is inconsistent with two facts 
of increasing importance in the modern world - decentral- 
1. 
ization and federalism." "State activities cannot be 
2. 
identified with sovereignty but with service.* "The idea 
of public service is today replacing the old theory of 
3. 
sovereignty as the basis of law.* "Public service is. the 
4. 
only adequate foundation for a modern system of government." 
"The/ 
1. Duguit. Law in the Modern State. Page 20. 
2. Page 31. 
3. Page 32. 
4. Page 38. 
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"The basis of public law is therefore no longer command 
but organisation. Public law has become objective,just 
as private law is no longer based on individual right or 
the autonamy of a private will but upon the idea of a 
social function imposed on every person, so government 
1. 
has in its turn a social function to fulfil." 
111 certain measure of truth does obviously underlie 
the passages which I have quoted. Certainly the Austinian 
theory of sovereignty cmnot be accepted today as giving 
anything like a true picture of the situation. Law 
obviously consists of far more than the commands of sover- 
eign power. Its roots lie very largely in custom. It is 
also true, as Duguit points out, that the functions of 
government have increased immeasurably since the classical 
theory of sovereignty was formulated . The functions of 
government are today very largely to render service. They 
are not primarily to command the obedience of subjects. 
As Duguit further points out, the classical theory of sover- 
eignty may be appropriate when applied to a society in which 
the functions of government are confined to the preservation 
of internal order, protection against crime, and the organ - 
isation of defence against external enemies. But it is 
inappropriate in a society where the main business or one 
of the main businesses of government is to serve its sub- 
jects. It is a society of this kind that we find today 
in all civilized countries. Governments make themselves 
responsible for education, health, standards of living, 
transport and innumerable other services. In all this, 
the/ 
1. Page 49. 
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the primary business of the government is to fulfil a 
social function. Its primary business is to organize 
services. It is not to command. 
The question arises how this limitation of the 
theory of sovereignty can be reconciled with the sovereign 
authority of Parliament, which we are accustomed to regard 
as the distinguishing feature of our own Constitution. 
This is not a question with. which M. Duguit is directly 
concerned. He is rather concerned with French Constitu- 
tional theory, but much of what he says can be applied to 
our own case. The answer to the question which I have 
raised is that,while the King in Parliament is, from a 
lawyers point of view, sovereign, that is possessed of 
unlimited sovereign power, it is not so in actual fact. 
The distinction is that while the King in Parliament is 
de _lure sovereign, Parliament is far from being so de facto. 
Mr. Laski is right when he says in his introduction to Lbw 
In The Modern State that, so long as we are satisfied with . 
the mere logic of a terminology, sovereignty will remain 
as impregnable to assault as it is inapplicable to the 
1. 
facts of life. A consideration of the facts at once 
shows how obvious this is. In the first place, Parliament 
is an elected body and owes duties to the electorate. There 
are various and obvious things which Parliament dare not do 
from fear of public opinion. Apart from that, there exists 
in this country, just as in France, a very considerable 
tendency towards decentralization. As M. Duguit points out, 
the/ 
1. Laski. Introduction to Duguit's Law In The Modern State. 
Page .1 !. 
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the vast increase of governmental power is counterbalanced 
by this movement towards decentralization, which is one 
1, 
of the main characteristics of governmental evolution. 
Local authorities possess extensive legislative powers 
allocated to them by Parliament. According to legal 
theory, Parliament could deprive them of their powers, but, 
in fact, Parliament could not and would not do this. The 
diffusion of legislative power at the centre is also to be 
noticed. There is an ever increasing tendency on the part 
of Parliament to delegate to government departments the 
power of issuing rules and regulations which have legis- 
lative effect. That in itself has not only undermined the 
prestige of Parliament, but has also considerably under- 
mined its sovereignty, as viewed from a de facto basis. It 
is a tendency which I propose to examine more fully at a 
later stage in this thesis. I mention it here as one 
example of the way in which sovereignty-has become dif- 
fused. 
M. Duguit also draws attention to the tendency to- 
wards functional devolution. There are innumerable groups 
in the modern state which possess legislative powers over 
their own concerns. Obvious examples of such autonomous 
groups are railway companies with their power to issue bye 
laws, universities with their power to issue ordinances 
and trade unions with their power to legislate o.n questions 
affecting their own members. Accordingly, the theory of 
illimitable sovereign power possessed by the central govern- 
ment/ 
1. Duguit. Law In The Modern State. Page 52. 
- 182: - 
government is no longer adequate to describe the true 
facts of the situation. 
The truth of that cannot I think be denied. But, 
while the functions of government are reduced very largely 
to service and while there is this diffusion of legislative 
power, does this mean that the theory of sovereignty is 
entirely to be rejected? I certainly think that the 
theory of sovereignty, as enunciated by Austin, must be, 
but the trappings of sovereignty still remain. M. Duguit 
regards the element of sovereignty as unnecessary, because 
he regards all law as being merely a set of social facts. 
Law cannot be regarded, however, simply in an objective 
setting, as M. Duguit regards it. To divorce law from 
rights is to divorce it from reality. The very idea of 
law involves the idea of right. This M. Duguit would I 
presume, deny. But the very idea of law involves the 
possibility that the law may be broken. When the law is 
broken the state or some body in the state has the subject- 
ive right to punish the offender, or the individual who has 
suffered prejudice by the breach of the law may have a sub- 
jective right to receive compensation. In essence, this 
does appear to be true. Again, if there are rights there 
must be some sanction for their enforcement. Nulla lex 
eine coercitione. Here the idea of sovereignty on the 
part of the enforcing power must come in. Even if we 
accept a purely objective theory of law, there must surely 
be some body in the state which can preserve by force the 
harmony of that objective system. No doubt it is true 
that/ 
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that the coercion required to preserve the social harmony 
is not exercised by any one group of men. Different 
groups compel its preservation in different circumstances 
and in different places. This simply means that sover- 
eignty is not one and indivisible, but is diffused among 
different men and groups of men who exercise it on behalf 
of the state. To Duguit the state is, of course, a fic- 
titious entity. Here, possibly, realism tends to obscure 
the situation. Men living in society are not simply 
units; there is a social organism. M. Duguit, it is 
true, denies corporate personality, but, as Mr. Barker 
has pointed out, the real nature of that problem is the 
1. 
philosophic nature of universals, and that I cannot dis- 
cuss. It does however seem to me that some modified con- 
ception of sovereignty, diffused through various bodies in 
the state and limited in its powers, does correctly describe 
the situation which exists in the modern state. 
I have dwelt on this conception of the limitations 
which are today imposed on sovereign power, because it is 
intimately linked up with M. Duguit's theory as to what is 
the end and aim of law. Since M. Duguit has discarded 
sovereignty, he finds it necessary to put something in its 
place. This something is social service. The fulfilment 
of social services he regards as having become the primary 
function of the government and the primary end and aim of 
law. This is very largely true. Where M. Duguit fails 
is in his description of the position of the individual in 
the new scheme of things. This is coloured by his view 
of/ 
1. See. Law In The Modern State. Introduction Page 
XXIX. 
of law as something purely objective and his denial of 
individual rights. This denial of individual rights is 
not only contrary to the facts, but, regarded from an 
ethical standpoint, quite undesirable. M. Duguit regards 
as the end and aim of law an ideal of social service. But 
the object of this social service is ultimately the happi- 
ness: of individuals, and why trouble about this happiness 
unless the individuals concerned have a right to it? It 
is difficult to argue on questions of first principle, but 
M. Duguit's view of society from which he has banished the 
conception of rights seems soulless and mechanical. With- 
out this idea of rights it seems impossible for man to 
achieve his fullest possible development. N. Duguit does 
wish to secure for the individual a possibility of full 
self development which he offers under the aegis of state 
service. In reality, M. Duguit merely banishes meta- 
physics from the field of jurisprudence to introduce his 
own new metaphysic, that of the "Law of Nature with a 
variable content." Mr. Laski says in his introduction to 
Law In The Modern State that i[. Duguit merely bows out 
rights at the front door, to admit them again at the back, 
and that sums up the situation. I have accordingly brought 
the chapter to a finish at the point where I began, namely 
in a consideration of the Law of Nature with a variable 
content as the outstanding feature of modern jurisprudence. 
- 185 - 
Charter 2. 
Pluralipm and Professor Laski's Idealism. 
An even fuller return to the ethics of the Law of 
Nature is found in the works of Professor Laski. It is 
safe to say that there is today no more stimulating writer 
on the subject of jurisprudence and politics. In great 
measure this is due to the vigour, consistency and clarity 
which are the distinguishing marks of all his writings. 
Not only that, his work is also notable for its warm re- 
gard for the aspirations of mankind, particularly that of 
its less fortunate members, towards a fuller and richer 
life. In so far as the state promotes these ideals it is 
a thing of value; in so far as it retards them it stands 
condemned. For Professor Laski the thing of ultimate 
worth is human personality. It is by that criterion that 
all institutions are in his eyes to be judged. His stand- 
point, although in many ways similar to that of M. Duguit, 
is also strikingly different. It is a clash between 
materialism and idealism. Although M. Duguit is not in 
reality so materialistic as he makes himself out to be, he 
has formulated a system of law from which rights are 
banished and his conception of all human institutions tends, 
as I have said, to become wholly mechanical. Professor 
Laski, on the other hand, is everywhere insistent upon the 
rights which men have, simply as men - the rights which 
they/ 
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they have to happiness, which can only be attained through 
the development of their personalities. His work is 
suffused with the generous glow of this idealism. Freedom 
for mankind is what he preaches, freedom not merely for the 
sake of freedom, but because only when man is truly free, 
can he be truly happy. For him, general notions of right 
and wrong far transcend in importance any supposed para- 
mount rights of the state and its claim to the unquestion- 
ing and uncritical obedience of its subjects. The state 
for him is not in itself an end. It is simply a means to 
the attainment of the supreme end, which is the satisfac- 
tion of human needs. 
The attainment of Professor Laski =s ideals can be 
achieved only through the dethronement of the sovereign 
authority of the state. It is obvious that, if the state 
is invested with complete sovereign power, the rights of 
the individual are sacrificed. The dethronement of 
sovereign authority he regards as something which has 
already been accomplished, and here he is in complete 
harmony with those views of M. Duguit, which I have al- 
ready discussed. A supreme, irresistable, uncontrollable, 
authority in which the Jura summa imperil or rights of 
sovereign power, reside is, as Blackstone says, the legal 
1. 
theory which lies at the root of the English state. That 
still remains true from the point of view of legal theory, 
but it no longer conforms to the facts. A realization of 
this has impelled Professor Laski to formulate what is 
called/ 
1. See Laski. Authority in the Modern State. (Published 
by Yale University Press). Page 24. 
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called the pluralistic theory of the state. What is meant 
by the pluralistic state is best seen by contrasting it 
with the monistic state. In the monistic state, sover- 
eignty is one and indivisible. It resides in a single 
authority which can enforce its sovereign decrees on all 
its subjects. In the pluralistic state, on the other hand, 
sovereignty is diffused among a number of bodies represent- 
ing the state in their various capacities. The state is 
also regarded as one among a number of associations, such 
as universities, churches, trade unions, employers' federa- 
tions and so forth. In the most extreme view, the state 
possesses no transcendent authority over the various other 
groups. These other groups command the loyalty of their 
members, just as the state commands the loyalty of its 
members, and, if a clash of loyalties occurs, it is by no 
means certain that loyalty to the state will prevail. In 
certain circumstances, Professor Laski would say, loyalty 
to the state ought not to prevail. These views are de- 
l. 
fined in an essay entitled The Pluralistic State. In the 
course of that essay, Professor Laski says: "The monistic 
state is an hierarchical structure in which power is for 
ultimate purposes, collected at a single centre. The 
advocates of pluralism are convinced that this is both 
2. 
administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate." 
Again: "Fundamentally, it (pluralism) is a denial that a 
law can be explained merely as a command of the sovereign 
for the simple reason that it denies, ultimately, the 
sovereignty/ 
1. Published in Foundations of Sovereignty. (George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd.) Page. 232. 
2. Laski. Foundations of Sovereignty. Page 246. 
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1. 
sovereignty of anything save right conduct. It puts 
the state's acts on a moral parity with the acts of any 
2. 
other association. It is obvious enough that 
freedom of speech, a living wage, an adequate education, 
a proper amount of leisure, the power to combine for social 
effort are all of them integral to citizenship. They are 
inherent in the eminent worth of human personality. Where 
they are denied the state clearly destroys whatever claims 
3. 
it has upon the loyalty of men." 
What is to be said of all this? In the first 
place, it is apparent that we have progressed to a very 
considerable extent in the direction of pluralism. Sover- 
eignty today can certainly not be regarded as illimitable 
and indivisible. The legal sovereign is obliged, as I 
have already mentioned, to consider popular desire as 
expressed by the electorate, while at the same time the 
functions of government have largely become the rendering 
of services. Nor is sovereignty any longer indivisible. 
De iure, the King in Parliament is still sovereign; but, 
as I have pointed out, in a world of decentralization and 
delegated legislation that is little better than a legal 
fiction. As Dean Pound has remarked, there is a vast 
4. 
difference between "Law in books" and "Law in action ". 
on the other hand, the complete acceptance of the plural- 
istic view would, I think, lead to chaos. This is not 
unrecognized by Professor Laski. Dealing with the point, 
he says: "Opposition to government is the coronation of 
anarchy/ 
1. Page 244. 2. Page 245. 3. Page 246. 
4. See Laski. Authority in the Modern State. (Yale 
University Press). Page 42. 
- 189 - 
anarchy. It is,to say the least,uncertain whether the 
assertion is so formidable as it appears. Disorder may 
1. 
be better than injustice." It is true that disorder may 
in certain circumstances be preferable to injustice, but 
it seems to open the gates to a very dangerous principle. 
Disorder and anarchy in themselves lead no where, and it 
is only in an extreme event that Professor Laski's ideals 
are likely to be furthered by them. The issue has been 
raised in particularly sharp form by the position occupied 
in the modern state by trade unions and employers' federa- 
tions. Here it does seem to me that pluralism is in- 
adequate. The failure by the state to assert its sup- 
remacy can (in my view) only lead to confusion. The state 
is a more important organization than either the Federation 
of British Industries or the Trade Union Congress. In 
that sphere the admission of pluralism appears ethically 
undesirable, not because of any divine right attaching to 
the state as such and not because of any vague patriotic 
ideal, but simply because order is a necessary condition 
of progress and the attainment of Professor Laski's own 
ideals. The aim ought to be to make the state fully 
representative of all its members. The drift away of 
labour from the state, such as was witnessed in the General 
Strike, was an indication that it did not regard its ideals 
as possible of furtherance by the state. Labour regarded 
the state as a capitalist organization, definitely hostile 
to its own aspirations. The aim ought, as I see it, to 
be to dispel that conception, not by the medium of repressive 
legislation/ 
1. Laski. Authority in the Modern State. Page 58. 
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legislation, but by demonstration of the futility of dis- 
ruption. If that cannot be done, the only alternative 
appears to be endless strife and confusion. 
The fundamental point in Professor Laski's phil- 
osophy is his insistence on the value of freedom. It is 
this which leads him to postulate the pluralistic state as 
a means of furthering his ideals. As I have tried to show 
the conception of pluralism, if carried too far, is likely 
to strike a grievous blow at the freedom it is designed to 
further. Freedom, for Professor Laski, possesses two 
aspects, a positive aspect and a negative. The latter is 
embodied in a demand for the removal of restraints; the 
former demands that the individual should be in such an 
economic position that freedom is of value to him. This 
aspect of the question distinguishes Professor Laski s 
attitude from the purely negative attitude of laissez- faire. 
A few quotations will serve to illustrate Professor Laski's 
position. Thus he says: "I mean by liberty the absence 
of restraint upon the existence of these social conditions, 
which, in modern civilization are the necessary guarantees 
1. 
of individual happiness:' ...."Men are free when the rules 
under which they live leave them without a sense of frus- 
3. 
tration in realms which they deem significant." The 
positive aspect of the question must also be noticed. 
"Without economic security, liberty is not worth having. 
Men may well be free and yet unable to realize the purposes 
of freedom.° 
With/ 
1. Laski. Liberty in the Modern State (Faber & Faber). 
Page 11. 
2. Page 11. 
3. Page 11. 
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With these generalizations one may express entire 
agreement. The positive aspect is particularly of the 
highest importance. It is a demand in the name of justice 
that the individual should be in a position to command what 
is of value in life. Unless this economic freedom exists, 
it is idle to talk of liberty. A man is free in no true 
sense when he is obliged to accept a standard of living 
not far removed from the starvation level. In such cases 
the absence of restraints is simply a mockery. Professor 
Laski goes on to consider democracy and equality as nec- 
essary concomitants of freedom. In any system, except a 
democratic one, there are bound to be restraints placed on 
the political activities of-the individual. Thus far he 
is prevented from truly realizing his personality, and thus 
far he ceases to be free. That is certainly true in so 
far as freedom is essentially subjective. There is bound 
to be a sense of frustration "in realms deemed significant ". 
The Englishman of the eighteenth century may have been 
"free" under the prevailing oligarchic system of govern- 
ment; it is equally true that if a return were made today 
to that system the Englishman would cease to be free, in 
that he would be deprived of something of value. Similar 
considerations apply to the question of equality, by which 
what is meant is equality of opportunity. Unless indiv- 
iduals are genuinely equal in this sense, the full oppor- 
tunity of self development is cramped. It is clear that 
in the state today true equality of opportunity does not 
exist. Probably, in the nature of things, it can never 
exist/ 
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exist. It is however the aim of idealists to bring into 
being as near an approximation as possible to the desired 
state of affairs, in which all individuals will achieve 
true freedom. 
Professor Laski's passionate demand for freedom 
finds expression in his rejection of the Hegelian theory 
of freedom, which regards man as finding his freedom in 
obedience to the law. Of this theory Professor Laski 
says: "To me this view contradicts all the major facts 
of experience. It seems to me to imply not only a par- 
alysis of the will, but a denial of that uniqueness of 
individuality, that sense that each of us is ultimately 
different from his fellows, that is the ultimate fact of 
1. 
human experience:' "The ultimate isolation of the 
individual personality is the basis from which any adequate 
2. 
theory of politics must start.* The ultimate isolation 
of each individual is rather finely summed up: "I am not 
a part of some great symphony in which I realize myself 
only as an incident in the motif of the whole. I am 
3. 
unique. I am separate. I am myself." 
Without in any way wishing to be unduly authoritar- 
ian or unsympathetic to the fine ideals which Professor 
Laski puts forward, it may be suggested that he does appear 
to diminish unduly the element of authority which the state 
must retain. He himself says (I have already quoted the 
passage/ 
1. Pages 24 -25. 
H. Page 28. 
3. Page 73. 
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1. 
passage) that disorder may be preferable to injustice. 
That is perfectly true, but it is also true that it is 
the retention of sufficient authority by the state which 
is the ultimate safeguard of freedom. As I have already 
pointed out, the element of security must be present in 
2. 
every theory of law. The danger is that the assertion 
of the supreme rights of the individual pave the way to 
anarchy. We may grant that individual right is the ultim- 
ate end, but that can only be secured under the aegis of 
strong government - of government fully alive of course to 
its responsibilities, but, none the less, of goverment. 
A real danger may arise from the loosening of authority. 
Thus, Professor Laski objects (for example) to the trial 
and imprisonment of communists for circulating seditious 
3. 
literature among the armed forces of the Crown. He does 
so on the ground that everyone ought to be free to propa- 
gate his beliefs, no matter how objectionable these beliefs 
may be. Generally speaking, that is perfectly true, but 
there is a real danger of security suffering unless 
reliance can be placed on the fidelity of the army, and, 
as I have said, security is the sine qua non of all govern- 
ment and all law. Professor Laski also appears to object 
to additional restraints being placed on individuals in 
times of crisis, such as during the late War. Here also 
there appears to be an insufficient realization that the 
sacrifice of security must result in the sacrifice of all 
that is worth preserving and of the hope of eventual 
advancement / 
1. See Page 189 supra. 
2. See Page 27 supra. 
3. See Laski. Liberly in the Modern State. Page 202. 
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advancement towards a better social order. With many of 
Professor Laski's examples of where the individual ought to 
have freedom where he is at present denied it, it is poss- 
ible to express entire agreement. It is impossible to 
discuss these examples here, but reference :m may be made 
to his courageous plea for more complete intellectual 
freedom. Thus discussing the question of literary 
censorship he says: "questions like these of birth 
control, extra -marital love, companionate marriage, 
cannot really be faced in a scientific fashion by applying 
to them the standards of a nomadic Eastern people which 
1. 
drew up its rules more than two thousand years ago." An 
affinity between Professor Laski and John Stuart Mill may 
be noted. Each protests against a stupid conventionalism 
which endeavours to enchain that liberty of thought and 
discussion which ought to prevail in any civilized country. 
In one respect Professor Laski seems to stand apart 
from the current of present social legislation. That 
current embodies in many ways the theory of the Law of 
Nature with a variable content. The tendency of modern 
legislation is, however, to emancipate the individual by 
strengthening the controlling powers of government, and, 
in particular, by enlarging, at an ever increasing rate, 
the numbers and authority of the bureaucracy. Professor 
Laski has a very wholesome dislike of bureaucracy, as he 
sees in it a threat to individual liberty. Particularly 
he protests against investing the executive with judicial 
2. 
or quasi judicial powers. At the same time Professor Laski 
is/ 
1. Page 88. 
2. See Page 43 et. seq. 
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is sympathetic to economic emancipation as the only means 
by which freedom and happiness can be secured for the 
masses'. One gets the impression that he would like to 
accept what is good in socialism without paying the price 
of it. 
The thing of supreme value in Professor Laski's 
writings is the insistence upon the supreme value of free- 
dom as the only means by which the individual can realize 
himself and make the fullest possible use of life. This 
is not a narrow or selfish view. . It does not imply of 
necessity that the individual is to use his talents sel- 
fishly. True self realization ought to include the ideal 
of service to one's fellow men. An advance towards 
Professor Laski's ideals does seem to offer the brightest 
hope for the future. As he reminds us, it was for the 
cause of freedom that so much heroic sacrifice was made 
during the liar, and, as he says, this generation, at 
least, can never forget the ghostly legions by which it 
1. 
is encompassed. 
1. Laski. Authority in the Modern State. Page 122. 
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Chapter 3. 
Modern Legislative Tendencies. 
I have been considering the general line of legal 
theory in the twentieth century; how it is based ultim- 
ately upon a conception of happiness as being the end and 
aim of law and of how the Law of Nature has been resuscit- 
ated in the guise of the Law of Nature with a variable 
content. It remains that I should consider as briefly 
as possible how far these theories have been transformed 
into facts. I have to consider what in fact is the drift 
of current legislation. That is a large subject, and, in 
the limited time at my disposal, it will only be possible 
to indicate in very brief outline some of the leading 
features which have transformed the field of law and 
politics during the twentieth century. 
I have already shown how towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, there was a great break away from the 
traditional policy of laissez -faire in the actual course 
of legislation. The long quotation which I gave from 
1. 
John Morley showed how far the process had actually been 
carried by the year 1880. Since than the pace has been 
definitely accelerated. Today, for better or for worse, 
we find ourselves embedded in the meshes of socialism. 
That is the greatest legislative feature of this century. 
The second outstanding feature is the establishment of an 
extreme/ 
1. See supra Pages 1 72. -173. 
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extreme form of democracy. As in the ease of socialism, 
so in the case of democracy, the general idea has been that 
the welfare of the masses of the people will thereby be 
promoted. These changes have entirely altered the social 
and political life of the country. They have also been 
accompanied by constitutional repercussions, of which the 
most outstanding are a decline in the prestige and the de 
facto sovereignty of Parliament, the increase in the power 
of the executive and in the numbers and authority of the 
bureaucracy, and the decline of the Rule of Law. These 
are the various tendencies which I propose to examine in 
the present chapter. 
First of all there is the drift towards socialism. 
It is true that we have not yet reached, and we are still 
very far distant from, the communist ideal of abolishing 
private property and of nationalizing all the means of 
production, distribution and exchange. That need not 
however blind us to what has been accomplished. In the 
first place, an effort has been made to secure a more 
equitable division of national wealth. The means employ- 
ed to this end have been the introduction of what may 
collectively be called the social services ". The prin- 
ciple was introduced by The Old Age Pensions Act of 1908. 
Under that act pensions became payable to persons over the 
age of seventy, subject to qualifications as to nationality, 
residence and means. The principle of that act has been 
extended by various subsequent acts, and the means dis- 
qualification has been abolished. The principle of 
national/ 
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national insurance was inaugurated by The National Insur- 
anee Act of 1911. The aims of that act are described by 
Professor 1icey, who says: "The act aims at the attain- 
ment of two objects: The first is that, speaking broadly, 
any person, whether a man or a woman, whether a British 
subject or an alien, who is employed in the United Kingdom 
under any contract of service, shall, from the age of 16 
to 70, be insured against ill health, or, in other words, 
be insured the meansfbr curing illness, e.g. by medical 
attendance. The second object is that any such person 
who is employed in certain employments specified in the act 
shall be insured against unemployment, or, in other words, 
1. 
be secured support during periods of unemployment." 
Professor Dicey is a somewhat gloomy critic of the new 
principle thereby introduced into British legislation. 
He goes on to say: "Thus under the National Insurance 
Act the State incurs new, an, it may be, very burdensome 
duties, and confers upon wage- earners new and very exten- 
sive rights. The State in effect becomes responsible 
for making sure that every wage- earner within the United 
Kingdom shall, with certain exceptions, be insured against 
sickness, and, in some special cases, against unemployment. 
Now before 1908 the question whether a man, rich an poor, 
should insure his health, was a matter left entirely to 
the free discretion, or indiscretion, of each individual. 
His conduct no more concerned the State than the question 
2. 
whether he should wear a black coat or a brown coat." 
This/ 
1. Dicey. Law and Qpinion in Hng1and. Introduction. 
Page XXXVI. 
2. Page XXXVII. 
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This principle of insurance has been carried to ever 
increasing lengths. The basis of the system has hitherto 
been contributory, that is,the individual pays premiums 
for the benefits he receives. It can hardly be denied 
however that, so far as unemployment insurance is concern- 
ed, the contributory system has been undermined, and, 
partly at any rate, the "dole" actually is a dole. 
The extension of state responsibility along these 
lines has involved burdens, probably far outwith the con- 
templation of the original authors of the system. It 
has involved an ever increasing rate of taxation, and not 
merely has the heavy taxation of income had to be resorted tq 
but a virtual capital levy exists in the form of a high 
rate of death duties. With the economic repercussions 
of this it is impossible to deal here, but it may be men- 
tioned that the system has resulted in a lessening of hard- 
ship and an alleviation of poverty. The general standards 
of health and living among the masses of the people have 
improved. On the other hand, national liabilities have 
as steadily increased. The profits of industry have 
diminished and this country bas lost its former position 
of preeminence among the industrial countries of the world. 
That is largely due no doubt to industrial development in 
foreign countries whose standards of living are inferior 
to our own. This decline does fall to be noted as a fact. 
Of socialism along other lines it is impossible to speak. 
Reference may however be made to the increase of govern- 
mental control over industrial undertakings. The degree 
of/ 
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of control varies in different industries, but, generally 
speaking, there is an increased vigilance on the part of 
the state directed towards safeguarding conditions of 
employment and towards securing for industrial workers 
as good conditions of employment as possible. 
What is of great interest is the complete social 
change which has taken place during the thirty years of 
the present century which have already elapsed. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the change has been revolutionary. 
It is summed up in certain words uttered by M. Paul Cambon, 
then French ambassador, in 1920. He said: "In the twenty 
years I have been here, I have witnessed an English 
Revolution more profound and searching than the French 
Revolution itself. The governing class have been almost 
entirely deprived of political power and to a very large 
extent of their property and estates; and this has been 
accomplished almost imperceptibly and without the loss of 
a single life." It is impossible to deny the truth of 
these conclusions. It is also important to notice that 
progress has been made towards socialism under liberal, 
coalition, conservative and labour governments. The last 
great step in the extension of the social services was the 
introduction of widows' pensions by the last conservative 
government. It is this which invests the progress towards 
socialism with an air of inevitability. The nation may 
be taking the course of the Gadarene swine, but, if it is, 
it would appear that there is nothing to stop it. The 
names of the different political parties today do not 
correctly/ 
1. Quoted by the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, M.P. in Mx 
Early Life. Page 1105. 
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correctly describe the ideas for which they stand. All 
parties in the state are largely socialistic and the 
differences between them are differences of degree. It 
is impossible to estimate how long this will continue to 
be so. It does look as though the conservative party 
would fain be more conservative and the socialist party 
more socialistic, but the future lies in the lap of the gods 
and prophecy is of little value. 
The other great feature of twentieth century legis- 
lation which I referred to was the introduction of an 
extreme form of democracy. This was achieved at one blow, 
so to speak, by the Reform Act of 1918, which introduced 
the principle of universal manhood suffrage. It is not- 
able that this act was carried with scarcely a breath of 
opposition. There was rather more of a flutter when the 
coping stone was placed on the democratic edifice by the 
Conservative act of 1928, which extended the suffrage to 
women on precisely the same terms as to men. It some- 
times escapes attention that democracy in its most extreme 
form has only existed in this country for a little more 
than a decade. Its introduction has however coincided 
with a general swing to the left in our national politics. 
In this respect also the future is an enigma. As the 
principal author of the 1928 act has frequently remarked 
in his speeches, democracy is still upon its trial. That 
is true. It is also true that once having accepted the 
principle, we are not likely to depart from it, unless 
there/ 
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there occurs (which seems unlikely) a communistic revolu- 
tion, in which power would be transferred to a dictator- 
ship representing proletarian interests. 
The march towards socialism has been accompanied 
by inevitable changes in the working of the Constitution 
and in the machinery of government. When Professor Dicey 
wrote his Law of the Constitution, he described as the two 
main pivots of the Constitution, the sovereignty of Par- 
liament and the Rule of Law. To a lesser and lesser 
degree that is becoming actually descriptive of the facts. 
Today the real centre of authority has shifted from Par- 
liament to the Cabinet. The latter body is, of course, 
dependent upon votes in the House of Commons, but, under 
the party system, the members of the party who are in 
office are expected to obey explicitly the dictatorship 
of the government. Governments do, in fact, wield dic- 
tatorial powers in the House of Commons, and the members 
of that House tend to become more and more voting robots. 
They seldom get the opportunity of expressing an independ- 
ent opinion; what are called "free votes ", that is with 
the party whips off, are very rare. The most interesting 
recent examples of "free votes" have been on the Prayer 
Book discussion and on the Bill at present before Parlia- 
ment to legalize the opening of Sunday cinemas. It is 
quite certain that members of the party in office have 
frequently to "swallow" measures, which, if their real 
opinion could be obtained, it would be shown that they 
heartily dislike. It is the Cabinet which in reality 
determines what legislation is to be passed, and the fate 
of/ 
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of the private memberts bill, which does not possess 
governmental backing, is almost certain® Mr. Ramsay Muir 
points out in his book, How Britain 4 Governed that during 
the passage of the Local Government Act in 1929, the gov- 
ernment was prepared to accept amendments on the Bill on 
the representations of local authorities, which they would 
not have been prepared to accept if these amendments had 
been proposed in the House of Commons. The real arena of 
debate was shifted, as Mr. Ramsay Muir shows,,from the 
House of Commons to the correspondence and interviews which 
took place between the government departments and the local 
authorities concerned. In such circumstances, to talk 
about the sovereignty of the King in Parliament may have 
truth so far as legal theory is concerned, but its fic- 
titious character is at once obvious. It is true that 
even in the days when Gilbert was writing the Savoy operas, 
members of Parliament were expected to "leave their brains 
outside and vote just as their leaders tell 'em to ". But 
that was humorous exaggeration of what is today approaching 
reality. Today, Parliament tends to become more and more 
the creature of the executive. The essential truth of 
all this is not altered when a minority government, such 
as the present one, is in office. It is true that such a 
government cannot just do as it wishes. It has to pay 
attention to the wishes of the House of Commons, but even, 
under such circumstances, it has a powerful sanction for 
the enforcement of its desires in the threat of a dis- 
solution. 
The/ 
The increase in the power of the government is an 
inevitable consequent of the creased range of governmental 
activity. The desire of governments to assume autocratic 
authority has been evidenced in a considerable amount of 
the legislation passed during this century. Governments 
have sought to free themselves from the trammels of Par- 
liamentary control by investing their Ministers with 
statutory authority to legislate in entire independence 
of Parliament. The extent to which this has been carried 
is shown with great wealth of examples in Lord Hewart's 
1. 
book entitled The New Despotism. This book is a strong 
condemnation of the system under which Ministers seek 
authority from Parliament to enact rules and regulations 
having legislative effect. Not only that, Ministers have, 
on various occasions, had power conferred on them to vary 
or annul Acts of Parliament as they think fit. Thus, in 
the Rating and Valuation Act, 1925, the Minister concerned 
is given power "to do anything" which he may deem exped- 
ient for the purpose named and he "nay modify the pro - 
2. 
visions" of the Act itself. The true analogy to all this 
is the famous Act which conferred legislative authority on 
the proclamations of King Henry VIII. It is customary to 
think that when Parliament agreed to that, it prostituted 
its own particular functions, but it has no less prostit- 
uted its functions in our own day. So also the dispensing 
power of the Crown was in the time of King Charles II and 
Sing James IÌ regarded as a real menace to Parliamentary 
sovereignty/ 
1. The New Despotism (published by Ernest Benn Limited). 
2.. See Lord Hewart. The New Despotism. Page 10. 
sovereignty. Yet here again, Parliament has not infre- 
quently during this century granted dispensing pavers to 
the Ministers of the Crown. Lord Hewart, dealing with 
the analogy to which I have referred says: *In those days 
the method was to defy Parliament - and it failed. In 
these days the method is to cajole, to coerce and to use 
Parliament - and it is strangely successful. The old 
despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a 
challenge. The new despotism, which is not yet defeated, 
gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The strategy is differ- 
ent, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate 
Parliament, to evade the Courts, and to render the will, 
1. 
or the caprice, of the Executive unfettered and supreme." 
It is possible to agree with these strictures up 
to a point, but it is none the less necessary to preserve 
a balanced judgment. In large measure, the process of 
delegating legislation into the hands of the executive is 
inevitable and necessary. So also, it is, in certain 
respects, quite a good thing. In view of the manifold 
activities of government, it is impossible for Parliament 
to legislate in complete detail for all these numerous 
activities. Parliament has neither the time to do this, 
nor has it the requisite expert knowledge. The critic of 
delegating legislation into the hands of government depart- 
ments must, if he is logical, also criticise the great mass 
of legislation necessary for the functioning of government 
and he must also criticise the ideal of happiness as the 
end/ 
1. Lord Hewart. ie Neer Des op tism. Page 1 ?. 
end and aim of law, as expressed by the rendering of 
services by the government. If one is prepared to accept 
the ideal of service as being the principle function of 
government in a modern civilized community, one cannot 
quarrel with the principle of delegating legislation into 
the hands of government departments. The system, as I 
view it, is not a bad one if Parliament contents itself 
with drafting measures in broad outline and leaves the 
task of filling in the details to the departments con- 
cerned. Danger does, however, creep in, when the powers 
given to the department are altogether too great. It 
does seem to admit a dangerous principle when Ministers 
are given power to abrogate Acts of Parliament, and it 
can hardly be denied that there ought to be a much greater 
scrutiny than there is at present, passed on measures 
which do delegate legislative power. The growth of 
despotism should be sternly curbed. 
The principle of assimilating legislative and 
executive powers, is, as I have said, up to a point quite 
unobjectionable. Altogether different considerations 
come in to play when an attempt is made to assimilate 
judicial and executive powers. The latter principle is, 
I would submit, wholly pernicious. It is altogether 
desirable that the judicature should be independent of 
the executive. The evils that result from a fusion of 
executive and judicial functions is very well illustrated 
in this country by the history of the Court of Star 
Chambers One might well imagine that no one would desire 
at/ 
at this time of day to reintroduce the principle of the 
Star Chamber into the British polity. Yet, if one did 
so imagine, one would not be reckoning with certain aspects 
of "the new despotism ". Certain Acts of Parliament have 
in recent years deliberately excluded the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary law courts and have invested Ministers with 
power to act in a judicial capacity. Such acts mark an 
entire reversal of the traditional principle of the Rule 
of Law and cannot be too strongly condemned. The concep- 
tion of the Rule of Law implies that no man can be punished, 
or can be lawfully made to suffer either in his body or in 
his goods, except for a distinct breach of law established 
in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts. 
It also means that in this country not only is no man 
above the law, but every man, whatever his condition or 
rank may be, is subject to the ordinary law of the land 
1. 
and the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. It is 
obvious that when Ministers are invested with judicial 
powers, these principles are sacrificed. The subject 
is made liable for what the Minister deems to be breaches 
of the law, and his liability is not established in the 
ordinary legal manner, or before the ordinary courts. It 
is likewise obvious that the Minister is so far placed 
above the law when the decisions which he makes cannot be 
challenged in a Court of Law. 
It is impossible here to quote many examples of 
instances in which the executive has been invested with 
judicial/ 
1. See Lord Rewart. The New Despotism. Page 24. 
judicial powers, but reference may be made to one or two 
typical cases. Thus under the Housing and Town Planning 
Act 1909, by section 17, provision is made for appeals to 
the Local Government Board against decisions of the local 
authority ordering houses to be closed. There is also a 
provision that the Board shall, if directed by the High 
Court, state a case for the opinion of the Court on any 
1. 
question of law arising. How far that latter safeguard 
is effective was well illustrated by the case of Local 
2. 
Government Board v. Arlidge. In that case the Board 
dismissed an appeal by Arlidge against a refusal by a 
local authority to determine a closing order. Arlidge 
applied to the Court to quash the order on the grounds 
that it did not disclose which officer of the Board had 
decided the appeal, that the applicant had been refused 
an oral hearing, and that he was not permitted to see the 
report of the Inspector who held the necessary public in- 
quiry before the appeal was dismissed. The House of Lords 
eventually decided that the Board was quite justified in 
3. 
acting as it had done. That is one example of the evils 
which flow from investing the executive with judicial 
powers, but such examples can easily be multiplied. Thus 
in various of the Insurance Acts provision is made for 
aggrieved persons appealing to the Minister whose decision 
4. 
is final. Reference may be made to one other example - 
the case of panel doctors. They are liable to severe 
penalties/ 
1. See Lord Hewart. The New }espotisrn. Page 241. 
2. 1915. A.C. 120. 
3. See Page 166. 
4. See Dicey. Law and Opinion in England. Introduction 
Pages xli -xiii. 
-209 - 
penalties, such as being struck off the list of panel 
doctors by the Minister concerned for such offences as 
"over prescribing" - a penalty which may possibly ruin 
1. 
their whole professional career. In defence of such a 
system there is little to be said. It ministers to the 
departmental love of power and it sacrifices ruthlessly 
the rights of the individual. No doubt the officials 
concerned do attempt to administer substantial justice 
in arriving at their decisions, but the evil results from 
this that there is no effective guarantee that they will 
so act. 
The issues involved in the fusion of executive and 
judicial powers are admirably summed up by Lord Hewart, 
and I cannot do better than quote his opinion. Lord 
Hewart says: "When it is provided that the matter is to 
be decided by the Minister, the provision really means that 
it is to be decided by some official, of more or less stand- 
ing in the department, who has no responsibility except to 
his official superiors. The Minister himself, in too many 
cases, it is to be feared, does not hear of the matter or 
the decision, unless he finds it necessary to make inquiries 
in consequence of some question in Parliament. The 
official who comes to the decision is anonymous, and so far 
as interested parties and the public are concerned, is 
unascertainable. He is not bound by any particular course 
of procedure, unless a course of procedure is prescribed 
by the department, nor is he bound by any rules of evidence, 
and indeed he is not obliged to receive any evidence at all 
before/ 
1. See Allen. Law in The Making. Page 329. 
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before coming to a conclusion. If he does admit evidence, 
he may wholly disregard it without diminishing the valid- 
ity of his decision. There is not, except in comparatively 
few cases, any oral hearing, so that there is no oppor- 
tunity to test by cross- examination such evidence as may 
be received, nor for the parties to controvert or comment 
on the case put forward by their opponents. It is, 
apparently, quite unusual for interested parties even to 
be permitted to have an interview with anyone in the 
department. then there is any oral hearing, the public 
and the press are invariably excluded. Finally, it is not 
1. 
usual for the official to give any reason for his decision." 
It is interesting to contrast this system with the 
French system of droit administratif. In France the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is excluded in all 
cases where the executive is one of the parties. Such 
cases are determined by a special court, the Conseil d'Etat, 
the Judges of which are partly nominated by the government 
and partly by the Cour de Cassation,, the highest civil 
court. The idea of droit administratif is highly repug- 
nant to our traditional conception of the Rule of Law. 
Yet it is certainly a much better system than the one of 
leaving decisions in the hands of departments, which are 
themselves concerned as one of the parties in the case. 
A remedy for the present evil might well be found in the 
approximation in this country to some sort of droit 
administratif. It might be desirable to have some form 
of administrative tribunal, such as the French Conseil 
d'Etat, which would, at least, hear parties, issue reasoned 
judgments/ 
1. LordHewart. The New Despotism. Pages 43-44. 
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judgments, and gradually perhaps come to be bound by its 
own precedents. An interesting example of the kind of 
body I am envisaging is supplied by the Transport Com- 
missioners, set up under the Road Transport Act of last 
year. The Commissioners exercise quasi, judicial functions, 
but they are of course an ad hoc body. An administrative 
court to consider all administrative matters might be 
desirable in the interests of justice. It is interesting 
to note that Mr. Allen has proposed such a development in 
1. 
our legal system. 
Perhaps enough has been said on the leading features 
of modern legislation. I shall not attempt to summarize 
them here, as that is a task which can more fittingly be 
left to my next and final chapter. 
1. See Allen. X,aw in the Making. Page 348. 
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Chapter 4. 
Freedom and Happiness. 
I have examined freedom as the end and aim of law; 
I have likewise examined happiness as the ideal end and 
aim. The problem for the future, as I see it, is to 
arrive at a satisfactory reconciliation of these two 
ideals. A theory, which thinks solely in terms of 
freedom, which ignores the problem of human wants, and 
which is essentially negative in outlook, is, I think, 
insufficient. Likewise a theory which thinks preeminent- 
ly in terms of human needs, which imposes countless 
barriers on individual liberty, and which ignores the 
supreme value of personality and self realization also, 
in my opinion, stands condemned. 
The theory of unfettered individualism is inadequate 
because it results in the oppression of the weak by the 
strong. It gives full play to the forces of wealth to 
play havoc with the lives of the great majority of people. 
It is a theory no doubt well suited to the animal kingdom, 
where, of course,it flourishes unchecked. If man, if 
human life, is a thing of worth at all, it ought to be 
rigorously rejected. In essence, the theory of freedom 
only extends freedom to those who are wealthy and powerful. 
It permits them to do what they please, provided they do 
not do what is regarded as positive harm to other people. 
The factory owner who wishes to employ persons in his 
factory/ 
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factory for, say, ten hours a day may thin*, and think 
quite sincerely, that he is doing good. He looks to 
what he conceives to be the industrial prosperity of his 
own business and ultimately of the country. His vision 
is blinded to the incalculable harm which flows from 
sweated labour, because it is so easy to be blind when 
the result of opening one's eyes is to see how thoroughly 
bad one's actions are. On the other hand, looking at 
the matter from the point of view of the factory worker, 
there is no freedom of choice when the alternative is 
either sweated labour or starvation. He is obliged to 
choose the former, but he is not free when he does so. 
Today laissez faire in these matters is dead or dying. 
It has been killed by trade union activity on the one 
hand and legislation on the other. It is not necessary 
to drop a tear on its bier. The theory of law and 
politics which regarded the functions of the government 
as confined to defence of the state, the punishment of 
crime and the enforcement of the law may have suited per- 
fectly well the needs of a former age. It certainly does 
not suit the needs of a modern industrial community. It 
leads, without doubt, to low standards of living and the 
degradation of the masses of the people. It is not likely 
to be resuscitated in a community such as ours, and that 
conclusion cannot be regretted by the impartial thinker. 
But if the freedom theory is inadequate, what is 
to be said of the happiness theory? In effect, the ques- 
tion means - that verdict are we to pass on socialism? 
This/ 
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This is so, because the satisfaction of human wants, as 
an end and aim of law, can only be achieved through the 
medium of state intervention. It seems to me that the 
happiness theory will also be inadequate, unless it is 
strongly tempered with insistence upon the value of in- 
dividual rights and individual worth. We must definitely 
adopt, I think, some theory of the Law of Nature with a 
variable content, and we cannot afford to exclude the 
worth of human personality from our synthesis. That is 
why I am prepared to reject the mechanical theories of 
Duguit, which involve the banishment of any metaphysical 
concept of law. It does seem right that the door ought 
not to be closed to human initiative and effort. That is 
why ideas of levelling mankind to a common denominator 
appear to me unfortunate. Levelling of that sort would, 
in my view, mean the elimination of progress, and the sac- 
rifice of everything which makes life best worth living. 
Some element of state intervention and control in 
industrial matters I regard as absolutely necessary. So 
also the state ought to concern itself with producing a 
more equitable division of wealth. It ought to do so 
because so long as masses of the population are leading 
lives devoid of ordinary comforts, we cannot hope for any 
advancement. At the same time, it is necessary that 
socialism should proceed gradually, and that for a variety 
of reasons. There is first the question of economics. 
However fine ideals we may have, these will be worthless, 
if, in pursuing them, we wreck what economic prosperity we 
have/ 
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have. We should then be engaged in the pursuit of will 
01 the wisps. It is essential for us to retain our com- 
petitive capacity as a nation in a competitive world. It 
can hardly be denied that high taxation (which is an almost 
inevitable concomitant of socialism) tends to reduce that 
competitive capacity. That in itself is a reason why we 
must proceed warily. Similar considerations apply to the 
nationalization of industrial concerns. If governmental 
interference tends to reduce efficiency, we must again 
proceed cautiously. I am not advocating that ruthless 
efficiency is of greater importance than the human values, 
but, unless a certain standard of efficiency is maintained, 
competitive capacity is bound to suffer and with it the 
sacrifice of all our ideals. To nationalization, as a 
principle, I am not opposed, but I do not propose to gen- 
eralize on its merits or demerits, because each particular 
case should, I think, be settled on its own merits. 
In coming to the larger question of communism, the 
reason why I oppose it (apart from the economic difficul- 
ties involved in any violent transition) is because I find 
in it a system which is hostile to the ultimate worth of 
human personality. The most perfect communistic organiza- 
tion is perhaps a heap of ants or a hive of bees. They 
all work for the common good,and individual worth (if I 
may speak of the individual worth of a bee or an ant) is 
entirely sacrificed. But do men really wish to be like 
bees and ants? Is it desirable that they should? On 
the other hand, I am no less opposed to the philosophy 
which/ 
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which tells us that we should go forth with sharp swords 
to seize the "glittering prizes" which the world continues 
to offer to those with stout hearts, who are prepared to 
shove aside their neighbours in a soulless scramble for 
wealth and power. That seems to me an immoral and an 
anarchic philosophy. It should rather be our concern to 
extend the numbers of those who may share in the good things 
of life, and to extend the sphere of opportunity for worthy 
as opposed to selfish ambition. 
There are other aspects of socialism, against which 
I deem it necessary to be on the watch. A swollen bureau- 
cracy is definitely a bad thing. Too many officials tend 
to make the ship of state top heavy. I feel also that a 
considerable amount of modern legislation which imposes 
restrictions of one form or another on individual freedom 
is unnecessary. Restraint can only be justified when it 
leads to a larger element of true freedom, and one often 
feels that this object is not really served by the mass of 
pettifogging restrictions, which modern bureaucrats appear 
to love imposing. A legislative holiday might not be 
altogether a bad thing. To sum up what I have been saying 
in a few swift sentences, I regard the state as responsible 
for the welfare of its citizens. I welcome the socialism 
which furthers that welfare, because I do not regard social- 
ism as necessarily opposed to individualism or to that self 
development, which I conceive as being the thing of supreme 
value. I believe that socialism is a necessary element in 
the summum bonum of the political affairs of mankind. But 
I/ 
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I axe opposed to socialism where it hampers what I believe 
to be true freedom. I am opposed to it, in so far as it 
strives to eliminate individual rights, and, for that 
reason, I am opposed to it in the form of communism. And, 
because I see the economic difficulties in the way, and 
because I believe violent transition will work infinitely 
more harm than good, I believe in amelioration and grad- 
ualism. 
I am aware that these conclusions are entirely 
general and, as lawyers say, lacking in specification. 
If I am accused of not giving sufficient particulars of 
what i mean, I fear I must plead guilty to the charge. I 
can plead in extenuation that both the space and time at 
my disposal are limited, and, I fear I have already extend- 
ed the bounds of all moderation. In conclusion, may I say 
that in the sphere of human affairs there is much that) e 
law cannot do. Such qualities as goodwill and unselfish- 
ness can do vastly more good in society than can any 
system of law whatever its professed end and aim may be. 
Ultimately, I believe that it is by a truer adoption of 
the ethics of Christianity that the New Jerusalem may be 
built. The ideal end would, doubtless, be a state in 
which law was unnecessary. That, of course, is definitely 
outside the range of human politics. Recognizing, as we 
must, the imperfections of human nature, we should do well 
to remember the importance of a charitable spirit, as a 
means of increasing happiness in a world in which so many 
people find it sadly lacking. 
